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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the implications of bank taxation for financial 
intermediation, bank liquidity creation, and the real economy. Our empirical 
analysis is underpinned by an identification strategy which relies on an exogenous 
variation in the taxation of banks. We exploit a unique quasi-natural experiment 
which occurred in the early 2000s when a group of Japanese commercial banks 
unexpectedly became liable to pay a gross-profit tax based on their respective 
presence in Tokyo prefecture.  
In Chapter 3, we investigate the impact of the Tokyo bank tax on loan 
supply, pricing of loans and deposits, and the monitoring efforts of banks. Using a 
difference-in-differences approach, we find that affected banks increase net 
interest and fee margins. Depositors are most affected by adjustments to interest 
and fee rates. The imposition of the tax also reduces the credit supply of affected 
banks. Moreover, affected banks appear to reduce the effort devoted to the 
monitoring of borrowers.  
In Chapter 4, we investigate the impact of the Tokyo bank tax on bank 
liquidity creation. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that affected 
banks reduce liquidity creation. This is driven primarily by the negative impact of 
the tax on the asset side of the balance sheet of affected banks. Specifically, the 
imposition of the tax leads affected banks to hold significantly less illiquid assets.   
In Chapter 5, we investigate whether the Tokyo bank tax matters for the 
investments of corporates that borrow from banks affected by the tax. Using a 
sample of banks matched with corporates, we find that banks with a greater 
exposure to the tax reduce lending more. Following the reduction in credit supply, 
corporate borrowers reduce levels of investment. Other funding sources available 
to corporates do not alleviate fully the impact of the tax on the overall level of 
corporate funding and subsequent investment.  
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Chapter 1 | General Introduction 
The 2007-2009 global financial crisis and resultant financial instability 
necessitated large-scale taxpayer funded state interventions. The subsequent 
economic crisis as well as stimulus packages bore further on public finances 
leading to large budget deficits and the accumulation of public debt. Reforms to 
bank regulation and supervision have aimed to curb excessive risk-taking of 
financial intermediaries. At the centre of these reforms stands the request of the G-
20 leaders that the financial sector should ‘make a fair and substantial contribution’ 
(IMF 2010, p.6). Changes to bank regulation include: the phasing in of new capital 
and liquidity standards under Basel III; the separation of commercial and 
investment banking activity; and the launch of macro-prudential regulation to 
complement existing micro-prudential regulations.  
 Against this backdrop, many countries have introduced new taxes targeted 
specifically at financial intermediaries. Rather than adopt a coordinated approach 
to the introduction and design of bank taxes, thus avoiding opportunities for cross-
border tax arbitrage (IMF 2010), most governments have taken a unilateral 
approach to bank taxation. This has resulted in the emergence of bank taxes 
ranging from taxes levied on specific forms of debt to special surcharges on the 
profits. Box 1 outlines the various bank taxation regimes. Common to all forms of 
bank taxes is their role in complementing regulatory initiatives that aim to boost 
the capacity of individual banks to absorb losses. By contributing to public 
finances, bank taxes allow governments to manage losses that fall on taxpayers 
and provide scope for crisis intervention.  
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Despite the introduction of bank taxes across the world, there is still a 
relatively limited understanding of how these affected banks and the customers 
they serve respond to taxation. Available evidence thus far suggests that the effect 
of taxation on bank behaviour is likely to depend on the type and size of the tax 
imposed, the prevailing market conditions under which banks operate and the 
interaction with existing bank regulation and supervision (Devereux 2014; 
Chronopoulos et al. 2017). In this thesis, we investigate the impact of bank taxation 
on financial intermediation (Chapter 3), bank liquidity creation (Chapter 4), and 
the real economy (Chapter 5). In order to do this, we ask four overarching 
questions: Are banks sensitive to taxation? Does taxation affect key functions 
(financial intermediation, liquidity provision, monitoring) performed by banks? 
What are the mechanisms through which taxation alters bank behaviour? Does 
taxing banks have consequences for local economic conditions?  
Our empirical analysis focuses on examining a margin-based tax and is 
underpinned by an identification strategy which relies on an exogenous variation 
in the taxation of banks. We exploit a unique quasi-natural experiment which 
occurred in the early 2000s when Japanese banks unexpectedly became liable to 
pay a local tax in Tokyo. The so-called Tokyo bank tax was targeted at a small 
number of banks leaving others unaffected. This set up provides an opportunity to 
adopt a counterfactual research design to establish a causal link between taxation 
and bank behaviour, and how this impacts on bank customers and the wider 
economy.  
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Box 1 | Bank Taxation Regimes  
Some argue that the taxation of banks should be aligned with non-financial firms 
(Gottlieb et al. 2012). Others favour a differential tax treatment for banks in order 
to reflect the special role of banks within the wider economy (Claessens et al. 
2010). Bank taxes can be broadly divided into: risk-, transaction-, and margin-
based tax schemes. These categories reflect differences in the tax bases upon 
which the tax is levied.  
 
Risk-based Tax Schemes 
Risk-based taxes or so-called bank levies fall typically on bank liabilities. Bank 
levies aim to reduce the risk-taking of individual banks that is likely to contribute 
to systemic risk. In addition, bank levies aim to raise revenue so as to assist 
governments in their efforts to recoup the costs incurred tackling of prior financial 
crises and to provide a source of funding that can be drawn upon in the event of 
future crises. Risk-based tax schemes have proved particularly popular among 
policy makers since the 2008 financial crisis. By 2012, 14 out of 28 European 
Union member states including France, Germany, Sweden and the UK had 
introduced a bank levy. 
 
Transaction-based Tax Schemes 
Transaction-based taxes are imposed on financial transactions. As such these taxes 
are not targeted exclusively at banks, but at any party that is involved in securities 
business. Transaction taxes aim to discourage high-risk, speculative activity which 
is likely to contribute to instability in the financial system. In some countries such 
as Switzerland or Belgium, transaction-based taxes have been in place for more 
than a century. In other countries such as France and Italy, transaction-based taxes 
were only introduced recently.  
 
Margin-based Tax Schemes 
Margin-based taxes or so-called financial activity taxes are levied on either bank 
profits, or employee remuneration, or the value added from financial 
intermediation activities. These types of taxes aim to alleviate imbalances in the 
tax treatment of financial institutions. These imbalances arise either from banks’ 
exemption from value-added-tax (VAT) payments or from the exemption of 
interest payments from the corporate income tax base. To address existing tax 
distortions, Australia and New Zealand have introduced so-called goods and 
services tax (GST), which resembles a VAT tax. Belgium and Italy introduced a 
scheme known as allowance for corporate equity (ACE), which reduces the tax 
advantage of debt by granting equity holders an allowance equal to a risk-free 
return on equity. In 2017, Norway introduced a financial activity tax on bank 
remuneration. 
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The overarching finding of this thesis is that bank taxation impacts on bank 
behaviour with potentially adverse consequences for bank customers and the 
wider economy. We find that bank taxation has implications for the intermediation 
and liquidity creation function performed by banks. Our findings suggest a 
substantial pass-through of tax costs from bank owners to bank customers. In the 
presence of higher taxes, banks supply fewer loans, adjust the pricing of products 
and services for depositors, and reduce the provision of liquidity. 
Moreover, we also uncover an important mechanism through which 
taxation can impact bank behaviour. In response to taxation, banks reduce their 
respective efforts in monitoring borrowers. The reduction in monitoring activity 
materialises in an adjustment of bank loan portfolios towards borrowers that are 
easier to monitor. Given the special role of banks in the economy, we find that 
taxation can also impact real economic outcomes. A reduction in credit supply in 
response to taxation is shown to impact adversely on the investment activity of 
corporate borrowers. Overall, the findings presented in this thesis suggest that 
banks respond to taxation by reducing their activity as financial intermediaries 
and liquidity creators, and that these tax-induced adjustments have consequences 
for the wider economy.  
1.1 Literature Contribution and Policy Implications 
This thesis contributes to distinct literatures on bank taxation, financial 
intermediation, liquidity creation, and finance and the real economy. The 
corresponding contributions are briefly outlined in the following paragraphs.  
First, this thesis addresses an important short-coming in the literature on 
bank taxation. Unlike bank levies and financial activity taxes which have been 
Chapter 1 | General Introduction 
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covered widely in the empirical and theoretical literature on bank taxation, there is 
considerably less evidence on margin-based (financial activity) taxes.1 To some 
extent, this reflects the fact that despite their initial popularity in academic and 
policy arenas margin-based taxes have not been imposed as frequently as other 
types of bank taxes (IMF 2010). By analysing the Tokyo bank tax (which 
represents an example of a margin-based tax scheme) important evidence can be 
accumulated as to whether and how this type of tax impacts bank behaviour. By 
extension, our findings have relevance for policy makers tasked with the design of 
new bank taxes and contribute to policy discussions regarding the costs and 
benefits of bank taxation. We further contribute to the literature on bank taxation 
with a simple theoretical model which establishes the link between taxation and 
bank monitoring activity. In contrast to previous models of bank taxation 
(Albertazzi and Gambacorta 2010; Devereux et al. 2013; Kogler 2016) which 
emphasise the interaction of taxation, bank capitalisation and competition, the 
model presented (in Chapter 3) of this thesis considers the special role of banks as 
monitors of borrowers. A key insight from our model is that a tax on bank margins 
increases monitoring costs and reduces the profitability of lending activities. As a 
consequence, banks adjust their loan portfolios toward safer borrowers. These 
findings have relevance for policy makers charged with overseeing the effects of 
taxation on banks and bank-dependent borrowers.  
Second, this thesis makes an important contribution to the well-established 
literature on financial intermediation. 2  While previous research provides 
numerous insights to financial intermediation in the context of institutions, 
                                                        
1 Devereux (2014) and Chronopoulos et al. (2017) provide an overview of the various bank taxation regimes 
and recent developments in taxation 
2 Gorton and Winton (2003) provide an extensive discussion of the theoretical and empirical literature that 
explores the role of banks as financial intermediaries.  
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regulations and laws, there is a paucity of evidence on financial intermediation in 
the context of taxation. In this thesis, we show that taxation is an important 
determinant for the costs of financial intermediation. In response to higher 
taxation, banks increase net interest margins. From a welfare perspective, higher 
bank margins raise an important question of who ultimately bears the burden of 
bank taxation. In general, a widening of the net interest margin is indicative of 
banks passing through the burden of taxes to bank customers. Our analysis shows 
tax-induced adjustments to banks’ pricing and product strategies affect borrowers 
and depositors alike. In addition to providing a better understanding of the factors 
that drive the pass-through of taxes from banks to customers, this thesis also 
produces valuable policy insights. For instance, if bank margins are determined by 
taxation and adversely impact the cost of intermediation services, then policy 
attention could arguably be better focused on alternative forms of bank regulation 
as a tool for improving bank stability.  
Third, this thesis contributes to the strand of literature concerned with 
banks in their role as liquidity creators. In response to the 2008 global financial 
crisis (which vividly demonstrated the consequences of a liquidity freeze in 
interbank markets for the functioning of the banking sector and the economy 
overall), a new strand of literature emerged to better understand how banks create 
liquidity3. This thesis extends this literature by analysing bank liquidity creation in 
the context of taxation. A priori, it is not clear whether taxation impacts positively 
or negatively on bank liquidity creation. The effect is likely to depend on the 
accompanying incentive structure of taxes and the tax sensitivity of banks. In this 
                                                        
3 See Berger et al. (2014) for an overview on bank liquidity creation. Important theoretical and empirical work 
on bank liquidity creation includes Diamond and Rajan (2001); Kashyap et al. (2002); Berger and Bouwman 
(2009); Fu et al. (2015); Andreou et al. (2016); Horvath et al. (2016); Jiang et al. (2016); Berger and Sedunov 
(2017). 
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thesis, we demonstrate that margin-based tax schemes, which incentivise banks to 
monitor less and increase leverage, induce a contraction in liquidity creation. The 
magnitude of the contraction is less pronounced among banks that are less 
sensitive to tax incentives. In response to taxation, better capitalised banks and 
banks with higher monitoring expenses reduce liquidity creation by less. As such, 
the results offer novel insights to the policy debate on the optimal design of bank 
taxation.  
Fourth, this thesis contributes to the literature concerned with the impact 
of finance on the real economy.4 Given that bank loans are the main source of 
external financing for corporates, changes in the banking system are likely to have 
a substantive impact on the real economy. Indeed, there is a growing body of 
research that demonstrates that changes in bank regulation affect real economic 
outcomes.  However, to date there is a paucity of evidence regarding the real 
effects of bank taxation. This thesis fills this void by analysing how tax-induced 
changes in the banking system impact on the investment activity of borrowing 
corporates. Our findings suggest that policy interventions in the form of bank 
taxation have implications for funding conditions facing corporates and their 
resultant strategic investment decisions. Research on finance and the real 
economy is particularly prone to issues related to reverse causality where changes 
in the real economy drive finance rather than changes in finance. We overcome 
endogeneity concerns using a unique dataset with information on corporates’ 
demand for credit. This enables us to control for demand-driven changes to finance 
                                                        
4 Berger and Roman (2018) provide an extensive review of the literature that explores how shocks to bank 
lending activity impact the real economy. The literature focuses on a wide range of shocks including regulatory 
shocks (Aiyar et al. 2014; Jiménez et al. 2017), liquidity shocks (Khwaja and Mian 2008; Duchin et al. 2010; 
Cingano et al. 2013), bank capital injections (Giannetti and Simonov 2013; Berger and Roman 2017), and 
shocks to bank assets (Gan 2007; Bottero et al. 2015).  
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and isolate the impact of bank taxation on real economic outcomes. An important 
contribution of this thesis is that it does not only show an association between 
bank taxation and investment activity of borrowing corporates, but offers direct 
evidence explaining this association.  
1.2 Thesis Outline 
The remainder of this thesis divides into five chapters, comprising one 
background chapter, three empirical chapters, and a concluding chapter. Chapter 2 
provides a general background to the Japanese banking system via a 
comprehensive analysis of evolution of bank size, balance sheet composition and 
performance. The chapter also includes a brief description of the various types of 
banks that populate the domestic banking industry. The chapter concludes with a 
short discussion of Japan’s 1990s banking crisis and the early post-crisis years 
from 1999 to 2005.   
Chapter 3 comprises an empirical investigation of bank taxation and 
financial intermediation. This chapter is the largest of the three empirical chapters 
and provides the foundation for the other empirical studies presented in this 
thesis. The chapter is concerned with two issues. First, we investigate whether 
taxation impacts on the functioning of banks as financial intermediaries. In this 
chapter we uncover the likely mechanism behind any adjustments to bank 
behaviour following changes in taxation. Second, we also investigate whether 
banks pass through tax costs onto bank customers. To inform our research 
hypotheses, we first present a simple theoretical model which incorporates 
elements of agency issues and contractual hazards into the context of bank 
taxation. The main predictions of the model are that taxation impacts on financial 
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intermediation activity by reducing the resources available to banks to perform 
monitoring. The model also predicts that depositors rather than borrowers bear 
the brunt of any tax. From our empirical analysis, it follows that taxation affects the 
effort banks devote to the monitoring of existing borrowers. Banks increase both 
net interest margins, and net interest and fee margins in response to higher 
taxation. Depositors are most affected by adjustments to interest and fee rates at 
banks. Taxation also impacts the overall credit supplied by banks. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis is concerned with the implications of taxation for 
bank liquidity creation. Besides intermediating funds, a key function of banks is the 
creation of liquidity. Banks create liquidity by issuing relatively liquid liabilities to 
finance relatively illiquid assets. In this study, we take the analysis presented in 
Chapter 3 a step further to investigate the impact of taxation on the liquidity 
creation of banks. Using a now generally accepted indicator of liquidity creation 
developed by Berger and Bouwman (2009), we find that higher income taxation 
impacts negatively on bank liquidity creation. This reduction is driven primarily by 
the negative impact of tax on the asset side of the balance sheet. Further analyses 
suggest that bank monitoring is the key mechanism via which taxation affects 
adversely bank liquidity creation. 
In Chapter 5, we turn the attention to the implications of bank taxation for 
the real economy. Official policy interventions in the banking industry are likely to 
have implications for funding conditions facing corporates and their resultant 
strategic investment decisions. In this chapter, we investigate whether bank 
taxation matters for the real economic outcomes of corporate borrowers. Using a 
large sample of banks matched with listed corporates, we find that banks with a 
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greater tax exposure reduce lending proportionately more than less exposed 
counterparts. The imposition of bank taxes reduces credit supply and leads 
corporates to reduce levels of investment. Moreover, corporate borrowers attempt 
to protect against the adverse impact of bank taxes by obtaining funding from 
other sources. Competitor banks (that are not exposed to the tax) assist corporates 
in the effort to substitute for the reduction in credit (by banks affected by bank 
taxes), but this does not alleviate the overall impact of bank taxes on corporate 
investment. Overall, these results suggest that by altering the environment in 
which corporates operate, taxation of the banking industry has a negative effect on 
the real economy. 
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Chapter 2 | Background on the Japanese Banking Industry 
2.1 Introduction  
The Japanese financial system is one of the largest in the world. It is a prime 
example of a bank-based financial system (Levine 2002). The domestic banking 
industry comprises approximately 2000 depository institutions. Prior to the 
Second-Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) well developed equity and bond markets 
provided the majority of finance to firms, while banks functioned primarily as 
underwriters for corporate equity and bond issuance (Allen 1996; Teranishi 
2005). The issuance of bank loans was less common. After the Second-Sino-
Japanese war, the financial system shifted towards a bank-based system patterned 
after US institutions. It was during this post-war period that Japanese banks 
exerted a dominant role in the financing of firms which persists today (Hoshi and 
Yasuda 2015).  
In the late 1990s, the Japanese banking industry was impacted severely by 
the failure of its largest institutions. These failures spilled over to other banks, 
resulting in large aggregate losses for the entire banking industry. Large-scale 
government interventions stabilised the ailing banking system but resulted in high 
levels of government debt. Following the crisis, the Japanese banking industry was 
subject to wide-ranging regulatory and institutional reforms, which aimed to 
improve bank supervision and reduce excessive risk-taking. During global financial 
crisis of 2007-2009, the Japanese banking sector proved relatively resilient to 
shocks that emanated from Europe and the United States.  
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Against this background, this chapter outlines the key events that impacted 
the Japanese banking system since the late 1990s. Section 2.2 presents a brief 
analysis of the industry structure and performance of Japanese banks. Section 2.3 
discusses the 1990s Japanese banking crisis. Section 2.4 examines the regulatory 
reforms and structural developments. Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.  
2.2 Structure and Performance of Japanese Banking 
The banking industry comprises commercial banks and cooperative banks.5 
Commercial banks are universal banks that are permitted to issue loans, collect 
deposits, and trade in financial markets. Under the Japanese Banking Law of 1981 
city banks, first-tier and second-tier regional banks, and trust banks are classified 
as commercial banks. Shinkin, shinkumi and agricultural banks are classified as 
cooperative banks. The remainder of this section discuss the characteristics of 
commercial (Section 2.2.1) and cooperative banks (Section 2.2.2).  
2.2.1 Commercial Banks 
Under the Japanese Banking Law, city banks, regional banks, and trust 
banks are classified as commercial banks. City and regional banks are so-called 
ordinary, banks and are similar to commercial banks in other countries. Trust 
banks are a special type of commercial bank that is also permitted to offer trust 
services. City banks, first-tier regional banks, and trust banks are generally 
incorporated as stock incorporated firms and are publicly listed with free floating 
equity. Second-tier regional banks tend to be privately owned and unlisted.  
                                                        
5 Alongside commercial and cooperative banks there also exist a number of other financial institutions that 
provide commercial banking services such as Japan Post Bank, foreign banks, as well as internet banks (Uchida 
and Udell 2014).  
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The classification of ordinary banks into city and regional banks is 
reminiscent of a time long before the 1990s. At first, the distinction between city 
and regional banks was based purely on geography. However, this distinction 
assumed a quasi-legal form during the post-war period with regional banks facing 
more restrictions on permissible activities relative to city banks. 6  Many 
restrictions on the permissible activities of regional banks were relaxed from the 
1980s onwards. However, this did not eliminate the traditional segmentation 
between city and regional banks. The repercussions of their unequal regulatory 
treatment persist, and are evident in terms of differences in the size, customer 
base, business models and branch networks of city and regional banks.  
In terms of size (measured by total assets), city banks are much larger than 
their regional counterparts. During Japan’s high growth era in the 1980s, city 
banks grew much more quickly than regional banks, and regularly featured at the 
top of international league ranking tables of bank size. During this period city 
banks and regional banks also diverged in terms of their respective customer base 
and business models. Regional banks focus almost exclusively on small- and 
medium-sized firms. City banks have a customer base comprising both small 
domestic orientated firms and large corporates with nationwide and international 
scope. While the business model of city banks is based upon high volumes of 
transactions and a diversified portfolio of assets, the business model of regional 
banks is based on relationship lending (Uchida et al. 2008). Another notable 
difference between city and regional banks is the degree of expansion in their 
                                                        
6 For example, the lending activities of regional banks were restricted to a narrowly confined geographical 
area. City banks, on the other hand, enjoyed relatively more freedom in their choice of borrowers and were 
permitted to lend nationwide. With regard to deposit taking, the policies were far more generous for regional 
banks than for city banks. In order to shield regional banks from competition, the Japanese government 
heavily curtailed a further extension of the already nationwide branch network of city banks (Teranishi 2005).  
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respective branch networks. City banks operate an extensive nationwide branch 
network, while the branch network of regional banks does not extend typically 
beyond the boundaries of the prefecture where the head office is located.  
The classification of regional banks into first- and second-tier banks dates 
back to the early 1990s. Prior to 1992, Japan’s banking industry also comprised a 
group of mutual banks so-called Sogo Ginko, which were regulated under a 
separate banking act (Mutual loans and Savings Bank Law 1951). In common with 
regional and cooperative banks, Sogo banks focused mainly on small firms, and 
operated within geographically confined areas. Sogo banks encountered difficulties 
during the 1980s. Industry deregulation and higher interest rates had translated 
into higher funding costs and severe competition from regional and cooperative 
banks (Brown 1999). In the early 1990s, the struggling Sogo banks were 
transformed into ordinary banks and classified as second-tier regional banks. 
Importantly, the two-tier classification of regional banks does not represent a legal 
distinction. Both types of regional banks operate under the same Banking Act and 
are supervised by the Financial Services Agency (FSA).7  
In Japan, trust business is generally restricted to trust banks. Besides 
offering trust services, trust banks also engage in traditional banking activities. As 
of 2015, the Japanese banking sector had four regular trust banks, alongside 12 
other trust banks including foreign-owned trust banks and trust bank subsidiaries. 
Trust services include money trusts, pension trusts, security investment trusts, as 
well as loan trusts. Trust banks manage trusts on behalf of institutional investors 
and individual customers. Besides ordinary deposits from banking business, 
money trusts and investment trusts represent the second largest source of funds 
                                                        
7 Dekle and Hamada (2000) provide an excellent historical overview on mutual banks. 
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for trust banks. Trusts are transformed into long-term loans to the corporate 
sector and are used for investments in financial markets.8  
2.2.2 Cooperative Banks 
Cooperative banks in Japan comprise credit associations (so-called Shinyō 
Kinko or shinkin banks), credit cooperatives (so-called Shinyō Kumiai or shinkumi 
banks), as well as agricultural and fishery cooperatives and labour banks.9 These 
banks are organised typically as not-for profit entities whose capital is subscribed 
by their respective members.10  
Shinkin banks and shinkumi banks are supervised by the Financial Services 
Agency and operate under a special set of banking laws. A special feature of 
cooperative banks is that banking services are restricted to members. Cooperative 
banks are organised under a two-tier system under which a designated central 
bank provides clearing services and access to capital markets. Shinkin banks 
operate under the umbrella of the Shinkin Central Bank. Credit cooperative banks 
are organised under the Shinkumi Federation Bank. Like first- and second-tier 
regional banks, shinkin and shinkumi banks provide banking services to small and 
medium-sized firms. However, they tend to adhere to a stricter geographic 
demarcation than regional banks.  
In terms of banking assets, shinkin banks represent the largest group of 
cooperative banks. Originally evolving from urban cooperatives, these banks have 
existed in their current form since 1951. Shinkin banks are small to medium-sized 
                                                        
8 The Trust Companies Association of Japan (Trust Companies Association of Japan:www.shintakukyokai.or.jp) 
provides a detailed overview of trust banks.  
9 Uchida and Udell (2014) provide a comprehensive overview of the various bank types and business models 
of Japanese banks.  
10 Japan’s cooperatives are designated as not-for-profit institutions. The law permits non-profit-institutions to 
generate and distribute surpluses (Kurimoto 2013).  
Chapter 2 | Background on the Japanese Banking Industry 
16 
 
financial institutions. They are organised in a two-tier system with a single central 
bank (Shinkin Central Bank) acting as the head organisation of the nationwide 
network of shinkin banks.11 As of March 2015, there were 267 shinkin banks with 
approximately 7300 branches throughout Japan. These banks had an aggregate 
membership of 9.3 million members and deposits of ¥131 trillion (11% of the total 
deposit market in Japan). 12  The membership of shinkin banks consists of 
individuals (local residents) as well as small and medium-sized entreprises. 
Shinkin banks are governed by the Shinkin Banking Act, which sets out the rules 
and regulations for the conduct of business, management and supervision. Shinkin 
banks must limit the issuance of loans to their members. 13 However, they are free 
to accept deposits from non-members leading to a funding structure that is 
partially independent of membership.  
By offering an extensive range of services and products to members and 
non-members, cooperative banks function like commercial banks. In common with 
commercial regional banks, cooperative banks are regionally oriented financial 
institutions with a focus on providing retail banking services to local customers. 
Branches are located typically in the prefecture or city where their headquarters 
are situated.14 Cooperative banks focus on individuals as well as small and medium 
enterprises (defined as firms with 300 employees or less).15 Anecdotal evidence 
from the Survey of Interfirm Relationships indicates that more than 40% of the 
                                                        
11 The Shinkin Central Bank undertakes various financial activities on behalf of Shinkin banks. For instance, the 
bank undertakes international transactions and invests deposited funds of Shinkin banks into marketable 
securities.  
12 This compares to 105 regional banks with approximately 7500 branches and deposits of ¥248 trillion.   
13 For instance, according to Ch.5, Article 53 of the Shinkin Banking Act, Shinkin banks must restrict their 
lending to members. Pursuant the provision of a Cabinet Order, Shinkin banks may issue loans to local 
governments, financial institutions and persons other than members. A recent amendment of the Shinkin 
Banking Act adds universities and research institutes to the list of borrowers without membership.  
14 “On average, 81.1% of regional bank branches locate within the same prefecture of their head office; 95.8% 
of Shinkin bank branches operate in their home prefecture” Tsutsui and Kano (2003, p.158) 
15 Japan’s economy consists of around 4.7 million small to medium-sized enterprises (Small and Medium 
Entreprise Agency of Japan). 
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responding small to medium-sized enterprises chose to bank with a shinkin bank; 
followed by city banks (25%) and regional banks (19%) (Uesugi 2015).  
Due to the geographic concentration of their respective asset portfolios, 
regional and cooperative banks are heavily dependent on prevailing economic 
conditions of their respective home prefecture. Cooperative and regional banks 
also share the same supervisory regime. Both cooperative and regional banks are 
co-supervised by the FSA and the Ministry of Finance MOF (IMF, 2012a). Notably, 
there are no differences in the rules concerning the supervision of regional and 
cooperative banks. The common approach to supervision further substantiates the 
similarity of cooperative banks and their commercial counterparts.  
Moreover, shinkin banks, shinkumi banks, and regional banks appear to 
face similar levels of competitive pressure and overall risk (Liu and Wilson 2013). 
However, shinkin banks generally have much higher credit risk as measured by the 
share of non-performing loans to total assets (IMF 2012b). In recent years, 
cooperative banks have been subject to deregulation that led to a substantive 
reduction in restrictions on permitted activities.  
2.2.3 Number of Banks and Branches 
Over the last two decades, the Japanese banking system has witnessed a 
considerable decline in the number of banks. As shown in Table 2.1, the most 
pronounced decline in the number of institutions took place among city banks, 
second-tier regional banks as well as cooperative banks. The reduction in the 
number of banks is mainly due to mergers and acquisitions, and to a lesser extent 
bank closures. Notably, the number of first-tier regional banks remained constant 
since the 1990s. This contrasts with a substantial decline in the number of second-
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tier regional banks, which are acquired typically by first-tier regional banks. 
Merger and acquisition activity of shinkin and shinkumi banks began to accelerate 
towards the end of the 1990s leading to reduction of -40% in the number of 
shinkin banks and a reduction of -62% in the number of shinkumi banks since 
1990 (Hosono et al. 2006).  
Table 2.1 | Number of Banks by Bank Type  
 1990 2000 2015 
City banks 13 9 5 
Regional banks (Tier I) 64 64 64 
Regional banks (Tier II) 68 60 41 
Trust banks (domestic) 16 8 4 
Shinkin banks 451 372 267 
Shinkumi banks 408 281 154 
This table lists the number of banks by bank type in year 1990, 2000 and 2015. Source: Japan Bankers 
Association; Shinkin Central Bank; Shinkumi Federation Bank. 
The decline in the number of banks is mirrored by a reduction in the 
number of branches. Table 2.2 shows a contraction in the number of branches by 
bank type between 2000 to 2015. Since 2000, all bank types experienced a decline 
in the number of branches, albeit of different magnitude. While the number of 
branches for city banks and first-tier regional banks reduced merely by 2% and 
5% respectively, second-tier regional banks and trust banks experienced a 
reduction in the number of branches by 24% and 37% respectively. Compared to 
second-tier regional banks, shinkin and shinkumi banks exhibit a relatively 
moderate decline in the number of branches.  
Comparing the reduction in the number of branches with the development 
in the number of banks from 2000 to 2015 shows that, for most bank types, the 
consolidation of banks outpaced the reduction in their branch networks. The 
number of city banks declined by 44%. This compares to a 2% decline in branches. 
Declines for other bank types second-tier regional banks (31% versus 24%), trust 
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banks (50% versus 37%), shinkin banks (28% versus 13%), shinkumi banks (45% 
versus 14%). Only first-tier regional banks exhibit a faster decline in branch 
numbers relative to the contraction in the number of banks. Here, a 5% 
contraction in the branch network stands against a constant number of banks since 
2000. This may indicate the presence of cost advantages for first-tier regional 
banks that materialise with larger bank size. As for the other banks, the slower 
decline in branches may indicate that the distribution of financial services through 
a branch-based network continues to be an important element of the business 
model of Japanese banks.  
Table 2.2 | Number of Bank Branches by Bank Type  
Year City  Regional I Regional II Trusts Shinkin  Shinkumi  
2000 2928 7904 4000 443 8480 - 
2001 2853 7788 3873 399 8400 - 
2002 2655 7600 3790 324 8263 - 
2003 2608 7536 3567 299 8059 1985 
2004 2575 7548 3354 292 7879 1955 
2005 2470 7484 3312 294 7777 1922 
2006 2463 7435 3274 292 7734 1901 
2007 2473 7456 3252 295 7687 1858 
2008 2484 7455 3253 293 7671 1826 
2009 2479 7521 3149 273 7619 1785 
2010 2489 7493 3138 277 7584 1765 
2011 2510 7504 3129 282 7535 1755 
2012 2525 7529 3062 283 7504 1737 
2013 2532 7520 3054 287 7451 1723 
2014 2868 7506 3058 275 7398 1718 
2015 2870 7507 3056 278 7379 1709 
% Change 
(2000-2015) -2% -5% -24% -37% -13% -14%* 
This table lists the number of branches by bank type for the period 2000 to 2015. The table also records the 
percentage change in branches between 2000 and 2015. Source: Japan Bankers Association, Shinkin Central 
Bank, Shinkumi Federation Bank. *% Change 2003-2015. 
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2.2.4 Developments in Bank Size 
In the aftermath of the 1990s banking crisis, the banking sector suffered 
from excess capacity. It was predicted that the sector would considerably shrink in 
size (Patrick 1998). This prediction however proofed inconsistent with subsequent 
developments in the banking sector. Despite the notable decline in the number of 
banks, total aggregate assets of Japanese commercial banks remained relatively 
stable.16 Figure 2.1 shows that aggregate assets of the Japanese banking sector 
grew moderately. From 2000 to 2015, aggregate total assets of commercial banks 
increased from ¥ 7.26 trillion to ¥ 9.77 trillion, a rate of 35%. The ratio of 
aggregate total assets of commercial banks to nominal GDP increased over the 
same period from 1.37 in 2000 to 1.83 in 2015.17 Notably, the turmoil that 
emanated from the 2007-2009 global financial crisis had a benign impact on the 
Japanese banking system. Figure 2.1 shows that growth in aggregate banking 
assets stagnated in 2009 but picked up again in 2010. For a discussion of the global 
financial crisis and the Japanese banking system see Section 2.3.  
The growth in aggregate assets of the Japanese banking sector which 
occurred alongside a significant reduction in the number of banks suggests a 
substantial increase in the size of banks. Figure 2.2 shows that the size of the 
average bank (dis-aggregated by bank type) increased since 2000. Trust banks, 
city banks, and first-tier regional banks exhibit the fastest growth in bank size. 
Second-tier regional banks, shinkin banks, shinkumin banks grew at a somewhat 
slower pace. The aggregate asset market shares of city banks, regional banks, and 
                                                        
16 The stable development of Japanese banks’ assets during the 2000s stands out against the enormous growth 
of banking sector assets in other countries. For example, Gischer et al. (2012) report a growth rate of 133% for 
aggregate asset holdings of the German banking sector between 2000 and 2010.   
17 Nominal GDP data series of Cabinet Office, Economic and Social Research Institute.  
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trust banks remained stable over the period from 2000 to 2015. A similar picture 
emerges for cooperative banks whose market share also remained unchanged.  
Figure 2.1 | Size of the Japanese Banking System 2000-2015 
 
This figure shows the evolution of aggregate total assets by bank type over the period from 2000 to 2015. 
Source: Japan Bankers Association, Bank of Japan, Shinkin Central Bank, Shinkumi Federation Bank. Unit: 
Trillion Japanese Yen. 
Figure 2.2 | Average Bank Size Selected Years 2000-2015 
 
  
   
This figure shows the development of the average bank size for different bank types over the period from 2000 
to 2015. Source: Japan Bankers Association, Bank of Japan, Shinkin Central Bank, Shinkumi Federation Bank. 
Unit: Billion Japanese Yen. Author’s own calculations. 
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2.2.5 Balance Sheet Composition 
Table 2.3 shows the composition of bank balance sheets in 2005 and 2015. 
For all bank types, loans represent the most important component of bank assets 
in 2015. However, there are some notable differences across bank types. While 
loans account for 50% of total asset of city banks, and cooperative banks, the share 
is considerably higher for regional banks (around 70%). The stark difference 
between city banks and regional banks may reflect to some extent the more 
diversified business model of city banks.18 As for cooperative banks, the difference 
to regional banks may reflect that cooperative banks in contrast to regional banks 
are mandated by law to limit the issuance of loans to members.  
Bonds represent the second largest component of earning assets, 
accounting on average for 25% in 2015. Comparing balance sheet compositions of 
2005 and 2015 shows a considerable increase in the share of bonds to total assets 
(of approximately four percentage points) for city, trust, and cooperative banks. To 
some extent, this increase reflects the expansion of Japanese banks into Japanese 
government bonds (JGBs). While JGBs made up 9% of total bank assets in 2000, by 
2012 JGBs holdings doubled in size to over 18% (Bank of Japan 2014). Several 
factors explain why Japanese banks increasingly lend to the Japanese government. 
Hoshi and Ito (2012) argue that the expansion into JGBs was initially triggered by a 
continued lack of loan demand in the private sector. In search for alternatives to 
real estate and SME loans, banks shifted their focus to the public sector. The need 
to reduce risk and the favourable zero-weighting of JGBs in the calculation of 
                                                        
18 Political factors have been shown to play an important role in determining lending of regional banks to local 
governments (Imai 2009). 
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regulatory capital may have also encouraged banks to increase their holdings of 
JGBs.  
As shown in Table 2.3, the share of stocks to total assets declined across all 
bank types between 2005 to 2015. On average, stocks accounted for 1.9% in 2015, 
compared to 3.1% in 2005. This contraction reflects the changing regulatory 
landscape. With the introduction of a legal limitation on shareholdings in 2001 and 
the stock purchasing program of Japan’s central bank, banks began to decrease the 
proportion of stocks in their portfolios (Bank of Japan 2005). In particular, the 
practice of cross-shareholdings which had characterised the industry for most 
parts of the twentieth century became less common. In the early 2000s, banks 
reduced cross-held shares by around 70%. Like the expansion into JGBs, the off-
loading of stocks had a positive impact on the risk-structure of bank portfolios. 
Lower levels of shareholdings generally made Japanese banks less exposed to 
market-risk. 
Another notable change on the asset side of bank balance sheets is the 
disposal of non-performing loans (NPL). After a period of few NPL disposals, the 
year 2001 was characterised by a sudden jump in the write-downs of NPLs (Bank 
of Japan 2005). Several factors appear to have prompted the rise in the disposal of 
NPL including improvements of loan evaluation methods, improved economic 
conditions, changes in the ownership of banks as well as a more assertive bank 
supervisor (Harada et al. 2011) 
Regarding foreign assets, there has been considerable change with the 
outbreak of the banking crisis in the late 1990s. The internationalisation trend of 
Japan’s banking industry which had been ongoing for more than a decade came to 
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a drastic halt. Japanese banks substantially cut back their foreign asset holdings. 62 
banks switched from an international to a domestic charter (Allen et al. 2011).  
Table 2.3 | Balance Sheet Composition by Bank Type  
Components of Assets and Liabilities as a % of Total Assets 
 City Regional I Regional II Trusts Shinkin Shinkumi 
Year 2005       
Assets             
Interbank 1.9 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.1 0.0 
Bonds 22.2 24.4 19.9 22.4 24.2 17.8 
Stocks 4.6 3.7 2.6 7.4 0.5 0.2 
Loans 50.1 63.9 68.6 54.0 53.4 54.0 
Others 21.3 6.9 7.9 15.2 21.8 28.0 
Liabilities5,885.0 
Deposits 64.1 86.0 90.0 56.5 92.3 91.8 
Interbank 3.4 0.7 0.2 2.1 0.1 0.0 
Equity 0.9 1.1 1.4 2.2 5.1 4.7 
Others 31.7 12.2 8.4 39.3 2.6 3.4 
        
Year 2015 
Assets       
Interbank 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 
Bonds 23.5 28.2 24.1 28.5 28.9 21.7 
Stocks 2.8 2.3 1.6 3.8 0.5 0.2 
Loans 44.7 61.4 66.5 48.3 45.7 48.1 
Others 28.8 7.3 7.4 19.0 24.7 29.8 
Liabilities 
Deposits 62.0 83.5 88.6 46.9 91.7 92.4 
Interbank 0.6 1.9 0.1 4.0 0.1 0.0 
Equity 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.1 5.6 5.9 
Others 36.5 13.7 10.0 48.1 2.5 1.7 
This table shows selected components of bank balance sheets by bank type. Components of assets and 
liabilities are listed as a % of total assets. Source: Japan Bankers Association, Bank of Japan, Shinkin Central 
Bank, Shinkumi Federation Bank.  
The closure of many foreign branches also reflects the scale of the de-
internationalisation of the industry; the number of non-domestic branches of 
Japanese banks decreased by more than half from 437 in 1995 to 130 in 2006. Imai 
and Takarabe (2011) note that developments abroad resembled those at home. 
Japanese city banks with nationwide operations also withdrew from activities in 
Japan’s regional loan markets. Several factors explain the retrenchment of 
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Japanese banks. Peek and Rosengren (2000) and Caballero et al. (2008) suggest 
that Japanese banks may have reduced lending in non-core foreign and domestic 
markets in order to support their core (often financially stressed) domestic clients. 
By extending loans to insolvent domestic borrowers, Japanese banks avoided 
declaring loans as non-performing and were able to meet minimum capital 
requirements.19 Allen et al. (2011) also argue that regulatory capital requirements 
best explain the de-internationalisation trend. Banks with international activities 
were required to hold 8% of risk-based assets in capital compared to 4% for 
domestic banks. Thus, banks finding it difficult to meet higher capital requirements 
had any incentive to retreat from international activities.  
Regarding the funding structure of Japanese banks, there are some 
significant differences across bank type. Table 2.3 shows that for commercial 
banks, the share of book equity to total assets is on average 1% in 2015. In 
contrast, cooperative-type banks hold equity in the order of 5.7%. Following the 
legal act that limited banks’ shareholdings, there have been some notable changes 
to the ownership structure of bank equity. Shares that were once cross-held by 
Japanese banks are now owned by foreign and domestic institutional investors 
(Bank of Japan 2005).  
Funding through deposits represents the most important source of funds 
across all bank types. As shown in Table 2.3, for regional banks and cooperative 
banks, the share of deposits to total assets is on average 89%. City banks and trust 
banks rely to 62% and 47% on deposits for funding. For trust banks, money trusts 
(comparable to longer term deposits) are also an important source of funding (not 
                                                        
19 The Japanese banks’ practice of extending loans to insolvent borrowers has become generally known as 
“evergreening” (Peek and Rosengren 2005) 
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listed in Table 2.3). Notably, over the last two decades, there has been little change 
to the way Japanese banks are funded. The funding through repos continues to 
remain less common in Japan (Kashyap 2002, IMF 2012b). This stands in stark 
contrast to developments in the US and European banking systems which 
increasingly relied on money market funds. Overall, the average bank liability 
structure confirms some systematic funding differences across bank types. 
Regional and cooperative banks rely almost exclusively on retail funding from 
customer deposits. The funding structure of city banks and trust banks differs 
somewhat. Although most funds are obtained in the form of retail deposits, the use 
of money markets is considerably higher.  
2.2.6 Development in Income and Expenses 
The development of income and expenses is shown in Table 2.4. In the year 
2005 and 2015, interest income is the most important source of revenues for 
Japanese commercial banks accounting on average for 58%. For shinkin banks 
interest income is significantly more important (83%). Comparing 2005 and 2015, 
a slight increase in the share of interest income to total income is visible for 
regional banks, trust banks and shinkin banks. The exception is the group of city 
banks whose revenue from interest income has decreased. City banks appear to 
have substituted interest income with fee-based income. Notably, this substitution 
effect is not observable for the other bank types. For regional banks, trust banks, 
and shinkin banks, income from interest and fees increased. Looking at 2015, there 
are some considerable differences in the importance of fees as a revenue source 
across bank types. While for trust banks and city banks fees accounted for 23% of 
revenues, for shinkin banks the corresponding figures was only 9% of total 
revenues. These stark differences across commercial and cooperative banks likely 
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reflect differences in business models. Overall, the development in interest income 
and fee income indicate that Japanese banks continue to perform their core 
function as financial intermediaries transforming deposits into loans.  
Table 2.4 | Income Statement by Bank Type  
Components of Income Statement as a % of Total Income and Expenses 
 City Regional I Regional II Trusts Shinkin Shinkumi 
Year 2005       
Income       
Interest  58.2 67.2 70.3 37.0 83.0 - 
Fees  19.5 15.4 13.1 23.0 9.0 - 
Other operating 11.8 9.0 6.9 14.4 3.5 - 
Expenses 
Interest  28.5 9.1 4.9 19.2 4.8 - 
Fees 4.5 5.7 6.9 3.9 6.0 - 
Administrative 43.9 56.2 56.6 40.3 68.9 - 
Other operating 7.7 9.7 8.7 16.8 2.8 - 
 
      
Year 2015       
Income       
Interest  57.5 71.7 74.3 42.1 84.3 - 
Fees  22.2 16.8 14.5 23.5 9.1 - 
Other operating 9.9 5.2 4.2 7.2 6.6 - 
Expenses447.27239 
Interest  19.7 7.3 7.2 20.7 7.5 - 
Fees 9.1 9.9 10.1 12.2 7.3 - 
Administrative 58.9 73.8 74.8 52.2 84.3 - 
Other operating 5.2 3.5 6.5 7.5 0.9 - 
This table shows selected components of bank income statements by bank type. Components of income and 
expenses are listed as % of total. Source: Japan Bankers Association, Bank of Japan, Shinkin Central Bank for 
2005, Nikkei Needs Financial Quest for 2015 shinkin bank financial data.  
Regarding expenses, a heterogeneous picture emerges. As shown in Table 
2.4, in 2015, fee-based expenses exceeded interest expenses for regional banks. In 
contrast, for city banks and trust banks, interest expenses dominate fee-based 
expenses. Comparing 2005 and 2015, fee expenses and administrative expenses 
have increased markedly across all bank types. The increase in administrative 
expenses (which include personnel expenses) may indicate that banks face 
increasing labour costs. Further inference is however not possible due to a lack of 
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detailed data on the composition of administrative expenses pertaining to labour 
costs.  
2.2.7 Performance 
Table 2.5 shows the mean of six bank indicators by bank type based on a 
sample of Japanese banks from 2005 to 2015. To compare bank performance, the 
following indicators are considered: net interest margin (measured as net interest 
income over total assets), return on assets (ROA, measured as net income over 
total assets), and return on equity (ROE, measured as net income over book 
equity). To gauge bank risks, non-performing loans (NPL, measured as non-
performing loans to total assets) and loans to deposits ratio (LTD) are used. The 
final ratio of cost to income (COST, measured as administrative expenses over 
operating income) looks at the cost efficiency of banks. Figure 2.3 shows the 
development of the six indicators by bank type over time.  
Table 2.5 | Performance Indicators by Bank Type 
 NIM ROA ROE NPL LTD COST 
City  0.9 0.5 11.6 0.04 81.8 50.8 
Regional I 1.4 0.3 5.9 0.2 73.2 58.7 
Regional II 1.7 0.2 2.6 0.3 76.4 59.5 
Trusts  0.7 0.7 10.0 0.1 (101.4)* 45.6 
Shinkin 1.5 0.1 1.0 0.4 52.3 69.3 
Shinkumi - - - - - - 
This table shows the mean of six bank performance indicators by bank type. The statistics are based on a 
sample of Japanese banks for the period 2005-2015. Bank performance indicators are: 1) NIM: net interest 
margin [net interest income over total assets], 2) ROA: return on assets [net income over total assets], 3) ROE: 
return on equity [net income over book equity], 4) NPL: non-performing loans [non-performing loans to total 
assets], 5) LTD: loans to deposits ratio [loans divided by deposits] 6). COST: cost efficiency [administrative 
expenses over operating income]. Variables are winsorized at the top and bottom percentile. Unit: in percent. 
Source: Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest. *The ratio in excess of 100% reflects that trust banks generally accept 
trusts besides deposits. Trusts are not reported in the financial statements underlying the calculation of the 
LTD ratio. Authors’ own calculations. 
ROA and ROE ratios indicate that Japan’s largest banks persistently 
outperform smaller banks. City banks and trust banks count among the top 
performers throughout the period from 2005 to 2015 (ROA: 0.5% and 0.7%. ROE: 
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11.6% and 10%). In contrast, shinkin banks and second-tier regional banks exhibit 
the lowest returns (ROA: 0.2% and 0.1%. ROE: 2.6% and 1.0%). A different picture 
emerges when considering net interest margins. As shown in Table 2.5, smaller 
banks achieve higher margins than larger banks reflecting again differences in 
business model. While smaller banks focus on traditional high-margin banking 
activities, larger banks are evolving away from traditional business models 
towards less capital-intensive, and lower-margin business models. 
As shown in Figure 2.3, the global financial crisis impacted on the 
performance of Japanese banks; performance pressures are clearly visible across 
all bank types in the run-up to the crisis. In 2009, ROA and ROA ratios across all 
bank types increased again after two consecutive years of decline and stabilised 
after 2010. There is no visible impact of the crisis on net interest margins. As 
shown in Figure 2.3, net interest margins have weakened across all bank types 
since 2005. The secular downward trend in net interest margins results to some 
extent from the low interest rate environment in which Japanese banks have been 
operating since the mid-1990s (IMF 2012b).  
Regarding NPL, Table 2.5 shows that smaller banks hold generally more 
credit risk than larger banks. Second-tier regional banks and shinkin banks have 
NPL ratios (NPL relative to total assets) of 0.3% and 0.4% respectively. This 
compares to a very low ratio for city banks (0.04%). Figure 3 shows the 
developments in NPL over time. Since 2005, bank credit risk has been on a 
negative trend across all bank types. Albeit for smaller banks, the decline is more 
pronounced then for larger banks. Following the outbreak of the financial crisis, 
NPL increased sharply in 2008 but have since declined.   
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Table 2.5 shows the loan-to-deposit ratio (LTD), a core indicator for 
liquidity mismatch risk. On average, banks exhibit relatively high LTD ratios. City 
banks have the highest LTD ratio (82%) followed by first- and second-tier regional 
banks (73% and 76% respectively). Shinkin banks have the lowest LTD ratio 
(52%), potentially reflecting the impact of regulations restricting the issuance of 
loans to members of the cooperative. The low LTD ratio of shinkin banks may 
indicate an abundance of deposits paired with a scarcity of viable lending 
opportunities. Developments in LTD ratios over the period from 2005 to 2015 are 
shown in Figure 2.3. Notably, there is no significant levelling off during the 
financial crisis of 2007 suggesting that Japanese banks continued to cover loans 
with stable retail savings.  
The last column of Table 2.5 shows the cost efficiency of banks. COST ratios 
indicate that larger banks are relatively more cost efficient compared to smaller 
banks. Shinkin banks exhibit the lowest cost-to-income ratio (69.3%). The 
differences in cost efficiency across banks may to some extent reflect differences in 
the competitive conditions under which banks operate. For a brief discussion see 
Section 2.2.8. Developments in cost efficiency, as shown in Figure 2.3, further 
substantiate the trend discussed in Section 2.2.6. The increase in administrative 
costs since 2005 across bank types is mirrored by a decline in the cost efficiency of 
banks over the decade from 2005 to 2015. Although banks exhibited an 
improvement in cost efficiency for a short period prior to the global financial crisis, 
the trend reversed again in 2009. Since then, banks have become less cost efficient.  
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Figure 2.3 | Performance Indicators by Bank Type 2005-2015 
 
Net Interest Margin (%) Return on Assets (%) 
  
Return on Equity (%) Non-Performing Loans(%) 
  
Loans to Deposits(%) Cost Efficiency (%) 
  
This figure shows the development of six mean bank performance indicators by bank type over the period 
from 2005 to 2015. Bank performance indicators are: 1) Net interest margin [net interest income over total 
assets], 2) Return on assets [net income over total assets], 3) Return on equity [net income over book equity], 
4) Non-performing loans [non-performing loans to total assets], 5) Cost efficiency [administrative expenses 
over operating income], 6) Loans to deposits ratio [loans divided by deposits]. Variables are winsorized at top 
and bottom percentile. Unit: in percent. Source: Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest.  
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2.2.8 Competition 
The competitive landscape of the Japanese banking sector has been subject 
to considerable change over the last three decades. Leuvensteijn (2007) finds that 
the increased consolidation of the banking sector since the late 1990s was 
accompanied by an industry-wide improvement in competitive conditions. 
Commercial banks operated under low competitive pressures in the years prior to 
the Japanese banking crisis, but faced more competition following the outbreak of 
the crisis. Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) suggest the presence of some noticeable 
differences in the development of competitive conditions across bank types. 
Examining the competitive conditions for city banks and regional banks separately, 
city banks are found to operate under less fierce competition than in pre-crisis 
years. In contrast, regional banks facing relatively low competitive pressure in pre-
crisis years are found to operate under more competitive conditions. Liu and 
Wilson (2013) suggest that competitive conditions may have intensified for 
smaller, locally operating banks including cooperative banks.  
2.3 Crisis in Japanese Banking  
In the 1990s, Japan experienced the failure of a large number of commercial 
banks and other financial institutions. Between 1995 and 2005, there were around 
180 bank failures, commencing with a few isolated cases in the early 1990s, which 
eventually turned into a system-wide collapse towards the end of the decade. The 
crisis had severe repercussions for the  economic development. For over a decade 
Japan’s gross domestic production stagnated making the 1990s infamously known 
as the ‘lost decade’. The severity of the shock and the far-reaching economic impact 
of the crisis motivated a large body of research across several disciplines to search 
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for the causes of the banking crisis. A variety of views emerged each offering a 
unique perspective on the origins of the banking crisis. 
2.3.1 Causes of the Japanese Banking Crisis 
Some argued that Japan’s banking crisis was primarily the result of 
macroeconomic shocks, in particular the large fluctuations in land and asset prices 
in the early 1990s (Ueda 1998; Ito and Patrick 2005). This strand of literature 
traces the origins of the crisis back to the 1970s and 1980s when Japan had 
experienced an oil price shock and introduced a floating exchange rate. These 
shocks induced a shift away from capital-intensive industries with far-reaching 
consequences for Japanese banks. Their traditional client-base disintegrated and 
necessitated a re-orientation in lending activities. In search for alternative 
borrowers, banks expanded into real estate loan markets.20 The increased loan 
supply paired with a loose monetary policy regime eventually led to acceleration in 
land prices and an overheating in economic activity. With the bursting of the 
housing bubble in the early 1990s, the vulnerabilities of the banking sector to 
movements in land prices began to emerge. At first, a number of isolated bank 
failures (Jusen banks) occurred but as land prices declined, bank failures 
accumulated.  
Other authors argue that the collapse of the asset bubbles was merely a 
trigger, but that the actual problem emanated within the banks themselves. This 
strand of literature identifies weaknesses in the banking system as the core 
problem (Kanaya and Woo 2000; Hoshi and Kashyap 2004). The liberalisation of 
capital markets which started in the 1970s dramatically changed Japan’s financial 
                                                        
20 Nakagawa and Uchida (2007) find that the banks’ expansion into real estate loan markets in the 1980s was 
characterised by irrational herd behaviour.  
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system. The gradual lifting of restrictions on bond issuance freed the corporate 
sector from its reliance on banks as a main source of funding. Capital markets 
gained in importance as an alternative to bank loans. Yet restrictions on the range 
of permissible bank activities were lifted only slowly. As a result, capital markets 
quickly began to take over some of Japanese banks’ business. In order to make up 
for declining profits, banks shifted towards riskier investments (including small 
business loans).21 The increased portfolio risk made the banking system less 
resilient to external shocks. When the real estate and asset price bubble eventually 
burst in the early 1990s, the banking system was unable to withstand the shock 
and experienced a system-wide collapse.  
Other research points to weaknesses in Japanese institutions as a key cause 
of Japan’s banking crisis (Brown 1999; Amyx 2004; Grossman 2010).22 At the core 
of Japan’s institutional problem stood the Ministry of Finance (MoF hereafter), an 
institution that acted as a bank supervisor and regulator since 1947.23 To govern 
the activities of banks, the MoF typically engaged in administrative guidance; 
regulatory enforcement was less common. This manifested itself in low levels of 
litigation (Vanoverbeke et al. 2014). The absence of litigation, however, did not 
mean that the ministry played a marginal role. On the contrary, many MoF 
administrators had assumed powerful positions as external micromanagers 
instructing banks in their daily business affairs (Adams and Hoshi 1972; Amyx 
2004). As MoF bureaucrats would often give preferential treatments to banks, 
maintaining a good relationship with the MoF became vital for banks’ business 
                                                        
21 Konishi and Yasuda (2004) also find that banks took on more risks when their franchise values declined.  
22 A direct implication of this is that a variety of crisis chronologies exists. For example, the literature discusses 
several different dates for the onset of the crisis; ranging from the early 1990s towards the latter-half of the 
1990s (see Romer and Romer 2014 for a discussion).  
23 Japan’s war period had caused a vacuum in the governance of banks which necessitated the establishment of 
the MoF as an external regulator and supervisor. 
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success (Hoshi and Ito 2004).24 Under the protective governance of the MoF banks 
would remain shielded from overly competitive pressures. As a result, Japanese 
banks became increasingly uncompetitive and dependent (Dekle and Kletzer 
2003). With the severe shock that emanated from the bursting of the real estate 
and asset bubbles in the early 1990s, the weaknesses in Japan’s institutional design 
became apparent. The MoF could no longer protect banks from the disciplinary 
forces of the market. However, vested interests reduced the MoF’s incentives to 
tackle the growing problem of bank failures. As the MoF failed to timely adopt 
reforms, isolated bank failures quickly developed into a system-wide collapse.  
As the above analysis indicates, the views on the causes of the Japanese 
banking crisis range from macroeconomic shocks to weaknesses in banks and 
regulatory institutions. The disagreement about the origins of the crisis among 
policy makers in charge of resolving the crisis had direct implications for the 
official policy response to the crisis.  
2.3.2 The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis  
The 2007-2009 financial crisis had a relatively benign impact on the 
Japanese banking industry. In retrospect, the policy mix of the late 1990s is 
recognised as one of the key factors contributing to the resilience of banks during 
the global financial crisis. In particular, the improvements in financial supervision 
facilitating more timely and effective intervention contributed to stabilising the 
banking sector (Harada et al. 2011). Other factors that played a considerable role 
in shielding Japanese banks from the impact of the crisis are the loose monetary 
policy regime, the overall low exposure of Japanese banks to US subprime 
                                                        
24 Amakudari, the hiring of MoF into boards of banks was a common strategy of banks (Amyx 2004). 
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mortgage markets, as well as the reliance of banks on deposits as a source of 
funding for securitized products (as opposed to short-term wholesale funding in 
repo markets which witnessed a substantial drying up of liquidity in the run-up to 
the global financial crisis).  
The relatively benign impact of the financial crisis on the Japanese banking 
sector was not mirrored by developments in other sectors. The manufacturing 
sector whose revenues depend largely on exports significantly suffered from the 
collapse in international trade. Notably, the deterioration in corporate profits 
paired with funding difficulties in bond markets resulted in a return to bank 
finance (Hoshi and Yasuda 2015). The issuance of new bank loans to 
manufacturing firms increased steeply in 2008 indicating an increased dependence 
of the sector on banks as a source of funding.25 The banking sectors’ assistance in 
facilitating corporate financing during the global financial crisis may have 
alleviated a full-blown, domestic credit crunch from which many other advanced 
economies suffered.     
To curtail the impact of the financial crisis on the economy, the Japanese 
government, like many other governments in advanced economies, took on an 
                                                        
25 The role of banks as a provider of liquidity during firm financial distress is a widely discussed topic in the 
literature on Japanese banking. It links closely to the concept of keiretsu which can be loosely described as an 
affiliation of businesses around a so-called main bank (Hsu 1999). Two functions of the main bank have 
attracted the attention of the academic research: 1) the banks’ function as a liquidity provider to keiretsu 
members in particular during periods of financial distress and 2) the banks’ role in the governance of 
borrowing firms (for a review see Uchida and Udell 2014). Owing to its implicit focus on the relationship 
between banks and firms, the literature on the Japanese keiretsu system is closely related to the literature on 
relationship lending. Earlier strands of the keiretsu literature identify the keiretsu system as the main 
contributor to Japan’s economic success in the 1970s and 1980s. However, in hindsight of the Japanese 
banking crisis of the 1990s, keiretsu systems have also been recognised as an impediment to economic growth. 
Weak firm performance and sluggish economic growth in Japan in the 1990s and 2000s have been attributed 
to some extent to excessive rent extraction of the Japanese banking system (e.g. Weinstein and Yafeh 1998). 
Although keiretsu has been the subject of intense research, it is not clearly defined. This is due to the main 
bank for which no universal definition exists. Evidence on keiretsu systems is also not without controversy; 
some authors have questioned the very idea of keiretsu as there is no direct proof its existence (Miwa and 
Ramseyer 2008).  
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expansionary fiscal policy. The increased government spending was financed by an 
increase in the issuance of government bonds; with the domestic banking sector 
acting as the main buyer of JGB. Between 2008 and 2010, major banks almost 
doubled their holdings of JGBs; from ¥70 trillion to ¥120 trillion. In the run-up to 
the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, Japan’s substantial increase in public debt 
paired with the exposure of Japanese banks to domestic government debt 
temporarily sparked fears of spill-over effects. These did not materialise in part 
owing the fact that most JGB are held domestically reducing the impact of sudden 
flights out of JGB driven by international investors (Fukuda et al. 2012). However, 
an assessment of Japan’s financial sector stability undertaken by the IMF identifies 
JGB market exposure as one of the central macro-financial risk factors (IMF 
2012b). In particular, the group of second-tier regional banks is most vulnerable to 
sudden yield shocks likely affecting substantially the banks’ ability to meet capital 
requirements.  
2.4 Financial Sector Regulatory Reforms 
The current structure of the Japanese banking system is largely influenced 
by various regulatory reforms that shaped the banking system from the late 1990s 
onwards. Following the banking crisis in the late-1990s, the banking industry 
became subject to substantial changes (for a review see Hoshi and Patrick 2000). 
The banking crisis revealed the weaknesses of the regulatory system and set the 
agenda for wide-ranging regulatory reform. The early post-crisis years were 
characterised by a large-scale re-design of the regulatory architecture including 
the establishment of new institutions. 
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The search for suitable policies to address the rise in bank failure in the late 
1990s was characterised by a lack of consensus on the causes of the crisis. 
Different interpretations of the origins of Japan’s banking crisis demanded 
different policy responses. The Japanese government made several attempts to 
stabilise the banking system and introduced a variety of measures and reforms. 
The result was a patchwork of policies of which some, in retrospect, turned out to 
be ineffective or even harmful (Calomiris and Mason 2003; Hoshi and Kashyap 
2004; Allen et al. 2011).  
Those stressing the important role of macroeconomic shocks in causing the 
banking crisis argued that the recovery of banks would largely depend on an 
improvement of Japan’s economic conditions. It was generally understood that the 
causal link between economic growth and bank health would not be one-way. For 
the economy to improve, the undercapitalisation of banks would have to be 
addressed. However, as policymakers failed to recognise the actual dimension of 
banks’ non-performing loans (NPL), the capital problem was perceived as a minor 
issue. As a result, a variety of policies were implemented that ignored the fragility 
of banks. For example, in order to alleviate a credit crunch, the government 
required that banks which had received public funds would have to increase 
lending to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) 
provide evidence that this approach substantially worsened the situation. In the 
early 2000s, banks were confronted with a second wave of troubled loans when 
SMEs became financially stressed. Other policy examples include Japan’s various 
piecemeal attempts to recapitalise banks. Allen et al. (2011) argue that many bail-
out packages were too small to be effective because the dimension of Japanese 
banks’ non-performing loans had been largely misunderstood. Caprio and 
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Klingebiel (1996) report that official estimates underestimated the amount of non-
performing loans by a factor of two (10% [estimated] versus 20% [actual] of GDP). 
Giannetti and Simonov (2013) note that the modest approach to capital injections 
was not only ineffective but also harmful for the economic recovery. Instead of 
lending to clients with viable business opportunities, banks were found to have 
subsidised ailing borrowers. Another example is the Tokyo bank levy, a local tax on 
banks that was introduced against the warning of some bank supervisors and 
regulators pointing to the fragile state of the banking system. The results 
presented in Chapter 3, 4 and 5 provide evidence on the impact of the tax on bank 
behaviour, in particular on monitoring effort, liquidity creation, and the supply of 
credit to corporate borrowers. Banks are found to increase net interest margins, 
reduce monitoring of borrowers, supply less credit. and create less liquidity in 
response to the tax. These findings suggest that banks passed along most of their 
tax burden to their clients.  
In retrospect, many of the policies that emanated from the macroeconomic-
fluctuations view are regarded as ineffective (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010; Nelson and 
Tanaka 2014). Because policymakers had failed to understand the true dimension 
of banks’ problems when designing policies, Japanese banks’ problems remained 
largely unresolved under those policies. Nevertheless, the argument that Japan’s 
banks would not return to stability unless economic conditions improved 
ultimately proofed to have a point. It was not until demand for Japanese exports 
had picked up that the situation of banks began to seriously improve (Bank of 
Japan 2005). A return to positive earnings and more solid capital positions allowed 
Japanese banks to finally resolve their problem of non-performing loans.  
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In the wake of the banking crisis, there were also some policies that 
emanated from the weaknesses-in-banks perspective. Acknowledging Japanese 
banks severe capital shortage, policymakers introduced a variety of policies that 
promoted a quick return to bank stability. These included changes to accounting 
and disclosure rules, restructuring programs, the lifting of a ban on bank holdings 
and a blanket deposit guarantee. Although the literature considers few of these 
policies as ineffective (Montgomery and Shimizutani 2009), most were heavily 
debated with regards to moral hazard and regulatory forbearance issues.  
Due to the potentially high costs of being tough on banks ex post, it is not 
uncommon to see regulators practise forbearance in the aftermath of a crisis. 
Skinner (2008) provides evidence that Japanese regulators were soft on banks by 
adopting deferred tax accounting. In the same vein, Allen et al. (2011) discusses 
the Act of Revaluation of Land and the adoption of mark-to-market accounting. 
These accounting changes allowed Japanese banks to bolster their regulatory 
capital with deferred tax assets and unrealised capital gains on real estate. 
However, it was also a tool to window-dress public financial statements of banks 
(Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). Critics argued that the regulatory forbearance made 
insolvent banks look financially sound and thereby substantially increased 
uncertainty over the asset valuation of Japanese banks.  
Another policy aimed at promoting bank stability was a change in 
disclosure requirements. The policy was motivated by the objective to reduce 
uncertainty over banks’ asset valuations by increasing the level of transparency. 
Japan’s crisis period had been characterised by a lack of information on the actual 
size of the banks’ NPL problem. The problem arose as banks were not legally 
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required to disclose information on troubled loans. Although the existing degree of 
disclosure was perceived as sub-optimal, banking regulators only gradually shifted 
to a mandatory disclosure regime. It was feared that the increased transparency of 
banks would cause a system-wide run on banks. To smooth the transition, banks 
were provided with the option to disclose information on a voluntary basis. This 
created considerable heterogeneity in the disclosure levels across banks until 1999 
when all banks became legally required to disclose NPL on new standardised 
definitions (Spiegel and Yamori 2006).  
The blanket deposit guarantee scheme represents another policy that 
emanated from the weaknesses-in-banks narrative. The Japanese government fully 
backed depositors’ funds from 1996 over period of six years. The main objective of 
the scheme was to prevent a bank run with system-wide implications. Among 
critics, the introduction of the blanket deposit insurance sparked a fierce debate on 
moral hazard issues and bank governing issues. Several studies find that 
depositors became more sensitive to bank financial conditions as soon as the 
Japanese government announced the return to a limited deposit insurance (Spiegel 
and Yamori 2007; Murata and Hori 2006; Hori et al. 2009). This suggests that the 
full-guarantee scheme suppressed market discipline and left the monitoring of 
banks mostly in the hands of Japan’s regulators.  
The restructuring of banks represents another policy that aimed to address 
the weaknesses in banks. Upon receipt of capital from public funds, Japanese banks 
were required to restructure their business including large cost cuts in personnel 
and other expenses (Onji et al. 2012). Restructuring programs were mainly 
motivated by the objective to increase the cost efficiency and profitability of 
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Japanese banks. Several studies indicate that Japan’s largest banks needed to 
considerably shrink in size in order to operate more cost-efficiently (Altunbas et al. 
2000). However, despite the substantial restructuring efforts in the aftermath of 
the crisis, Japan’s largest banks struggled to recover earlier profitability levels 
(Bank of Japan 2001). Low revenues rather than excessive operational costs have 
been identified as the main cause of the weak post-crisis performance 
(Loukoianova 2008). The study suggested that the restructuring of large banks 
contributed to gains in efficiency but failed to address other issues that 
undermined performance. As Japan’s larger banks continued to underperform, 
policymakers began to consider other options. There was a general recognition 
that a further consolidation of Japanese banks was necessary. In 1998, a long-held 
ban on bank holding structures was lifted and resulted in a substantial 
transformation of Japan’s largest banks. By 2004, 16 large Japanese banks had 
amalgamated into six bank holdings, Japan’s so-called mega banks. A direct result 
of this transformation was that banks had increased in size again. Montgomery et 
al. (2014) find that the rise in banks’ size reversed most of the earlier gains in cost-
efficiency; bank holdings were found to operate less cost-efficiently. However, 
their findings indicate that the increase in market power resulting from the 
consolidation somewhat improved the profitability of Japanese banks. Among 
policy circles, the emergence of mega banks and their increased market power 
raised too-big-to-fail concerns. Critics argued that the bank holding policy failed to 
address weaknesses in banks as it encourages excessive risk-taking of too-big-to-
fail banks ultimately destabilising the entire banking system.  
In retrospect, many of the policies that addressed the fragile state of banks 
have been criticised for promoting only short-run bank stability. Critics argued 
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that most policies were associated with an increase in moral hazard jeopardizing 
banks’ long-run stability. Nevertheless, policies that prioritised bank stability often 
proofed to be more effective than other policies in addressing Japan’s banking 
crisis, not least because the makers of those policies recognised the full dimension 
of the banks’ NPL problem.  
According to the institutional-weakness view, close ties between MoF 
officials and banks paired with lax enforcement practices had contributed to the 
built up of severe instabilities in Japan’s banking system. Curtailing the authorities 
of the MoF was seen as an essential step towards a more stable banking sector. 
Following the collapse of Japan’s banking sector, a variety of policies were 
introduced that promoted a change in Japan’s institutions. The most notable 
program was the establishment of the Financial Service Agency (FSA) in 1998.  
With the creation of the FSA, a new institution assumed the role of the MoF, 
Japan’s previous bank regulator and supervisor. Like its predecessor, the FSA 
functions as an interpreter of financial regulation and has to ensure its compliance. 
In contrast to the MoF, the FSA was given more legal power in the governance of 
bank activities. This resulted in more rigorous examinations of banks’ books and 
frequent onsite inspections of financial institutions. According to Hoshi and 
Kashyap (2010), the more assertive bank regulator and supervisor was the main 
determinant of Japanese banks’ recovery in the early 2000s. Ota (2001) notes that 
the more rigorous approach to bank governance would have not been possible 
without the separation of fiscal policy making and bank regulation. Prior to the 
establishment of the FSA, the MoF had been jointly responsible for the regulation 
of banks as well as Japan’s fiscal affairs. According to Ota, this joint authority had 
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caused severe conflicts of interest within the MoF. The MoF had little incentive to 
tackle the banks’ NPL problem because large-scale loan losses in the banking 
sector would have had severe fiscal implications.26 Ota concludes that with the 
establishment of the FSA these conflicts of interests were largely resolved.  
Following Japan’s banking crisis, there was a general recognition that 
leaving the governance of banks in the hands of the bank regulator was not a 
sustainable option. The introduction of the FSA was therefore accompanied by a 
comprehensive financial sector reform.27 The dual approach was motivated by the 
objective to give markets a more meaningful role in the governance of banks 
(Hoshi and Ito 2004). A key obstacle to greater market discipline at that time was 
the common practice of cross-shareholding (Hanazaki and Horiuchi 2003). In 
2001, the FSA therefore enacted a law that limited banks’ shareholding causing a 
considerable unwinding of cross-held shares.  
Despite the objective to curtail the power of the MoF, the ministry did not 
lose its role as a bank supervisor altogether. While the MoF is no longer in charge 
of large and foreign-capitalised banks, it maintained its role as a supervisor of 
small financial institutions. Because the FSA delegates some of its activities, the 
policing of small financial institutions is still in the hands of the Local Bureaus of 
the MoF. Anderson and Imoto (2008) conclude from this that the MoF continues to 
be a key determinant for the intensity with which regulation is actually enforced in 
Japan.  
                                                        
26 Loan losses can be claimed as an allowable expense for tax purpose reducing not only the banks’ tax 
liabilities but also the government’s tax revenues.  
27 Due to its size, Japan’s financial sector reform is often referred to as Japan’s London-style Big Bang.  
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In retrospect, improving Japan’s institutional framework and the 
governance of banks has been recognised as a key policy response to resolving 
Japan’s banking problem (Hoshi and Kashyap 2004). Some argue that the FSA’s 
more assertive regulation and supervision of Japanese banks was also an 
important determinant of the banks’ improved resilience to shocks that recently 
emanated from the U.S. financial crisis in 2007 and the subsequent sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe (Harada et al. 2011).  
Since the recent financial crisis, the deregulation of capital markets has 
continued alongside measures to enhance the stability of these markets (Hoshi and 
Yasuda 2015). To deregulate capital markets further, a number of measures have 
been brought under way that aim to increase the exposure of Japanese households 
in capital markets. These include the amendment of laws restricting investment 
into capital markets, tighter regulation pertaining to market misconduct and 
insider trading, as well as the introduction of higher fraud penalties. To stabilise 
capital markets, Japan’s regulators have established a resolution mechanism and 
introduced stricter regulations for OTC derivative trades. In the years to come, the 
ongoing effort to deregulate capital markets is likely to put pressure on Japan’s 
incumbent banks.  
2.5 Summary 
This chapter provides background information on the evolution of the 
Japanese banking industry since 1990s, relevant for putting findings on the Tokyo 
bank tax presented in Chapter 3, 4 and 5 into a broader economic and institutional 
context.  
Chapter 2 | Background on the Japanese Banking Industry 
46 
 
Section 2.2 delivers important insights into the structure and performance 
of Japanese banking since the early 2000s. By looking at key indicators across 
different bank types over time, a picture emerges that shows relatively 
homogenous trajectories across different bank types. Across all bank types, the 
number of banks and branches has declined; a secular trend that has started in the 
1990s and is mirrored by developments in banking industries in other advanced 
economies. Net interest margins also declined while administrative expenses 
increased over time reflecting the impact of Japan’s low interest rate environment 
and increases in the costs of labour.  
Section 2.3 and 2.4 highlight key developments in the banking industry and 
the regulatory landscape with a particular focus on the Japanese banking crisis of 
the 1990s. A short discussion of causes and effects of the Japanese banking crisis of 
the 1990s reveals the challenges faced by policy makers charged with the task of 
reforming the banking sector. The causes of the crisis were diverse and complex in 
nature and therefore required a major reform to both, bank regulation and the 
institutional framework. A brief analysis of these various policy measures against 
the backdrop of the more recent 2008 financial crisis shows that the resilience of 
the Japanese banking industry during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis is 
mainly due to the policy mix introduced after the banking crisis of the 1990s.  
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Chapter 3 | Bank Taxation and Financial Intermediation 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the impact of taxation on the financial 
intermediation activities of banks in Japan. Taxing banks has received widespread 
media coverage and attention in policy circles in many developed economies 
following the global financial crisis, where taxpayer funded bank bailouts led to 
large fiscal deficits. As part of a range of policy reforms, proposals to increase bank 
taxes have been suggested as a means to replenish government coffers and contain 
excessive risk-taking of banks. Opponents of such proposals contend that 
increasing taxes would have adverse consequences for customers if banks pass on 
any resultant cost increases by reduced lending, lower deposit rates or higher loan 
rates. 
Anticipating and assessing the effects of taxation on the behaviour of banks 
is not straightforward. Depending on the type and size of the tax imposed, and the 
prevailing market conditions under which banks operate, banks may choose to 
absorb any increase in costs by reducing costly activities such as monitoring of 
borrowers, or instead pass increased costs onto customers by restricting credit 
supply, reducing deposit rates or increasing loan rates. Moreover, establishing a 
causal link from tax to bank behaviour is challenging, given that tax policy changes 
often form part of a broad package of regulatory and fiscal reforms, which are 
often anticipated in advance by market participants, and phased in gradually over 
an extended period of time. 
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In this chapter, we utilise a quasi-natural experiment to investigate how the 
unexpected imposition of a special tax on gross profits (known locally as the Tokyo 
bank tax) in 2000 influenced the lending, deposit taking, pricing and monitoring 
behaviour of Japanese banks.28 The tax was levied on commercial banks with 
sizeable financial intermediation activities in Tokyo and had the objective of 
generating additional tax revenue for the Tokyo Government. The Tokyo Bank Tax 
was levied on gross profitability (composed of net interest, and net fee, 
commission and trading income). 29  As such the tax was tantamount to a tax on the 
financial intermediation activities of banks. Using this differential tax treatment to 
overcome identification concerns, we investigate whether there is a causal link 
from tax to the financial intermediation activities of banks. As such, we make a 
significant contribution to a small, but important literature on the taxation of 
banks. The results of our study have relevance beyond Japan, by contributing to 
and informing ongoing discussions amongst academics and policy makers as to the 
best way to reform and design the taxation of banks following the global financial 
crisis. 
To inform our theoretical framework and research hypotheses we draw on 
prior theoretical contributions related to agency issues and contractual hazards in 
financial intermediation settings (Diamond 1984; Holmström and Tirole 1997).  
We develop a theoretical model (in Section 3.3) that describes the relationship 
between bank monitoring, the intermediation process and product pricing. A basic 
assumption underlying this model is that the outcome of a borrower’s investment 
                                                        
28 In the early 2000s, the banking sector in Japan was emerging gradually from a severe financial crisis. For 
extensive discussions of the financial crisis and its global repercussions see: Peek and Rosengren (2000); 
Hoshi and Kashyap (2000); Ito and Patrick (2005). For a more recent overview see Uchida and Udell (2014).  
29 In contrast to net profits, gross profits exclude expenses such as personnel costs, loan loss provisions, and 
write-offs. 
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project is not perfectly observed by the lender in the absence of monitoring. The 
model also incorporates the possibility of strategic default by borrowers. As a 
consequence, banks monitor borrowers closely in order to prevent them from 
defaulting on their loans. Given that the introduction of a gross profit tax reduces 
the resources available to banks to perform monitoring, our theoretical model 
predicts an increase in the probability of borrower default. Faced with loan losses 
arising from borrower defaults, banks reduce loan rates. This reduction in loan 
rates provides an incentive for borrowers not to default.  Banks also reduce the 
size of their respective loan portfolios in order to compensate for the combined 
losses arising from the reduction in loan rates, reduced monitoring and increased 
taxation.  On the liability side, our model predicts a reduction in the volume and 
rate of interest paid on deposits, and under certain conditions the reduction in 
deposit rates exceeds that of loan rates.30 The intuition that depositors rather than 
borrowers bear the brunt of any tax is that the latter have a tendency to default. As 
a consequence, resources are required to enable monitoring activity and prevent 
borrower default.  
Our dataset comprises semi-annual financial accounts for a sample of 126 
banks over the period 1998-2001 (which straddles the introduction of the Tokyo 
bank tax in 2000). In order to assess the effects of the gross-profit tax on the 
financial intermediation activities of banks, we classify banks into those that are 
affected by the Tokyo bank tax and those that are not. Based on this classification, 
we use a difference-in-differences approach to compare the difference in 
behaviour of the affected banks between the pre-tax and post-tax period with the 
                                                        
30 The conditions under which the reduction in deposit rates exceeds that of loan rates are described in detail 
in Section 3.3.2. 
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same difference in the behaviour of the unaffected group of banks. We corroborate 
the evidence presented from the difference-in-differences analysis with a 
regression discontinuity analysis and an event study.  
By way of preview, the main findings of the empirical analysis suggest a 
causal link between the Tokyo bank tax and the financial intermediation activities 
of banks. In response to an unexpected tax on gross profit, banks increase net 
interest and net interest and fee margins. A decomposition of the net interest 
margin into deposit and loan pricing components indicates that both the interest 
rates paid to depositors and charged to borrowers decline following the 
introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. This implies a pronounced pass-through effect 
from banks to depositors. Further analysis reveals that when faced with additional 
taxes, affected banks reduce total lending. Furthermore, banks subject to the tax 
experience a decrease in rate-sensitive deposits on a larger scale than counterparts 
unaffected by the tax. These results are indicative of rate adjustments (in 
particular) for deposit products with relatively high interest rates, and confirm a 
partial pass-through effect of the tax from banks to depositors. These results are 
consistent regardless of the estimation method employed.  
Our theoretical model also predicts that the channel through which a tax on 
gross profit leads to contraction in financial intermediation is via a reduction in the 
level of bank monitoring of borrowers. We investigate the validity of this 
prediction via a series of empirical tests employing a data set of banks and 
constituent borrowing firms. Underlying these aforementioned tests is the 
assumption that the cost of monitoring borrowing firms is lower when these firms 
are: geographically proximate to their lending bank; less informationally opaque 
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(with a credit rating assigned by a third-party agency); or invest more in 
pledgeable (tangible) assets. Thus, following an increase in taxation, affected banks 
seek to reduce monitoring costs by rebalancing their respective loan portfolios 
toward those borrowers that are geographically proximate, less informationally 
opaque or hold more pledgeable assets. Moreover, bank monitoring is of value to 
borrowing firms by providing valuable information to external stakeholders 
(investors, bondholders). This reduces the cost of external funding and enhances 
the overall market values of borrowing firms. Thus, following an increase in 
taxation, if affected banks reduce monitoring of borrowing firms, this is reflected in 
an increase in the cost of financing (bond issuance) and a decline in market values 
(returns to investors) of firms with existing borrowing relationships with banks 
affected by the Tokyo bank tax. 
The results of the aforementioned series of tests are as follows. Banks 
subject to the provisions of the Tokyo bank tax reduce the costs of monitoring by 
reducing lending to firms located at distance (relative to counterparts that are 
geographically proximate); firms that are less informationally opaque; and firms 
that have less pledgeable assets. The costs of debt issuance increase for firms that 
borrow from affected banks, suggesting that the monitoring of these borrowers 
deteriorates after the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. Finally, the market value 
of firms which borrow from affected banks reacts more negatively to the 
announcement of the tax relative to the market value of firms not borrowing from 
affected banks. We find no significant results after executing a placebo analyses in 
which assume falsely that the Tokyo bank tax was introduced one year prior to its 
actual introduction. Taken together these results provide corroborating evidence 
in support of the monitoring channel identified by our theoretical model. 
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Our analysis contributes to several literatures. We contribute to a small 
literature that examines the pass-through effects of taxes to bank customers.31 The 
results emanating from this literature are rather mixed. Early evidence suggests 
that taxes feed through to higher levels of bank profitability (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga 2001). Huizinga et al. (2014) extend this analysis by accounting for 
international double taxation and find that these taxes are almost passed fully 
through to bank customers. Other evidence, presented by Albertazzi and 
Gambacorta (2010) and Chiorazzo and Milani (2011) for large samples of 
European banks, and Capelle-Blancard and Havrylchyk (2017) for Hungary 
suggests that banks shift most of their respective tax burdens onto customers, with 
borrowers bearing most of the tax burden via increased loan rates or a reduction 
in credit access. For a large sample of European banks, Kogler (2016) finds that 
bank taxes lead only to small increases in net interest margins via increases in loan 
rates. Deposit rates paid to savers are unaffected. The level of competition and 
capitalization affect the pass-through of taxes. Other studies find no evidence of a 
change in loan or deposit rates following the introduction of bank taxes (Capelle-
Blancard and Havrylchyk 2014; Buch et al. 2016). Instead the increased costs 
arising from the tax burden is absorbed by banks. Our contribution to this strand 
of literature is manifold. First, we derive our empirical hypotheses from a new 
theoretical model which incorporates a moral hazard problem for the borrower. 
                                                        
31 Several studies investigate the implications of taxation on the capital structure of banks. Hemmelgarn and 
Teichmann (2014) and Keen and De Mooij (2016) provide cross country analyses of the impact of the 
asymmetric tax treatment of debt and equity on capital structure decisions of banks. Schepens (2016) finds 
that banks in Belgium increased equity capital following a policy change (known as allowance for corporate 
equity) that reduced the relative tax advantage of debt funding. Celerier et al. (2017) investigate the impact of 
a tax policy change in Italy. The authors find that banks increase equity capital when equity and debt are 
treated symmetrically by tax authorities. Moreover, such a symmetric tax treatment of debt and equity leads to 
a large expansion in bank lending.   
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This allows for a consideration of the monitoring function of banks and its 
interplay with taxes. As such our model departs from the Monti-Klein approach, 
which is used extensively in this literature (Klein 1971; Monti 1972). Second, we 
focus on a relatively simple gross-profit tax to investigate whether taxes affect 
bank behaviour. Assessing the effect on bank behaviour of a tax applied to net 
profit is difficult given that banks can use loan loss provisions and other forms of 
discretionary expense to reduce tax liability (Andries et al. 2017). A tax levied on 
gross profit limits this possibility, and enables a thorough assessment of the effects 
of tax on the financial intermediation activities of banks.  Third, in line with prior 
literature we find strong support for a pass-through effect of taxes to bank 
depositors. However, we divert from previous findings with respect to bank 
behaviour towards borrowers. As predicted by our theoretical model (and 
contrary to previous evidence) we find that banks faced with an increase in taxes 
on gross profits reduce both deposit and loan rates. Therefore, banks that are left 
with fewer resources to monitor borrowers as a result of the tax, are forced to 
switch from a ‘stick’ (monitoring) to a ‘carrot’ (reduced loan rate) approach in 
order to discourage loan default.  
We extend the literature that explores the determinants of bank monitoring 
effort. Previous research suggests that the extent to which banks engage in the 
processing of borrower-related information (loan monitoring) depends on: loan 
contract design (Cerqueiro et al. 2016); managerial contracting (Udell 1989); 
lending technology (Mester et al. 2007); organisational form (Stein 2002); and the 
structure of bank-firm relationships (Carletti 2004). Competition, capital 
requirements (Almazan 2002), and market power (Caminal and Matutes 2002) 
also impact monitoring. The novelty of our work lies in our analysis of how bank 
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monitoring effort changes in response to taxation. In a simple model, we show that 
taxes on gross profits reduce the incentive to exert sufficient effort to monitoring 
borrowers.  
Our analysis contributes to a long-established literature that examines the 
determinants of interest margins for financial institutions. The results of prior 
research suggest that the size, capitalisation, credit and liquidity risk, competition, 
regulation and supervision are important determinants of bank interest margins 
(Ho and Saunders 1981; Allen 1988; Valverde and Fernandez 2007, Kitamura et al. 
2015). Our approach augments these aforementioned studies by incorporating 
taxation as a key determinant of bank margins. The difference-in-differences 
approach used in the empirical analysis allows us to isolate the specific 
implications for interest margins of tax differences across banks, and decompose 
the net interest margin to investigate the effect of taxes on deposit and loan 
pricing. 
Finally, our analysis contributes to the recent literature that explores the 
impact of negative exogenous shocks on bank credit supply. For example, Buch et 
al. (2016) find that banks subject to extra taxes do not on average reduce lending. 
However, banks most affected by the imposition of these taxes (those with higher 
market share) extend fewer loans than less affected counterparts. Schandlbauer 
(2017) shows that banks reduce lending following an increase in taxes. This is 
more evident for less well-capitalised banks, which have more limited 
opportunities for increasing debt in order to benefit from tax shields. Cornett et al. 
(2011) show that fewer new loans are originated when banks are exposed to 
liquidity risk. The results of the present study lend some support to prior literature 
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by finding that the Tokyo bank tax leads affected banks to contract credit supply. 
We also identify an overall reduction in the flow of intermediated funds. Banks 
affected by the Tokyo bank tax did not only extend fewer loans, but also held fewer 
interest rate-sensitive deposits. 
In summary, this chapter provides new insights as to the effects of taxation 
on bank behaviour, and the extent to which banks pass on the increased burden of 
higher costs to customers via changes in pricing and lending strategies. As such the 
results have relevance for policymakers tasked with monitoring the effects of 
taxation on banks, the wider financial system and the real economy.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a 
background to the current study. Section 3.3 introduces the theoretical model and 
the hypotheses. The sample and methodology are described in Section 3.4. Section 
3.5 discusses the main results. In Section 3.6 we describe the sample and 
methodology related to testing the channel and discuss the results. Robustness 
tests are discussed in Section 3.7. Section 3.8 provides a summary.  
3.2 Background 
To estimate the impact of taxes on bank behaviour, we exploit a differential 
tax treatment of banks that occurred in Japan in 2000 when the Tokyo Government 
levied a special tax that affected one group of banks but left other banks 
unaffected. This decision was motivated by the urgent need to generate tax 
revenues for Tokyo, where the revenues raised from income taxes collected from 
banks declined by more than 25 percent between 1996 and 1999. 
The Tokyo Government selected banks liable for the tax based on three 
criteria. First, banks with a physical presence in Tokyo would have gross profits 
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generated in this metropolitan area taxed by the Tokyo Government. Banks 
without headquarters or branches in Tokyo were exempt from the tax. Second, 
only domestic banks were liable for the tax. Foreign banks (including those with 
operations in Tokyo) were not liable for the tax. Third, banks with average 
deposits exceeding ¥5 trillion over the past five years were subject to the tax. 
Banks with deposits below this threshold were not liable for the tax (DeWit 2000).  
A timeline of key events surrounding the announcement, introduction and 
the repeal of the Tokyo bank tax is summarised in Table 3.1. The Tokyo 
Government planned to levy the bank tax over a period of five fiscal years. 
However, following a successful legal challenge by banks, the tax was not levied 
over the full period. By the end of the second year, the Tokyo District Court 
declared the bank tax to be void followed by a final decision against the tax by the 
Tokyo High Court. For the purposes of the empirical analysis conducted in the 
present study, we consider the declaration of the District Court shortly before the 
end of fiscal year 2001 as the date which marks the official termination of the 
Tokyo bank tax. After this declaration, the Tokyo Government ceased collecting the 
Tokyo bank tax. 
The imposition of the Tokyo bank tax occurred during the period when the 
Japanese banking system was recovering from a major banking crisis (see Chapter 
2, Section 2.3), during which time some of the largest financial institutions failed.  
To resolve the banking crisis and to contain the negative impact on the real 
economy, the government implemented a large-scale and far-reaching programme 
of reforms. This programme included: recapitalising distressed banks; creating a 
new financial supervisor; and establishing a support scheme for distressed non-
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financial firms. While none of these interventions were implemented over the 
same period as the Tokyo bank tax, the recapitalisation of distressed banks (under 
the terms of the Prompt Recapitalisation Act) as well as mergers between 
established banks could potentially act as confounding events, and affect the 
results of any investigation of the impact of the Tokyo Bank Tax on bank 
behaviour. We investigate this possibility in Section 3.7.2. 
Table 3.1 | Timeline of Events 
Fiscal year Date Event 
1999 February 7, 2000 Ishihara announces plan to levy a special bank tax, 
selects banks for tax treatment 
 March 23, 2000 Tokyo Assembly of Public Finance approves bank 
tax 
2000 April 1, 2000 Tokyo bank tax adopted 
 October 18, 2000 Lawsuit filed against Tokyo Government 
2001 July 7, 2001 Tokyo Government collects tax revenue* 
 March 26, 2002 District Court declares bank tax to be void 
 March 29, 2002 Tokyo Government files appeal with the Tokyo High 
Court 
2002 January 30, 2003 Supreme Court rejects appeal by Tokyo Government 
and rules against the Tokyo bank tax 
Sources: Meji-Gakuin (2008), The Japan Times, Ministry of Finance (Japan). In common with the US, the 
Japanese taxation system generally delays the recognition of income for tax purposes until the income has 
been realised. Banks affected by the Tokyo bank tax filed tax returns at the end of fiscal year 2000 (fiscal year 
2000 = 1st April 2000 - 30th March 2001). Tax payments were due by the end of the third month after filing. 
The Tokyo bank tax levied on gross profit represents a direct form of a tax 
on financial intermediation. Gross profits comprise three components. First is the 
net interest margin, defined as the difference between interest income and 
expenses. This margin relates to a bank’s core function as a financial intermediary, 
encapsulating the price of intermediation of funds from savers (depositors) to 
borrowers (entrepreneurs). The net interest margin represents the largest 
component of gross profit, accounting on average for 80% of gross profits during 
the sample period. The net fee and commission margin and the net trading margin 
represent the second and third components of gross profit.  
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3.3 Model and Hypotheses 
3.3.1 A Simple Model of Intermediation 
Banks in our framework design loan contracts and monitor borrower 
behaviour. Such actions aim to curb borrowers’ moral hazard resulting in 
tendencies towards strategic default or outright repudiation on borrowed funds. 
Loan contract design and borrower monitoring have provided a unifying theme in 
models of financial intermediation (Diamond 1984; Rajan 1992; Besanko and 
Kanatas 1993; Holmström and Tirole 1997; Repullo and Suarez 1998). 
We present a one-period model of financial intermediation with a single 
representative bank that performs tasks as an active lender and passive holder of 
deposits. The bank operates in a competitive market for deposits. Deposits are 
used to finance loans to individual borrowers. While the bank pays a competitive 
rate to depositors, it decides upon loan size, loan rate and the effort devoted to the 
ex-post monitoring of borrowers.  
The ex-post monitoring of borrowers is costly, but reduces the probability 
of loan default. The bank’s monitoring effort reduces the risk of loan default, and 
leads to a decline in the spread between deposit and loan interest rates. The model 
posits that if a tax is levied on the profit the bank earns from offering financial 
intermediation services to borrowers and depositors, then such a tax affects 
directly core financial intermediation activities including the volume of loans and 
deposits, and the interest rates for depositors and borrowers.  
The bank engages with both borrowers and depositors via a set of loan and 
deposit contracts. In the remainder of this section, we present a model which 
addresses how key contractual variables, such as the size of loans and deposits, 
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loan and deposit rates, and monitoring effort are affected by a sudden increase in 
tax. For the purposes of exposition, we assume that depositors and borrowers are 
two distinct sets of agents. This allows us to analyse the features of loan and 
deposit contracts separately, before combining these to examine the overall impact 
of taxes on financial intermediation.  
Loan Contracts – Borrowers  
Each borrower has a project which produces a cash flow with a technology 
given by a concave production function,𝑓(𝐿), where 𝐿 denotes the loan amount. We 
impose the following assumption on the technology: 𝑓/(𝐿) > 0 and𝑓//(𝐿) < 0. An 
example of such a technology is 𝑓(𝐿) = 𝐴√𝐿, where 𝐴 is a parameter. Borrowers 
do not have any internal means of finance, and so rely on bank financing. The bank 
charges interest rate 𝑅 against a loan amount 𝐿. The bank also chooses the 
probability, 𝑝, of monitoring each borrower in order to deter strategic default. 
Given the one-period nature of the model capturing the relationship between the 
borrowers and the bank, there is no scope for reputation building by the borrower 
(which would emerge from repeated interactions). Hence, borrowers are more 
likely to default strategically after securing financing. Financial intermediation and 
lending in particular is special in this context, since banks can use information and 
expertise to monitor borrowers in order to deter strategic default.  
A borrower may or may not behave honestly depending on the payoff 
(gains and costs) associated with such behaviours. If the bank charges a loan rate 
𝑅, on a loan amount 𝐿, disbursed to a borrower, the pay-off to an honest borrower 
(who repays the total loan obligation) is 𝑓(𝐿) − 𝑅𝐿. Whether a borrower repays a 
loan depends on the bank’s monitoring effort, 𝑝. If the borrower intends to behave 
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dishonestly, then a cost is incurred which takes a fraction 𝛼 of output 𝑓(𝐿). If the 
borrower gets caught by the bank, 𝑅𝐿 is paid back and legal and other pecuniary 
expenses amounting to 𝑐 are incurred. The borrower’s expected pay-off from 
dishonest behaviour is 𝑝[𝛼𝑓(𝐿) − 𝑅𝐿 − 𝑐] + (1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝐿). Hence the borrower’s 
incentive compatibility condition is 𝑓(𝐿) − 𝑅𝐿 ≥ 𝑝[𝛼𝑓(𝐿) − 𝑅𝐿 − 𝑐] + (1 − 𝑝)𝑓(𝐿) 
which re-arranging reduces to 𝑝[(1 − 𝛼)𝑓(𝐿) + 𝑐] ≥  (1 − 𝑝)𝑅𝐿 . This can be 
written in the equality form as:  
𝑅𝐿 =  
𝑝[(1−𝛼)𝑓(𝐿)+𝑐]
(1− 𝑝)
 (3.1) 
Equation (3.1) is the reduced form version of the borrower’s incentive 
constraint precluding default, and states that the total obligation of the borrower 
must not exceed a multiple of the expected costs from default.32 
Loan Contracts – Bank and Borrowers  
The bank’s profit after tax earned from financial intermediation activities is 
(𝑅𝐿 − 𝑟𝑑𝐷 + 𝑟𝑓𝑆)(1 − 𝜏) − ℎ(𝑝), where 𝜏 is the tax rate, 𝑟𝑑 is the rate paid on 
deposits, and 𝐷 is the amount of deposits. The cost of monitoring, ℎ(𝑝), is an 
increasing and convex function of the bank’s monitoring effort with ℎ/(𝑝) > 0 and 
ℎ//(𝑝) > 0. An example of such a monitoring cost function is: ℎ(𝑝) = 𝑎𝑝 +
1
2
𝑏𝑝2, 
where 𝑎 > 0 and 𝑏 > 0 are constant, and where the cost of monitoring tends to 
increase rapidly with the effort devoted to monitoring. The bank holds a safe asset, 
𝑆 > 0  and earns a risk-free return, 𝑟𝑓 . 
                                                        
32 In Equation (3.1) the present value of the equilibrium loan can be written as: 𝐿 =  
𝑝[(1−𝛼)𝑓(𝐿)+𝑐]
(1− 𝑝)𝑅
.    
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The bank’s balance sheet comprising the sources of funds, 𝐷, equals the 
total uses of the fund, which are: the sum of loan disbursements, 𝐿; reserve 
requirements, 𝑋; and the safe asset, 𝑆. This can be expressed as: 
𝐷 = 𝐿 + 𝑋 + 𝑆 (3.2) 
Since the reserve requirement is mandatory and a constant fraction of the 
total deposits, X = β𝐷, 0 < 𝛽 < 1. Incorporating X into (3.2) gives: 
𝐷(1 − 𝛽) = 𝐿 + 𝑆 (3.3) 
Assuming that the bank earns a return of 𝑟0 = 0 on reserves, the profit 
(after using the identity of balance sheet and reserve requirements as given in 
(3.2) and (3.3) respectively) can be expressed as 𝜋𝑏 = [𝑅𝐿 − 𝑟𝑑𝐷 + 𝑟𝑓{𝐷(1 − 𝛽) −
𝐿}](1 − 𝜏) − ℎ(𝑝), which can be rewritten as: 
𝜋𝑏 = [𝑅𝐿 − {𝑟𝑑 − 𝑟𝑓(1 − 𝛽)}𝐷 − 𝑟𝑓𝐿](1 − 𝜏) − ℎ(𝑝) (3.4) 
This yields the bank’s objective function, where the bank maximizes profit 
by choosing 𝑅, 𝐿, and 𝑝, subject to (3.1). That is, the bank offers a combination of 
the loan rate 𝑅, and the loan size 𝐿, and commits to a monitoring policy 𝑝, to 
maximise profit as given in (3.4). Incorporating (3.1) into (3.4), yields the objective 
function in reduced form: 
𝜋𝑏(𝑝, 𝐿) =  [
𝑝[(1−𝛼)𝑓(𝐿)+𝑐]
(1− 𝑝)
− {𝑟𝑑 − 𝑟𝑓(1 − 𝛽)}𝐷 − 𝑟𝑓𝐿] (1 − 𝜏) − ℎ(𝑝), 
where 𝜋𝑏(𝑝, 𝐿) is the bank’s profit function with two choice variables, 𝑝 and 𝐿. The 
reduced form profit function above includes: (i) the incentive compatibility 
condition; (ii) the balance sheet identity; and (iii) the reserve requirement 
constraint.  
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The first-order conditions with respect to 𝐿 and 𝑝 for the optimum are: 
𝑝(1 − 𝛼)𝑓/(𝐿) =  𝑟𝑓(1 − 𝑝), which can also be expressed as: 
𝑝(1−𝛼)𝑓/(𝐿)
(1−𝑝)
 = 𝑟𝑓 (3.5) 
and 
[(1−𝛼)𝑓(𝐿)+𝑐](1−𝜏)
(1−𝑝)2
= ℎ/(𝑝) (3.6) 
The incentive constraint preventing strategic default is given by:  
𝑅𝐿 = 𝑝 
(1−𝛼)𝑓(𝐿)+𝑐
(1− 𝑝)
 (3.7) 
Equations (3.5) and (3.6) determine jointly the optimal loan amount (𝐿∗) 
and monitoring effort (𝑝∗) of the bank. The optimal values in Equation (3.7) can be 
substituted to solve for the optimal 𝑅∗ as a function of the tax rate, technology, 
costs of default, and other parameters. Equation (3.5) describes the trade-off for 
the optimal disbursement of the loan. The left-hand side represents the 
incremental productivity of the loan, while the right-hand side is the marginal cost 
of loan, which is the risk-free rate that the bank could have earned. 
Equations (3.6) and (3.7) can be combined to derive the relationship 
between the loan rate (𝑅∗), monitoring effort (𝑝∗) and the tax rate 𝜏:  
𝑅∗𝐿∗(1 − 𝜏) = 𝑝ℎ/(𝑝)(1 − 𝑝)  (3.8) 
The left-hand side of Equation (3.8) is the bank’s marginal after-tax loan 
loss from a reduction in monitoring activity. The right-hand side captures the 
marginal savings from a reduction in monitoring activity. Equation (3.8) also 
captures the relationship between 𝑅∗ and 𝜏. We return to this relationship later 
when discussing Hypothesis 4.  
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The model so far completes the borrowing side of the bank loan where the 
optimal borrowing rate is 𝑅∗(𝑟𝑓 , τ), the optimal loan amount issued by the bank is 
𝐿∗(𝑟𝑓 , τ) and the optimal probability of monitoring is 𝑝
∗(𝑟𝑓 , τ). Next, we discuss the 
deposit contracts offered by the bank under competitive market conditions. 
Deposit Contracts – Bank and Depositors: 
Depositors of the bank are economic agents who smooth consumption over 
time (as in any standard model). We assume two periods, 𝑡 = 0, 1. Depositors have 
endowments of 𝑤0 at period 0 and 𝑤1 at period 1 with 𝑤0 > 𝑤1. If depositors 
deposit 𝐷 with a bank and are promised a deposit rate equal to 𝑟𝑑, then the 
depositors’ budget constraints are 𝑤0 = 𝑐0 + 𝐷 and 𝑤1 + 𝐷𝑟𝑑 = 𝑐1, in each of the 
two periods, 𝑡 = 0, 1, respectively, where 𝑐𝑡  denotes the consumption of the 
depositors at time t. 
If the depositor’s utility function is 𝑢(𝑐0) + 𝜃𝑢(𝑐1), then intertemporal 
maximization of utility would generate an optimal deposit function of 𝐷∗ = 𝐷∗(𝑟𝑑). 
For example, if the depositor has a logarithmic utility function, then the optimal 
deposit function is given by 𝐷∗ =
1
1+𝜃
(𝑤0 −
𝑤1
𝑟𝑑
).33 Thus for any deposit rate, 𝑟𝑑 
offered by banks, individual depositors save 𝐷∗. 
We assume that the competitive structure of the market, results in an 
equilibrium determination of the deposit rate where banks earn zero profit and 
depositors maximize utility. Proceeding with the logarithmic utility function of the 
depositors, a bank’s competitive zero profit condition implies that the following 
condition holds for all banks: 
                                                        
33 The first order condition for a logarithmic utility function is: 
1
𝑤0−𝐷
=
𝜃𝑟𝑑
𝑤1+𝑟𝑑𝐷
. By rearranging, we get the 
equation for 𝐷∗ =
1
1+𝜃
(𝑤0 −
𝑤1
𝑟𝑑
). 
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𝜋𝑏∗(𝑝, 𝐿) =  [𝑝∗
(1−𝛼)𝑓(𝐿∗)+𝑐
(1− 𝑝∗)
− {𝑟𝑑 − 𝑟𝑓(1 − 𝛽)}
1
1+𝜃
(𝑤0 −
𝑤1
𝑟𝑑
) − 𝑟𝑓𝐿
∗] (1 − 𝜏) − ℎ(𝑝∗) = 0 (3.9)  
where * denotes a variable set at the optimal level given by Equations (3.5) and 
(3.6). Equation (3.9) determines the optimal deposit rate 𝑟𝑑 = 𝑟𝑑(𝜏). Deposits are 
determined by 𝐷∗ =
1
1+𝜃
(𝑤0 −
𝑤1
𝑟𝑑(𝜏)
). 
3.3.2 Hypotheses 
Our hypotheses follow from the comparative statics results when all key 
endogenous variables are subject to changes arising from an exogenous increase of 
the tax rate. In this section, we list our testable hypotheses. A proof of each 
hypothesis (unless in the text below) are provided in Section A of the Appendix.  
The first two hypotheses are related to the effect of a tax on the bank’s 
deposit rate and volume.  
Hypothesis 1: In response to increased taxes on bank profit, the deposit rate 
declines unambiguously (
𝑑𝑟𝑑
𝑑𝜏
< 0).  
Hypothesis 2: The volume of deposits declines in response to increased taxes on 
bank profits (
𝑑𝐷∗
𝑑𝜏
< 0).  
The next set of hypotheses follow directly from the analysis of the bank’s 
optimal contract design with borrowers. Our third hypothesis considers the effect 
of a tax on the bank’s volume of lending, while hypotheses 4 and 5 deal with the 
effect of a tax on the loan rate. 
Hypothesis 3: The bank reduces the volume of loans in response to taxes (
𝑑𝐿∗
𝑑𝜏
< 0).  
Hypothesis 4:  The bank may reduce the loan rate.  
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Hypothesis 4 is concerned with the sign of  
𝑑𝑅∗
𝑑𝜏
 . In order to examine the impact of 𝜏 
on 𝑅∗ , we write Equation (3.8) in the following form:  
𝑅∗ =
𝑝∗ℎ′(𝑝∗)(1−𝑝∗)
𝐿∗(1−𝜏)
=
𝐺(𝑝)
𝐿∗(1−𝜏)
, where 𝐺(𝑝∗) ≡ 𝑝∗ℎ′(𝑝∗)(1 − 𝑝∗). 
First, we consider the case where taxes have no impact on bank monitoring 
effort. In other words,  𝑝∗ is independent of the tax rate and is constant. In this 
case, an increase in the tax rate leads to an increase in the loan rate (the 
denominator of  
𝐺(𝑝)
𝐿∗(1−𝜏)
 diminishes as  
𝑑𝐿∗
𝑑𝜏
< 0, and the term (1 − 𝜏) decreases). An 
increase of the loan rate allows the bank to recover some of its costs that arise 
from higher taxes, and from a decline in the volume of loans (see Hypothesis 3).34  
This is the direct tax pass-through effect where part of the increased cost arising 
from an increase in taxes is absorbed by clients (borrowers) who now pay a higher 
price (loan rate).  
Second, we consider the case where taxes have an impact on the bank’s 
monitoring effort. In this case 𝑝∗ is dependent on the tax rate. As shown in 
Hypothesis 6 (below), taxes can curb the effort that the bank devotes to monitoring 
borrowers, and as a consequence increases the risk of strategic default among 
borrowers. Formally, 
𝑑𝑝∗
𝑑𝜏
< 0 and 𝐺′(𝑝∗) > 0, which implies that the numerator 
also decreases as the tax rate increases. The combined impact of the tax rate on the 
numerator and denominator of  
𝐺(𝑝)
𝐿∗(1−𝜏)
 however makes changes in the direction of 
the loan rate ambiguous. Taking a logarithmic differentiation of 𝑅∗ =
𝐺(𝑝)
𝐿∗(1−𝜏)
, we 
obtain the following expression 
𝑑𝑅∗
𝑑𝜏
1
𝑅∗
= 
𝐺/(𝑝∗)
𝐺(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝∗
𝑑𝜏
−
𝑑𝐿∗
𝑑𝜏
1
𝐿∗
−
1
(1−𝜏)
. If 
𝐺/(𝑝∗)
𝐺(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝∗
𝑑𝜏
>
                                                        
34 An increase in the loan rate in response to higher tax rates is also in line with the prediction of a standard 
Monti-Klein model.  
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𝑑𝐿∗
𝑑𝜏
1
𝐿∗
+
1
(1−𝜏)
, the loan rate decreases. By decreasing the loan rate the bank prevents 
strategic defaults, which would have otherwise increased if the bank had opted for 
a higher loan rate while reducing monitoring effort. We call this the borrowers’ 
incentive effect as it reduces their pay-off in default even when the bank’s 
monitoring effort is lower.  
In summary, the net effect on the loan rate of a tax on bank profit depends 
on the relative strength of the incentive effect. The prevalence of the incentive 
effect over the pass-through effect would prompt a reduction in loan rate. In 
contrast, where the pass-through effect dominates the incentive effect, there would 
be an increase in the loan rate.35  
Hypothesis 5:  If the incentive effect dominates the tax pass-through effect, the 
loan and deposit rate both decrease. The relative magnitude of the downward 
adjustment of the two rates is ambiguous.  
Formally, the change of the spread between the loan and deposit rate, 
𝑑𝑅∗
𝑑𝜏
1
𝑅∗
−
𝑑𝑟𝑑
𝑑𝜏
1
𝑟𝑑
, is expected to decrease under the following conditions:  
𝑑𝑟𝑑
𝑑𝜏
< 0 
(Hypothesis 1) and 
𝑑𝑅∗
𝑑𝜏
1
𝑅∗
< 0 if 
𝐺′(𝑝∗)
𝐺(𝑝)
d𝑝∗
dτ
−
𝑑𝐿∗
𝑑𝜏
1
𝐿∗
+
1
(1−𝜏)
> 0 (Hypothesis 4). Using 
expressions from Hypothesis 3 (see Appendix I) gives:  
𝑑𝑅∗
𝑑𝜏
1
𝑅∗
−
𝑑𝑟𝑑
𝑑𝜏
1
𝑟𝑑
=
[(
𝐺′(𝑝∗)𝑝(1−𝑝)
𝐺(𝑝)
𝑎 − 1) 𝜖𝐿 − 𝜖𝑟𝑑] < 0 where 𝜖𝐿 = 
𝑑𝐿∗
𝑑𝜏
(1−𝜏)
𝐿∗
  (the tax elasticity of 𝐿∗) and 
𝜖𝑟𝑑 =
𝑑𝑟𝑑
𝑑𝜏
(1−𝜏)
𝑟𝑑
  (the tax elasticity of 𝑟𝑑). If  
𝐺′(𝑝∗)𝑝
𝐺(𝑝)
> 1 (the incentive effect), the tax 
elasticities, 𝜖𝐿 and 𝜖𝑟𝑑 , are negative since (1 − 𝑝) < 1 and 𝑎 < 1. The change in the 
                                                        
35 The combined outcome of lower loan rates (Hypothesis 4) and lower loan volumes (Hypothesis 3) predicted 
by our model is similar to other models of financial intermediation (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Besanko and 
Kanatas 1993; Bester 1994). However, our model differs from previous models as we show that taxes can have 
similar effects through the channels of strategic borrower default and bank monitoring effort. 
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spread between the loan and deposit rate is 
𝑑𝑅∗
𝑑𝜏
1
𝑅∗
−
𝑑𝑟𝑑
𝑑𝜏
1
𝑟𝑑
= 𝜖𝐿 − 𝜖𝑟𝑑 < 0. If the 
incentive effect is negligible, i.e.  
𝐺′(𝑝∗)𝑝
𝐺(𝑝)
≅ 0 , the change in the spread between the 
loan and deposit rate is  
𝑑𝑅∗
𝑑𝜏
1
𝑅∗
−
𝑑𝑟𝑑
𝑑𝜏
1
𝑟𝑑
= 𝜖𝐿 − 𝜖𝑟𝑑 > 0.  
Our sixth and last hypothesis relates to the bank’s monitoring efforts with 
respect to a change in the tax rate.  
Hypothesis 6: The optimal monitoring will decrease in response to taxes ( 
d𝑝∗
dτ
< 0).  
This hypothesis describes the tax wealth effect on the bank’s monitoring 
effort. As marginal gains from recovering money from defaults are partly taxed 
away, the bank adjusts by reducing its monitoring costs at the margin. 
3.4 Empirical Strategy 
In this section we describe our research design, identification strategy, 
sample of banks and the outcome and control variables used in the empirical 
analysis.  
3.4.1 Research Design 
For our research design to be valid, an important requirement is shock 
exogeneity. Tax changes often violate exogeneity assumptions because 
governments propose them far in advance of imposition and collection. If 
taxpayers anticipate and change behaviour prior to a change in taxation, potential 
outcomes are likely to be correlated with the policy intervention.  
In this respect, the Tokyo bank tax is an exception for two reasons. First, the 
tax was planned in great secrecy giving banks no time to make strategic 
adjustments as a means of avoiding the Tokyo bank tax. No details were revealed 
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to the public prior to its first announcement on 8th February 2000 (DeWit, 2000). 
We verify this through a news wire search, where we find no press coverage 
discussing the Tokyo bank tax prior to this date. At the first public announcement, 
the Tokyo Government issued a preliminary list with banks selected to pay the 
Tokyo bank tax. These banks would later all be obliged to make tax payments to 
the Tokyo Government. Second, it is unlikely that banks could predict the type of 
tax change. For the tax proposal to become legally binding, it took approximately 
eight weeks. This period was marked by a high level of uncertainty as various 
decisions regarding the design of the bank tax were taken. Final terms and 
conditions of the bank tax were not revealed until one week prior to its formal 
adoption. In addition, the rule which legitimised the adoption of the Tokyo bank 
tax was based on an unusual interpretation of Japanese tax law. The Tokyo 
Government exploited a loophole in the tax system which entitled local 
governments to implement certain tax policies without the consent of the federal 
government (Ishi 2001). Although tax policies are not exclusively decided at 
federal level in Japan, the introduction of a special tax for banks on a local level was 
rather unusual. Due to the potential interaction with other types of bank 
regulation, bank taxation is generally considered as a policy tool used at national 
level. We check for anticipation effects in our robustness tests (discussed in 
Section 3.7.1) by introducing a placebo tax in the period just prior to the 
introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. If banks anticipated the tax change, we would 
expect to pick up a change in behaviour during this period. Our results are not 
indicative of any anticipatory effects (with the relationship between the Tokyo 
bank tax and our outcome variables proving to be insignificant).  
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Our research design also rests on the assumption that the adoption of the 
Tokyo bank tax triggered a change in bank behaviour. If the Tokyo bank tax did not 
represent a significant increase in the tax liabilities of affected banks, we would be 
concerned about a potentially weak effect from the introduction of the Tokyo Bank 
tax. We examine the tax payments made in relation to the Tokyo bank tax relative 
to other tax payments made during the fiscal year. In fiscal year 2000, the Tokyo 
Government collected bank taxes in the amount of ¥111 billion, representing 
around 30% of banks’ overall tax expenses in that year.  
3.4.2 Identification Strategy 
Our assumption is that exogenous variation in taxation affects the ability of 
banks to act as financial intermediaries. We classify banks into affected banks 
(those that are liable to pay the Tokyo bank tax) and unaffected banks (those that 
are not). Based on this classification we use a difference-in-differences approach, 
which compares the difference in the outcome of the affected banks between the 
pre-tax period and the post-tax period with the same difference in the outcome of 
the unaffected banks. To investigate the effect of the Tokyo bank tax on bank 
behaviour, we estimate a regression of the form: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡⏟            
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡,   (3.10) 
where 𝑖 denotes bank and 𝑡 denotes time. 𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents each of the dependent 
variables: net interest margin, net interest and fee margin, mark-up, and 
markdown, amount of loans granted, core and non-core deposits (see Section 
3.4.3.2 for a discussion of variables). 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 is an indicator variable which 
captures whether a bank is liable for the Tokyo bank tax or not. The indicator 
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variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  equals one after the Tokyo bank tax is introduced and zero 
otherwise. Therefore, the dichotomous treatment indicator 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is zero for all 
banks in the pre-Tokyo bank tax period and one for those banks that are taxed 
when the Tokyo bank tax comes into effect. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of bank level control 
variables that vary over time and across banks. These control variables include 
capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, earnings, liquidity, 
diversification, size and market share. Each of these controls enters the model 
lagged by one period to avoid simultaneity. The model also includes time dummies, 
𝛾𝑡, to capture time effects common to all banks, as well as, bank specific fixed 
effects, 𝛼𝑖, to control for unobserved bank level heterogeneity. 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is a stochastic 
error term.  
Estimation of Equation (3.10) is executed using ordinary least squares 
(OLS), with standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at 
the bank level to control for within-bank correlation (Arellano 1987). The 
coefficient of interest is 𝛿, which represents the impact of the Tokyo bank tax on 
bank behaviour.  
A key identification assumption behind our estimation strategy is that, in 
the absence of treatment, the difference-in-differences estimator is zero; the so-
called parallel trend assumption. This assumption requires that the trend in the 
outcome variable is similar for both treatment and control groups in the pre-tax 
(shock) period. To check whether the parallel trend assumption is satisfied we 
repeat the analysis in periods when there was no change in the taxes. We find that 
the coefficients on 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 do not differ from zero (see Section 3.7.1). 
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3.4.3 Data 
3.4.3.1 Sample 
The data used in our analysis is compiled from the Japan Bankers 
Association dataset, which provides detailed balance sheet and income statement 
for all 148 of its member-banks on an individual bank basis. Results reported here 
are all from the semi-annual frequency dataset. The period of analysis, spans 
March 1998 (fiscal year 1997) through September 2001 (fiscal year 2001). This 
period is determined primarily by the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax and the 
availability of semi-annual data. The Tokyo bank tax became effective on 1st April 
2000. This divides our sample into a pre-intervention period of two and a half 
years, and an intervention period of one and a half years. 
Our sample of commercial banks comprises both city and regional banks. 
Trust banks and long-term credit banks are excluded from our sample, since these 
types of banks have supervisory procedures and business models that are 
fundamentally different from commercial banks. The restriction of our sample to 
commercial banks ensures sufficient overlap in the distribution of the covariates 
across affected and unaffected banks, thus allowing the correct statistical inference 
to be drawn (Imbens and Rubin 2015).  
Banks which either fail or went into public administration during the period 
of our analysis are excluded from the sample.36 We also identify one incidence of a 
                                                        
36 The following banks were excluded from the sample: Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (failed November 17, 1997), 
Tokuyo City Bank (failed Nov 27, 1997), Tokyo Sowa Bank (under public administration, June 12, 1999), 
Kokumin Bank (under public administration, April 11, 1999), Niigata Chuo Bank (under public administration, 
October 2, 1999), Ishikawa Bank (failed, March 2001), Chubu Bank (failed, March 8, 2001), Kyoto Kyoei Bank 
(failed, October 14, 1997), Kofuku Bank (under public administration, May 22, 1999), Kansai Sawayaka Bank 
(formerly Kofuku Bank), Namihaya Bank (under public administration, August 7, 1999), Midori Bank (failed, 
May 15,1998). (Source: Bank of Japan, Deposit Insurance Corporation Japan, Financial Services Agency Japan). 
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merger between an affected and an unaffected bank.37 To ensure the separability 
of treatment and control groups, these banks are also excluded from our sample.  
Our final sample is an unbalanced panel of 998 bank-year observations of 126 
Japanese commercial banks (9 city banks and 117 regional banks). Of the 126 
commercial banks in our sample, 17 banks were subject to the Tokyo bank tax. 
3.4.3.2 Variables 
To investigate the impact of the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax on bank 
behaviour, and in line with our hypotheses, we employ several dependent 
variables. The main variable of interest is the net interest margin, which is defined 
as interest income minus interest expenses over total assets. We use the net 
interest margin to capture a bank’s ability to generate profits via financial 
intermediation. We also calculate the net interest and fee margin. This would 
account for a potential shift in the pricing of loans and deposits from a rate-based 
approach to a fee-based approach as a response to the Tokyo bank tax.  
In principle, a pass-through of taxes could occur through an increase in the 
interest rate on loans or through a decrease in the interest rate on deposits. To 
investigate the effect of the tax on the pricing of loans and deposits, we calculate a 
markdown and mark-up. These are calculated using implicit interest rates on 
deposits and loans. Following prior literature, we define the implicit deposit (loan) 
rate as the ratio of interest expenses (income) to total deposits (loans) (Becker 
1975). These implicit rates reflect the average interest rates over various types of 
deposits and loans respectively. We then calculate the mark-up (markdown) as the 
                                                        
37 Hachijuni Bank (treated) acquires Niigata Chuo Bank (unaffected), September 29, 2000; (Financial Services 
Agency Japan). 
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spread between the implicit loan (deposit) rate and the money market interest 
rate (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2010). 
To assess the effect of the Tokyo bank tax on the funds channelled from 
savers to borrowers, we use total loans, core and non-core deposits, denoted as 
loanvol, coredep and noncoredep respectively. We take the natural logarithm of 
these variables. Core deposits are those that have low interest-rate sensitivity. 
These include current, ordinary, savings and deposits at notice. Non-core deposits 
are those that have high interest-rate sensitivity, including time, instalment and 
negotiable certificates of deposits (Aonokazu, 2006). Core and non-core deposits 
are reported at an annual frequency.  
Panel A of Table 3.2 provides detailed definitions of the outcome variables 
used in our analysis. Table 3.3 reports means and standard deviations of the same 
variables for affected and unaffected banks before and after the introduction of the 
Tokyo bank tax at the beginning of the new fiscal year in April 2000. Panel A of 
Table 3.3 shows that unaffected banks are slightly more profitable in 
intermediating funds (1.99%) than affected counterparts (1.33%). This pattern 
remains when fees are also considered. This is due to affected banks charging on 
average slightly lower rates on loans granted (2.27%) and paying higher rates to 
depositors (0.67%) relative to unaffected counterparts (2.54% and 0.27%). 
Treated banks are larger than unaffected counterparts (in terms of total loans). 
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Table 3.2 | Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Name Definition Data Source 
Panel A | Dependent Variables 
Net Interest Margin  
nim 
(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 –  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  
Japan Bankers 
Association 
Net Interest and Fee 
Margin 
nifm 
𝑛𝑖𝑚 +
𝐹𝑒𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝐹𝑒𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Japan Bankers 
Association 
 
Mark-up 
markup 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
− 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 
Japan Bankers 
Association and Bank 
of Japan 
Mark-down 
markdown 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠
− 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 
Japan Bankers 
Association and Bank 
of Japan 
Loan Volume 
loanvol 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) Japan Bankers 
Association 
Core Deposit Volume 
coredep 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠) 
Core Deposits include: current deposits, 
ordinary deposits, savings deposits and 
deposits at notice  
Japan Bankers 
Association and 
(Aonokazu 2006, p.3) 
Non-core Deposit Volume 
noncoredep 
log (𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠) 
Non-core deposits include: time deposits, 
instalment deposits and negotiable 
certificates of deposits 
Japan Bankers 
Association and 
(Aonokazu 2006, p.3) 
Panel B | Control Variables 
Capital Adequacy (𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐼 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  
Japan Bankers 
Association 
 
Asset Quality 
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Japan Bankers 
Association 
 
Management Efficiency 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
 
Japan Bankers 
Association 
 
Earnings 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Japan Bankers 
Association and Bank 
of Japan 
Liquidity 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Japan Bankers 
Association 
Diversification 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
 
Japan Bankers 
Association 
Size 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 
Japan Bankers 
Association 
Market Share 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖
∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑁𝑖
 
 
Japan Bankers 
Association 
The table presents definitions and data sources of the dependent and control variables used in the empirical 
analysis.   
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Table 3.3 | Summary Statistics 
Variables Affected banks  Unaffected banks 
 Before After  Before After 
Panel A | Dependent Variables      
Net Interest Margin (%) 1.33 1.31  1.99 1.89 
 (0.28) (0.26)  (0.23) (0.24) 
Net Interest and Fee Margin (%) 1.48 1.48  2.09 1.99 
 (0.29) (0.28)  (0.21) (0.20) 
Mark-up (%) 2.27 2.15  2.54 2.49 
 (0.23) (0.15)  (0.32) (0.33) 
Mark-down (%) 0.67 0.46  0.27 0.17 
 (0.43) (0.33)  (0.14) (0.10) 
Total Loans (¥ Trillion) 11.81 11.46  0.97 0.97 
 (0.92) (0.89)  (0.76) (0.77) 
Core Deposits (¥ Trillion) 4.22 5.15  0.31 0.36 
 (0.90) (0.88)  (0.92) (0.95) 
Non-core Deposits (¥ Trillion) 8.32 8.16  0.87 0.88 
 (0.84) (0.83)  (0.74) (0.75) 
 
Panel B | Control Variables 
     
Capital Adequacy (%) 2.88 3.49  1.88 2.19 
 (1.03) (1.04)  (0.82) (1.03) 
Asset Quality (%) 2.93 4.08  2.71 4.86 
 (2.93) (1.64)  (2.14) (2.18) 
Management Efficiency (%) 0.97 1.09  1.03 1.05 
 (0.16) (0.10)  (0.15) (0.33) 
Earnings (%) -0.23 0.10  -0.09 -0.03 
 (0.64) (0.22)  (0.62) (0.43) 
Liquidity (%) 4.93 4.85  3.44 3.28 
 (2.69) (2.06)  (2.08) (1.78) 
Diversification (%) 27.12 31.23  17.12 17.05 
 (12.07) (9.93)  (6.66) (6.17) 
Size (¥ Trillion) 27.3 26.4  1.81 1.85 
 (22.8) (22.2)  (1.28) (1.32) 
Market Share (%) 3.38 3.52  0.23 0.24 
 (2.79) (3.13)  (0.16) (0.17) 
Number of Observations 85 50  542 321 
Number of Banks 17 17  109 109 
The table presents means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of dependent and control variables used in 
the empirical analysis by treatment status before and after the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. 
Bank specific covariates include financial characteristics used typically by 
supervisors to monitor the performance and safety and soundness of banks. These 
include capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, earnings and 
liquidity. We also include three additional covariates in order to capture any 
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effects related to bank size, diversification, and market share.38 Panel B of Table 3.2 
provides detailed definitions of the covariates used in our empirical analysis. The 
comparability of affected and unaffected banks is assessed based on these 
aforementioned observable covariates by examining their respective moments and 
empirical distributions. Panel B of Table 3.3 reports means and standard 
deviations of these variables for affected and unaffected banks before and after the 
introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. Overall, the summary statistics confirm that 
affected and unaffected banks are on average relatively similar across a number of 
dimensions. There are however, dimensions in which the two groups differ. We 
adjust statistically for such observed pre-intervention differences in the 
characteristics of affected and unaffected banks, by including all the 
aforementioned bank specific control variables in our estimable model. 
3.5 Findings 
Table 3.4 presents the results of estimating Equation (3.10). We find that 
the coefficients on TAX reported in Columns 1 and 2 are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with our hypothesis that banks widen 
margins in response to the imposition of the Tokyo bank tax. The net interest 
margin (nim) and the net interest and fee margin (nifm) widen by 6.2 basis points 
and 8.2 basis points respectively, on average, after the introduction of the Tokyo 
bank tax. These coefficients also indicate that the impact of the tax on bank 
margins is economically significant since affected banks increase both their nim 
and nifm by about 20% of their respective within sample standard deviation. As 
such, these findings are consistent with banks passing some of the costs associated 
                                                        
38 All regressions reported below include an income-based diversification measure. Nevertheless, our results 
do not change if an asset diversification measure is included as well. This implies that our findings are robust 
to differences in portfolio or business activities of banks included in our sample. 
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with the imposition of the tax onto customers via adjustments in interest and fee 
rates. 
To disentangle the effect of the Tokyo bank tax on borrowers and 
depositors, we decompose the net interest margin into a mark-up and markdown. 
The results reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.4 indicate that both the mark-
up and markdown decrease once the Tokyo bank tax is introduced. However, the 
markdown declines by two basis points more than the mark-up, which is in line 
with a widening of the net interest margin. Specifically, the mark-up declines on 
average by 8.3 basis points, whereas the markdown declines by 10.3 basis points. A 
declining mark-up is in line with our hypothesis that banks reduce their lending 
rate as a response to the tax. Overall, these results suggest a pronounced pass-
through effect to depositors who shoulder a considerable portion of the increased 
tax burden arising from the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. These results are 
also in line with prior evidence suggesting that taxes on banks are passed through 
to customers (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2001).  
Column 5 of Table 3.4 summarises the estimated relationship between the 
Tokyo bank tax and bank credit supply. The coefficient on TAX is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This finding indicates that banks when 
faced with the Tokyo bank tax reduce lending. The effect is also economically 
significant. Treated banks reduce total lending by 2.8% more than unaffected 
counterparts on average. The average affected bank contracts credit supply by 
¥354bn. This decline in the credit extended by affected banks implies a sizeable 
reduction in funding for real economic activity. This supports our second 
hypothesis which contends that the imposition of the Tokyo bank tax affects the 
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entire economy via a contraction in credit supply. Our findings also accord with 
recent documented evidence of an adverse effect of taxes on credit supply (Buch et 
al. 2016; Schandlbauer 2017).  
Finally, Columns 6 and 7 provide estimates of the tax effect on the volume 
of core deposits and non-core deposits. Banks affected by the Tokyo bank tax hold 
fewer non-core deposits (noncoredepovol) than banks in the control group. In the 
aftermath of the Tokyo bank tax, non-core deposits on average decline by 5.74 
percent more for affected banks. Core deposits remain unchanged. These results 
are indicative of rate adjustments for deposit types with relatively high interest 
rates, and are consistent with the notion that banks affected by the tax accept 
fewer deposits. Our findings further substantiate a partial pass-through effect of 
the tax burden from banks to depositors. 
3.6 Testing the Bank Monitoring Channel 
Our theoretical model predicts that the channel through which a tax on 
gross profit leads to contraction in financial intermediation is via a reduction in the 
monitoring effort expended by affected banks. In this section, we present the 
results of several tests conducted at bank and borrower level, in order to provide 
corroborating evidence in support of the monitoring channel. 
3.6.1 Bank Monitoring and the Loan Portfolio 
To investigate whether the Tokyo bank tax affects financial intermediation 
activity via an adverse impact on the monitoring effort of affected banks, we 
analyse changes in the structure of the loan portfolios of affected banks around the 
time of the introduction of the tax. First, we examine changes in the loan portfolios 
of banks in relation to the geographic proximity of their respective borrowers.
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Table 3.4 | Baseline Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 nim nifm markup markdown loanvol coredepovol noncoredepovol 
TAX 0.062*** 0.082*** -0.083*** -0.103*** -0.028** 0.008 -0.057*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.027) (0.025) (0.011) (0.019) (0.014) 
Capital Adequacy 0.044*** 0.045*** -0.019 -0.046*** 0.010*** 0.025** -0.00001 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) 
Asset Quality 0.0001 -0.003 0.007 0.005 0.0004 -0.001 0.006*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Management Efficiency -0.068 -0.104 -0.035 0.067 0.009 -0.016 0.002 
 (0.054) (0.063) (0.045) (0.042) (0.017) (0.050) (0.024) 
Earnings 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.017* -0.026* -0.001 0.012 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.003) (0.010) (0.005) 
Liquidity -0.006** -0.008** 0.001 0.010** -0.002* -0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Market Share 0.287*** 0.293*** 0.314*** 0.267 0.039 -0.164* 0.120*** 
(0.085) (0.089) (0.127) (0.186) (0.027) (0.092) (0.039) 
Diversification -0.001 -0.001 -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0004* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Size -0.435** -0.424** -0.254** -0.030 0.863*** 1.116*** 0.903*** 
 (0.183) (0.172) (0.122) (0.060) (0.042) (0.136) (0.058) 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 998 998 998 998 998 500 500 
R2 0.41 0.37 0.63 0.59 0.85 0.85 0.88 
This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions using a sample of 126 Japanese banks spanning the period from March 1998 to September 2001. The 
dependent variables are defined in Table 3.2. The main explanatory variable is TAX, an indicator variable equal to one for banks affected by the Tokyo bank tax when it comes 
into effect and zero otherwise. To control for potential heterogeneity between affected and unaffected banks the lagged values of capital adequacy, asset quality, management 
efficiency, earnings, liquidity, market share, diversification and size (see Table 3.2 for definitions of these variables) are included in all regressions as further control variables. 
In addition, a set of time dummies and bank specific fixed effects are included across all regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Geographic proximity between banks and borrowers may reduce asymmetric 
information, which in turn lowers the cost of monitoring.39 Prior evidence suggests 
that banks face higher costs in collecting soft information on distant borrowers 
relative to more geographically proximate counterparts (Sufi 2007; Agarwal and 
Hauswald 2010; Knyazeva and Knyazeva 2012; Cotugno et al. 2013). Moreover, 
banks may reject loan applications from firms that are located at distance, given 
that the reliability of soft information regarding the creditworthiness of the 
borrower decreases with distance (Hauswald and Marquez 2006). Therefore, we 
postulate that following the imposition of the Tokyo bank tax affected banks 
reduce the proportion of their overall lending toward borrowers that are 
geographically distant. 
To test this hypothesis, we collect data on the loans outstanding to 
individual listed firms for each bank in our sample. The data are compiled from the 
Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest database. The data are reported on an annual 
frequency. Each firm and bank included in this database has a unique geographic 
area code based on the location of their headquarters. Using these area codes we 
create two portfolios, which we term ‘local’ and ‘distant’. The local portfolio (LP) 
contains all loans granted to firms located in the same area code as the bank is 
located. The distant portfolio (DP) contains loans granted to firms outside the area 
code where the bank is located. To test the monitoring channel, we estimate the 
following model:  
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛿𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (3.11) 
                                                        
39 This is an assumption adopted in a number of theoretical papers, which investigate the impact of geographic 
proximity on: banks’ decision to diversify (Almazan 2002), banks’ ability to extract informational rents 
(Hauswald and Marquez 2006); and banks’ competitive location (Lederer and Hurter, 1986).  
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where 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡  represents LP or DP as a proportion of total loans. The 
explanatory and control variables are as defined in Table 3.2. The model also 
includes time dummies, 𝛾𝑡, to capture time effects common to all banks, as well as 
bank specific fixed effects, 𝛼𝑖, to control for unobserved bank level heterogeneity. 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 is a stochastic error term.  
The results of estimating Equation (3.11) are reported in Panel A of Table 
3.5. We find that both local and distant loan portfolios as shares of affected banks 
total loans decline after the introduction of the tax, reflecting an overall decline in 
the supply of credit granted by affected banks. However, the DP declines 
proportionately more than the LP. The difference in the decline of the DP relative 
to the LP is significant at the 10% level.  
Overall these results suggest that banks affected by the imposition of the 
Tokyo bank tax reduce lending to firms located at distance relative to those which 
are geographically proximate. As such this lends support to the contention that the 
introduction of the Tokyo bank tax reduces the level of monitoring by affected 
banks. The robustness of these findings is verified by a placebo test whereby we 
show that local and distant portfolios do not change when we assume falsely that 
the Tokyo tax is introduced one year prior to its actual adoption. The results of this 
test are reported in Panel A of Table 3.10. 
As a further test of whether banks respond to the tax by reducing lending to 
borrowing firms that entail higher monitoring costs, we follow Sufi (2007) and 
classify borrowing firms as transparent and opaque. We use these classifications to 
construct two portfolios. The transparent portfolio (TP) contains all loans granted 
to firms with a rating from the Rating and Investment Information, a Japanese 
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rating agency.40 The opaque portfolio (OP) contains loans granted to unrated firms. 
We use the TP and OP to estimate Equation (3.11). The point estimates presented 
in Panel B of Table 3.5 suggest that affected banks reduce lending to unrated firms 
by more than to rated counterparts. This finding provides further support to the 
contention that the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax reduces the level of 
monitoring by affected banks.  
Finally, we investigate whether banks respond to the Tokyo bank tax by 
altering lending to borrowers with higher levels of intangible assets. Intangible 
assets are difficult to value, and as such have lower collateral value, making them 
less useful as support for securing external financing (Almeida and Campello 
2007). Moreover, given that the use of collateral mitigates borrower moral hazard 
and reduces the probability of default (Boot et al. 1991) or asset substitution (Stulz 
and Johnson 1985)41, we might expect that banks affected by the tax reduce 
lending to those firms that invest more in intangible assets.  
To investigate this proposition, we construct two loan portfolios based 
upon the extent to which borrowing firms invest in intangible assets as follows. 
The intangible portfolio (IP) contains loans granted to firms that belong to the top 
quantile of the distribution of intangible assets (normalised by total assets) in the 
pre-tax period.42 The pledgeable portfolio (PP) comprises loans granted to firms in 
                                                        
40 Unfortunately, due to a lack of data pertaining to rating information on Japanese listed companies our 
sample is restricted between 1999 and 2001, and thus prevents us from conducting a placebo test to verify the 
robustness of this analysis.  
41 Asset substitution describes the process of substituting less risky assets with riskier ones.   
42 Long and Malitz (1985) argue that informational asymmetry associated with a borrower’s investment on 
research and development (R&D) projects is such that the potential of risk shifting is difficult for outsiders to 
detect. Building on this argument we create two portfolios based on the loans granted to firms in the bottom 
quantile and the top quantile of the distribution of their pre-tax period R&D expenses (normalised by total 
assets), respectively. Untabulated results lend support to the contention that the introduction of the Tokyo 
bank tax reduces the level of monitoring by affected banks.  
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the bottom quantile of the distribution of intangible assets (normalised by total 
assets) in the pre-tax period. 
Table 3.5 | Testing the Bank Monitoring Channel – Bank-based Analysis 
Panel A | Distance-based portfolios 
 Local Portfolio Distant Portfolio 
TAX -0.002** -0.004* 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Control variables YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 457 457 
R2 0.15 0.46 
Panel B | Rated-based portfolios 
 Transparent Portfolio Opaque Portfolio 
TAX -0.003*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Control variables YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 379 379 
R2 0.39 0.47 
Panel C | Collateral-based portfolios 
 Intangible Portfolio Pledgeable Portfolio 
TAX -0.002** -0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Control variables YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 474 474 
R2 0.21 0.04 
This table reports the results of the bank-based analysis on the bank monitoring channel. Panel A reports the 
results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions using a sample of 126 Japanese banks spanning the period 
from 1998 to 2001. The dependent variables are the shares of the local portfolio, LP (loans granted to firms 
located in the same area code as the bank is located) and distant portfolio, DP (loans granted to firms outside 
the area code where the bank is located) to the bank’s total loan portfolio. Panel B reports the results of OLS 
regressions using a sample of 126 Japanese banks spanning the period from 1999 to 2001, due to data 
limitations on borrowing firms’ ratings. The dependent variables are the shares of the transparent portfolio, 
TP (loans granted to firms rated by a third party) and opaque portfolio, OP (loans granted to unrated firms) to 
the bank’s total loan portfolio. Panel C reports the results of OLS regressions using a sample of 126 Japanese 
banks spanning the period from 1998 to 2001. The dependent variables are the shares of the intangible 
portfolio, IP (loans granted to firms belonging to the top quantile of the distribution of pre-tax period 
intangible assets) and pledgeable portfolio, PP (loans granted to firms belonging to the bottom quantile of the 
distribution of pre-tax period intangible assets) to the bank’s total loan portfolio. The main explanatory 
variable is TAX, an indicator variable equal to one for banks affected by the Tokyo bank tax when it comes into 
effect and zero otherwise. To control for potential heterogeneity between affected and unaffected banks the 
lagged values of capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, earnings, liquidity, market share, 
diversification and size (see Table 3.2 for definitions of these variables) are included in all regressions as 
further control variables. In addition, a set of time dummies and bank specific fixed effects are included across 
all regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
We use the IP and PP to estimate Equation (3.11). The point estimates 
presented in Panel C of Table 3.5 suggest that affected banks reduce lending to 
firms with higher intangible (fewer pledgeable) assets relative to total assets. The 
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robustness of these findings are verified by a placebo test where we falsely assume 
that the Tokyo tax is introduced one year prior to its actual adoption. The results of 
this test are reported in Panel B of Table 3.10. These findings further corroborate 
our hypothesis that the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax reduces the level of 
monitoring by affected banks. 
3.6.2 Bank Monitoring and Borrowing Firms 
3.6.2.1 Evidence from the Bond Market 
We also test for the existence of the monitoring channel predicted by our 
model by examining the value of bank monitoring to borrowing firms. To this end 
we first examine the effect of the announcement of the tax on the borrowing costs 
of firms. Here we focus on external public debt. Prior theoretical and empirical 
literature suggests that bank monitoring of corporate creditworthiness provides 
benefits to firm claimants (Holmström and Tirole 1997; Datta et al. 1999). These 
benefits arise due to banks’ superior access to private information on borrowers 
(Fama 1985), as well as to their efficiency and flexibility in restructuring and 
renegotiating debt claims (Berlin and Loeys 1988; Gertner and Scharfstein 1991; 
Denis and Mihov 2003). In line with this literature, we postulate that if an increase 
in taxes reduces the monitoring effort expended by banks, we expect to observe 
higher at-issue yield spreads for public (straight) bond offerings from firms that 
borrow from banks that are liable to pay the Tokyo bank tax.  
To test this hypothesis, we collect data on Japanese bond issues from 
Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database and merge it with financial statements of 
bond issuing firms drawn from Datastream. Following standard practice in 
corporate bond pricing literature we restrict our sample to straight bonds with 
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fixed coupon rates (Gande et al. 1997; Datta et al. 1999). In doing so, we avoid 
complications of measuring yields for convertible and floating rate bond issues. We 
use our sample to estimate the following regression equation:  
𝐵𝑃𝑆𝑓,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑓,𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽𝑋𝑓,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜉𝑓 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑗,𝑡 (3.12) 
where BPS is the premium of the at-issue yield spread of the debt security 𝑗 over 
the yield of a Japanese government security of comparable maturity. 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑓,𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 is a 
dummy variable that equals zero for all bonds issued by a firm 𝑓 in the pre-Tokyo 
bank tax period 𝑡 and one for those bonds issued by firms that are customers of 
affected banks when the Tokyo bank tax comes into effect. More specifically, we 
consider the two largest banks the firm is banking with (in terms of loans granted 
to the firm) in classifying firms into treatment and control groups. This is done on 
the basis that the two largest banks a firm banks with typically have similar loan 
shares among bank lenders of the firms in our sample, and are therefore similarly 
incentivised to monitor the borrowing firms. 𝑋𝑓,𝑗,𝑡 represents a vector of bond and 
firm specific variables comprising: maturity (measured in years to bond maturity); 
amount (the natural logarithm of the size of the bond issue); size (the natural 
logarithm of the total assets of the issuing firm) and leverage (total debt scaled by 
total assets). We also control for Keiretsu affiliation43, industry, prefecture and 
bank type effects. The model also includes time effects, 𝛾𝑡, and firm specific fixed 
effects, 𝜉𝑓. 𝜀𝑓,𝑗,𝑡 is a stochastic error term. 
                                                        
43 Keiretsu are groups of Japanese firms and financial institutions that have financial inter-connections, leading 
to close cooperation (Hoshi et al. 1991; Berglof and Perotti 1994). The importance of Keiretsu in the Japanese 
economy, as well as the strength of the links between Keiretsu members is somewhat contested (Miwa and 
Ramseyer 2002; Ramseyer and Miwa 2002). 
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The estimation of Equation (3.12) is reported in Panel A of Table 3.6. All 
statistically significant control variables have the expected sign. The at-issue yield 
spread reduces with size (as larger firms are considered safer investments) and 
Table 3.6 | Testing the Bank Monitoring Channel – Borrower-based Analysis 
Panel A | Borrowers’ cost of public debt 
 BPS   
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑  22.57**   
 (9.41)   
Maturity -0.001   
 (0.002)   
Amount -2.182   
 (5.71)   
Size -67.42**   
 (25.35)   
Leverage 151.43**   
 (70.82)   
Other control variables YES   
Observations 660   
R2 0.734   
Panel B | Borrowers’ market value 
 CAR[0,0] CAR[0,3] CAR[0,5] 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘  -0.203*** -0.286** -0.295** 
 (0.062) (0.111) (0.111) 
Size -0.001 0.032 0.025 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) 
Risk -0.126 -0.065 -0.107 
 (0.205) (0.185) (0.185) 
Access to finance 0.022 -0.089 -0.078 
 (0.049) (0.136) (0.135) 
Other control variables YES YES YES 
Observations 928 928 928 
R2 0.101 0.181 0.176 
This table reports the results of the borrower-based analysis on the bank monitoring channel. Panel A reports 
results on the effect of the Tokyo bank tax on the borrowers’ cost of public debt using bonds issued during the 
period spanning fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2001. The dependent variable, BPS, is the at-issue yield spread 
in basis points of the debt security over that of a corresponding Japanese government security of comparable 
maturity.  𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 is an indicator variable equal to one if the two largest banks the firm is banking with (in 
terms of loans granted to the firm) are affected by the Tokyo bank tax when it comes into effect and zero 
otherwise. Maturity is the number of years of the security until maturity. Amount is the natural logarithm of 
the size of bond issue. Size is the natural logarithm of issuing firm’s total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total 
debt to total assets of the issuing firm. Panel B reports coefficient estimates of OLS regressions of cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) for all listed Japanese firms included in the Japan Company Handbook (excluding 
banks) surrounding the announcement of the Tokyo bank tax. The event day 0 is February 7, 2000, when the 
Tokyo governor announced the plan to levy the Tokyo bank tax. The CAR is measured on the day of the 
announcement only, from day 0 to day 3, and from day 0 to day 5, as indicated. 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 denotes the 
treatment group dummy which takes the value of one if the two largest banks the firm is banking with (in 
terms of loans granted to the firm) are affected and zero otherwise. Market cap is the natural logarithm of the 
firm’s total market capitalization a month before the Tokyo bank tax announcement. Risk is the standard 
deviation of the firm’s stock returns during the estimation period [-260,-20]. Access to finance is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm has issued at least one bond in the 3 years prior to the Tokyo tax bank 
announcement. Other control variables include industry, prefecture, bank-type and Keiretsu affiliation 
dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses.***, **, *, indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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increases with leverage (since more debt exacerbates risk shifting and asset 
substitution agency conflicts). More interesting (for our purposes) is that the at-
issue yield spread increases by 22 basis points for bond issues offered by firms 
banking with affected banks after the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. This 
increase in the at-issue-yield spread is economically and statistically significant 
(the latter at the 5% level) and is congruent with the contention of our theoretical 
model that the monitoring of borrowers by affected banks deteriorates after the 
introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. To validate this finding, in Panel C of Table 3.10 
we report the results of a placebo test where we show no change in the at-issue 
yield spread in the 12 months prior to the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. 
3.6.2.2 Evidence from the Stock Market 
As an alternative approach to testing the monitoring channel, we 
investigate the effect of the announcement of the Tokyo bank tax on the stock 
prices of firms borrowing from affected banks. We postulate that if the increase in 
taxes reduces the monitoring effort expended by affected banks (as predicted by 
our theoretical model) we expect to observe negative abnormal returns for firms 
that borrow from banks subject to the Tokyo bank tax, upon the announcement of 
the tax. Our hypothesis aligns with extant literature, which views bank monitoring 
as a value enhancing function for the borrowing firm (Diamond 1991; 
Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993; Billett et al. 1995). This is due to bank monitoring 
raising the probability of firm success through enforcing either efficient project 
choice or level of entrepreneurial effort, which mitigates the moral hazard faced by 
outside shareholders and other investors (Seward 1990; Besanko and Kanatas 
1993). 
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In testing our hypothesis, we obtain stock market data for all listed 
Japanese firms recorded in the Japan Company Handbook (excluding banks) from 
Datastream. Following Brown and Warner (1985), we calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns using the risk-adjusted market model as 𝐶𝐴𝑅[0, 𝑛]𝑓 =
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑓,𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=0 , where 𝐶𝐴𝑅[0, 𝑛]𝑓 is the cumulative abnormal return for firm f for event 
days 0 through n. 𝐴𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is calculated as 𝐴𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 − (?̂? + ?̂?𝑅𝑀,𝑡), where 𝐴𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is 
the abnormal return for firm f on event day t, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the actual return on firm f for 
event day t, and 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 is the daily return of the market portfolio approximated by 
the Tokyo Stock Price Index (Topix). ?̂? and ?̂? are estimated from the equation 
𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑓 + 𝛽𝑓𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑡 over the interval from 260 to 20 trading days before the 
event date. We subsequently regress these CARs on a treatment group dummy and 
control variables. Specifically, we estimate the following regression equation: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅[0, 𝑛]𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑓
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛸𝑓
′𝛾 + 𝜀𝑓  (3.13) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑓
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm’s largest 
bank lenders are subject to the Tokyo bank tax and zero otherwise. As above, we 
consider the two largest banks the firm is banking with (in terms of loans granted 
to the firm) in classifying firms into treatment and control groups. 𝑋𝑓 denotes a 
vector of firm specific variables comprising: size (market capitalization); risk 
(volatility of stock returns); and access to alternative sources of finance (a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the firm has issued a bond within the past 
three years and zero otherwise).44 We also control for Keiretsu affiliation, industry, 
and prefecture and bank type effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bank 
level.  
                                                        
44 Data on Japanese bond issues are obtained from Thomson Reuters’ SDC Platinum database. 
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Panel B of Table 3.6 provides estimates of Equation (3.13) for CARs of different 
length. In Column 1, where we consider the abnormal return on the day of the 
Tokyo tax announcement (CAR[0,0]) the coefficient on 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑓
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 is -0.203, and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The difference in CARs between affected 
and unaffected firms increases slightly when we consider longer event windows. 
Specifically, when CAR[0,3] is considered (Column 2), the coefficient on 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑓
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 
is -0.286. This increases to -0.295 when CAR[0,5] is used in Column 3. These 
coefficients are also statistically significant at the 5% level. The negative signs on 
the coefficients indicate that the market value of firms which borrow from soon to 
be taxed banks reacts more negatively to the announcement of the tax than the 
market value of firms not borrowing from affected banks. These results are in line 
with the hypothesis that a reduction in bank monitoring activity can have a value 
destroying impact on the borrowing firm. This argument finds additional support 
from a placebo test conducted in the month prior to the introduction of the Tokyo 
Bank tax, the results of which are reported in Panel D of Table 3.10. Overall, Table 
3.6 provides evidence in support of the monitoring channel identified by our 
model in Section 3.3 through which a tax levied on the gross profits of banks 
affects adversely financial intermediation activities. 
3.7 Robustness Tests 
This section presents the results of a set of robustness tests. These 
comprise: falsifications tests to test the common trend assumption, sensitivity 
checks on subsamples of banks and firms, tests on confounding events, and 
alternative methods (regression discontinuity and event study method). 
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3.7.1 Falsification Tests and Sensitivity Checks 
A key identifying assumption behind the difference-in-differences approach 
is that outcome variables of affected and unaffected banks demonstrate similar 
trends in the absence of treatment (Abadie 2005). Although this assumption 
cannot be tested directly, placebo tests can to some extent mitigate concerns that 
the parallel trend assumption is violated. We conduct a placebo test by assuming 
falsely that the Tokyo bank tax was introduced one year prior to actual adoption. 
By introducing a placebo tax before the actual bank tax was adopted, we also test 
for potential anticipation effects. Panel A of Table 3.7 presents results of this test. 
None of the coefficients on Placebo-Tax are significant. This suggests that: the 
parallel trend assumption for the pre-period is not violated; anticipation effects are 
not present; and the effects on the outcome variables reported in Table 3.4 are 
associated with the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax.  
To provide additional insights, we also examine whether certain groups of 
banks in our sample are driving our results. First, we consider the possibility that 
banks included in our control group and located further away from Tokyo may be 
exposed to different economic conditions than counterparts operating closer to 
Tokyo. In order to alleviate such concerns, we restrict our sample to banks which 
operate predominantly in the three major regions (Kanto, Chubu and Tohoku) that 
surround the Tokyo prefecture.45 This restriction excludes banks located in Japan’s 
other major industrial centres (such as the Kansai and Kyushu region) and reduces 
our sample size from 126 banks to 64 banks (comprising 17 affected and 47 
unaffected). The results presented in Panel B of Table 3.7 are consistent with our 
                                                        
45 Even after dropping the Tohoku region (which is more rural than either Kanto or Chubu), the results remain 
consistent.  
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main findings. Second, in Panel C of Table 3.7 we also consider the possibility that 
banks included in our control group and without any physical presence in Tokyo 
may behave differently to unaffected counterparts operating in Tokyo. We exclude 
banks without presence in Tokyo from our sample and re-estimate Equation 
(3.10). In all cases, the signs and the coefficients on the TAX variable are similar to 
those reported in Table 3.4. Third, in Panel D of Table 3.7, we address the 
possibility that our results are driven by banks included in our control group that 
are relatively smaller in size compared to the affected banks. To this end we 
restrict our sample to banks with total assets greater than the median bank in the 
sample. The results of this analysis are also consistent with our main findings. 
Next, we deal with a common issue which often arises in empirical research 
using panel data in combination with difference-in-differences estimation. The 
problem arises due to serially correlated dependent variables, long time series, 
and little variation in the treatment variable (Bertrand et al., 2004). As a result, 
conventional OLS standard errors of difference-in-differences estimates could be 
biased downward. To alleviate concerns regarding serial correlation, we cluster 
the standard errors at the bank level throughout our analysis. To further check the 
robustness of our results, we collapse our sample period in two (Bertrand et al., 
2004). We average the observations in dates prior to the Tokyo bank tax into a 
single pre-intervention period, and the observations in dates after the introduction 
of the tax into a single post-intervention period. The results are reported in Panel E 
of Table 3.7 and are consistent with the estimated tax effects reported in Table 3.4.  
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Table 3.7 | Robustness Checks 
 Panel A: Fiscal Year 1999 
Economic 
Trends 
 nim nifm markup markdownn loanvol coredep noncoredep 
Placebo-TAX 0.012 -0.008 0.006 -0.018 -0.013 -0.012 -0.070 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.018) (0.009) (0.054) (0.047) 
Control Var YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 375 375 375 375 375 250 250 
Panel B: Economic Trends 
Economic 
trends 
 nim nifm markup markdown loanvol coredep noncoredep 
TAX 0.055** 0.062** -0.071** -0.091*** -0.032*** -0.006 -0.043*** 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.031) (0.027) (0.012) (0.019) (0.014) 
Control Var YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 455 455 455 455 455 228 228 
Panel C: Tokyo Presence Sample 
 nim nifm markup markdown loanvol coredep noncoredep 
TAX 0.059*** 0.077*** -0.079*** -0.097*** -0.027** 0.002 -0.055*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.027) (0.025) (0.011) (0.020) (0.015) 
Control Var YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 894 894 894 894 894 447 447 
Panel D: Large Banks Sample 
  nim nifm markup markdown loanvol coredep noncoredep 
TAX 0.053** 0.065** -0.051* -0.053* -0.021* -0.013 -0.030** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.030) (0.030) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) 
Control Var YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 500 500 500 500 500 251 251 
Panel E: Two-Period Sample 
Sample 
Averaging 
 nim nifm markup markdown loanvol coredep noncoredep 
TAX 0.056** 0.078*** -0.065** -0.085*** -0.017* 0.042** -0.030** 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.033) (0.030) (0.010) (0.020) (0.012) 
Control Var YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
This table summarises the results of a number of robustness tests on the effect of the Tokyo bank tax on bank 
behaviour as well as on the validity of the “parallel trend” assumption. Panel A presents the results of ordinary 
least squares regressions using a sample spanning the periods before the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. 
The main explanatory variable is Placebo-TAX, an indicator variable equal to one for banks affected by the 
Tokyo bank tax when it comes into effect and zero otherwise, but this time we falsely assume that this happens 
one year prior to the actual introduction. In Panel B, we restrict our sample to banks with presence in Tokyo, in 
order to alleviate concerns that some unaffected banks do not compete with affected banks in Tokyo, and as a 
consequence may affect our results. In Panel C, we limit our sample to banks which operate predominantly in 
the three major regions (Kanto, Chubu and Tohoku) that directly surround the Tokyo prefecture, in order to 
alleviate concerns regarding differential economic climates across Japan driving our main findings. In Panel D, 
we limit our sample to banks which have total assets greater than that of the median bank, in order to alleviate 
concerns regarding relatively small sized banks driving our main findings. In Panel E, following Bertrand et al. 
(2004) we collapse our dataset into a two-period panel, by averaging the observations in dates prior to the 
Tokyo bank tax into a single pre-intervention period and likewise for the observations in dates after the tax 
which are averaged into a single post-intervention period, in order to account for problems arising from serially 
correlated outcomes. The main explanatory variable for Panels B, C, D, and E is TAX, an indicator variable equal 
to one for banks affected by the Tokyo bank tax when it comes into effect and zero otherwise. The dependent 
variables are defined in Table 3.2. The set of control variables include capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management efficiency, earnings, liquidity, size, diversification and market share (see Table 3.2 for definitions 
of these variables). In addition, a set of time dummies and bank specific fixed effects are included across all 
regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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3.7.2 Confounding Events 
The validity of our approach would be threatened if factors other than the 
Tokyo bank tax were driving our results. We isolate activities that could have the 
potential to confound our analysis. 
3.7.2.1 Mergers and Acquisitions  
Our difference-in-differences approach in Section 3.5 identifies the effect of 
the Tokyo bank tax on the financial intermediation activities of banks. One 
potential confounder of this identification is the merger and acquisition (M&A) 
activity involving existing banks in our sample. Bank mergers may have similar 
effects on our outcome variables of interest as those attributed to the introduction 
of the Tokyo bank tax. However, such M&A activities are unlikely to affect all our 
outcome variables simultaneously in the same way as the Tokyo bank tax. For 
instance, in a perfectly competitive market a bank M&A is likely to result in a 
reduction in the loan supply, but at the same time push the loan rate upwards (Van 
Hoose 2010, p.88). In the deposits market, an M&A would bring about a reduction 
in deposits and a decrease in deposit rates. As a consequence, an M&A would result 
in a widening of the profit margin for the merging banks, much like the Tokyo bank 
tax. However, in contrast to the Tokyo bank tax, this would happen via a 
simultaneous increase in the loan rate and a decrease in the deposit rate. In order 
to check the robustness of our findings to bank M&A activity we include Merger, a 
dummy variable in the difference-in-differences regressions, which takes the value 
of one if a bank was involved in an M&A in that period and zero otherwise. The 
results which are reported in Panel A of Table 3.8 indicate that the tax effects on 
the different aspects of bank behaviour are similar to the estimates from our main 
difference-in-differences analysis.  
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In a second step, we attempt to account for the degree of difficulty and 
challenges bank management faces in consummating a merger. In line with the 
M&A literature we use the relative size, measured as the ratio of the target to 
acquirer assets, as a proxy for the complexity of an M&A deal (e.g. Healey and 
Palepu 1992; Brewer and Jagtiani 2013). We introduce an interaction term 
between the dummy for affected banks and the relative size of banks involved in 
an M&A activity, and a triple interaction term between the dummy for the affected 
banks, the dummy for the enactment of the Tokyo bank tax and the relative size 
variable. The results, shown in Panel B of Table 3.8, confirm our expectations that 
(complex or less so) mergers do not drive our main findings.  
3.7.2.2 Capital Injections 
An alternative source of shock which could act as a confounder to the 
results of our analysis is the Prompt Recapitalisation Act (PRA) that was enacted 
by the Japanese government in March 1999. Under this act, some banks in our 
sample received public capital injections. Recent empirical findings suggest that 
capital injections result in boosting the credit supply of banks while at the same 
time increasing the loan rate as banks assume riskier projects (Allen et al. 2011; 
Black and Hazelwood 2013; Li 2013). Clearly, the effects of public capital injection 
on credit supply and lending rates are the opposite of what our model predicts for 
the Tokyo bank tax. Nevertheless, we re-run our difference-in-differences 
regressions including PRA, a dummy variable which takes the value of one if a bank 
received capital injection under the Prompt Recapitalisation Act in March 1999, 
and zero otherwise. Results are reported in Panel C of Table 3.8. In Panel D of 
Table 3.8 we re-estimate Equation (3.10) including additional interaction terms 
between the affected banks and a proxy for the intensity of bank recapitalization,
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 Table 3.8 | Confounding Events 
 
 
Panel A: Mergers & Acquisitions 
Mergers and  
Acquisitions 
 nim nifm markup markdown loanvol coredep noncoredep 
TAX 0.047*** 0.068*** -0.074*** -0.080*** -0.029** 0.004 -0.056*** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.011) (0.019) (0.014) 
Control Var YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 998 998 998 998 998 500 500 
Panel B: Complexity of Mergers & Acquisitions 
 nim nifm markup markdown loanvol coredep noncoredep 
TAX 0.072*** 0.087*** -0.052* -0.080*** -0.022* 0.023 -0.040** 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.013) (0.020) (0.016) 
TAX * Size  -0.014 -0.082 -0.142* -0.054 -0.032 -0.066 -0.075** 
 (0.064) (0.067) (0.076) (0.053) (0.021) (0.053) (0.030) 
Control Var YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 998 998 998 998 998 500 500 
Panel C: The Prompt Recapitalisation Act 
Capital Injection  nim nifm markup markdown loanvol coredep noncoredep 
TAX 0.062** 0.082*** -0.083*** -0.102*** -0.028** 0.007 -0.058*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.011) (0.020) (0.014) 
Control Var YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 998 998 998 998 998 500 500 
Panel D: Intensity of the Prompt Recapitalisation Act 
 nim nifm markup markdown loanvol coredep noncoredep 
TAX 0.053** 0.074*** -0.043 -0.064** -0.021* 0.027 -0.041*** 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026) (0.012) (0.020) (0.014) 
TAX * PRA 
intensity 
-1.061 -0.420 -0.637 -0.364 -0.921 -0.562 -0.257 
 (1.978) (2.036) (2.140) (1.291) (0.824) (2.072) (0.997) 
Control Var YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 998 998 998 998 998 500 500 
This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions examining the effect of the Tokyo bank tax on 
Japanese banks’ behaviour using a sample of 126 Japanese banks spanning the period from March 1998 to 
September 2001. The dependent variables are defined in Table 3.2. The main explanatory variable is TAX, an 
indicator variable equal to one for banks affected by the Tokyo bank tax when it comes into effect and zero 
otherwise. The set of control variables include capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, earnings, 
liquidity, size, diversification and market share (see Table 2 for definitions of these variables). To rule out the role of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) between banks in our sample the regressions reported in Panel A also include the 
variable Merger, a dummy that equals one when a bank is involved in an M&A and zero otherwise. Panel B 
regressions include additional interaction terms between the dummy for affected banks and the complexity of 
M&As, proxied by the relative size of the involved entities, and a triple interaction term between TAX and the proxy 
for M&A complexity. Panel C regressions include the variable PRA to consider the effect of Prompt Recapitalisation 
Act. PRA is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if a bank received capital injection under the Prompt 
Recapitalisation Act in March 1999, and zero otherwise. Panel D focuses on the intensity of capital injections by 
including additional interaction terms between the dummy for affected banks and our proxy for the intensity of 
capital injections, measured by the ratio of a bank’s capital injection to total assets, and a triple interaction term 
between the dummy for affected banks, the dummy for the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax, and the proxy for the 
intensity of capital injections. The set of control variables include capital adequacy, asset quality, management 
efficiency, earnings, liquidity, size, diversification and market share (see Table 3.2 for definitions of these variables). 
In addition, a set of time dummies and bank specific fixed effects are included across all regressions in all panels. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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measured by the ratio of capital injection received by a bank to its total assets, and 
a triple interaction term between the dummy for the affected banks, the dummy 
for the enactment of the Tokyo bank tax and the proxy for the intensity of the 
Prompt Recapitalisation Act. Our main findings remain robust to these tests.  
3.7.3 Alternative Methods 
3.7.3.1 Regression Discontinuity Design 
We take advantage of the transparent assignment mechanism of the Tokyo 
bank tax and apply a sharp regression discontinuity design. Banks were assigned 
to pay the Tokyo bank tax based on a simple and transparent rule. Banks which 
operated in Tokyo and held funds in excess of ¥5 trillion were assigned to pay the 
tax, while all other banks were exempt. This approach serves as an additional 
robustness check. In particular, we address concerns of a violation of only-through 
conditions by using a regression discontinuity design.46 Because the assignment 
variable (funds) is unique to the Tokyo bank tax (no other contemporaneous policy 
assigns treatment based on the ¥5 trillion funds threshold), a design that takes into 
account this discontinuity enables us to retrieve the pure effects of the Tokyo bank 
tax on bank behaviour.  
To uncover the average treatment effect, we examine the discontinuity in 
the conditional expectation of the net interest margin (and other outcome 
variables) given the amount of funds of bank i. Ideally, we would like to compare 
the outcomes only for those banks whose values are just below and just above the 
threshold of ¥5 trillion funds because these banks will have on average similar 
                                                        
46 Using a difference-in-differences identification strategy, the only-through condition must hold in order to 
correctly identify the impact of the Tokyo bank tax on bank behaviour. The only-through condition means that 
the change in outcomes of affected banks is caused only through the imposition of the Tokyo bank tax and not 
by any other event. The only-through condition is violated if a confounding event which occurs at the time of 
the Tokyo bank tax causes the change in outcomes for affected banks.  
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characteristics. However, such an approach will severely limit our sample size and 
reduce the efficiency of our estimation method. We therefore follow Pettersson-
Lidbom (2012) and estimate regressions of the form: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛾𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑓(𝑥𝑖𝑡) + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡        (3.14) 
where 𝑓(𝑋) is a smooth function of the forcing variable, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 (funds). To improve 
efficiency, we constrain the regression function to be of the same functional form 
on both sides of the cut-off. We restrict higher order polynomial to the order of two 
(Pettersson-Lidbom 2008).  
The results from estimating Equation (3.14) are presented in Panel A of 
Table 3.9. The striking similarity of estimates lends strong support to the 
robustness of our original findings. For instance, using the net interest margin as 
our main outcome variable of interest reveals that the introduction of the Tokyo 
bank tax results in net interest margins widening by 4.8 basis points. This 
compares to the original estimate of 6.2 basis points for the difference-in-
differences approach. The net interest and fee margin widens by 6.5 basis points 
(original: 8.2 basis points), the mark-up declines by -10.8 basis points (original: -
8.3 basis points) and the mark-down by -13.2 basis points (original: -10.3 basis 
points). The volume of loans and non-core deposits declines by -3.1 and -6.4 basis 
points respectively (original: -2.8 and -5.7 basis points respectively). In line with 
our original findings, the Tokyo bank tax does not impact on the volume of core 
deposits.  
3.7.3.2 Event Study 
The results of our theoretical model, backed up by our empirical findings, 
indicate that the introduction of the Tokyo tax influences interest rates on loans 
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and deposits, and the credit supply of affected banks. Such effects may in turn 
influence investors’ expectations of the likely future profitability of the affected 
banks in our sample. To assess this proposition, we conduct an event study to 
evaluate whether the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax led to a reduction in the 
market value of affected banks. We obtain stock market data for 100 listed 
Japanese banks (16 treated, 84 unaffected) from Datastream. To this end, we 
estimate deviations in actual bank stock returns, as a result of the Tokyo bank tax 
announcement, from expected stock returns. Following Brown and Warner (1985)  
Table 3.9 | Alternative Identification Methods 
Panel A: Regression Discontinuity 
Mergers and  
Acquisitions 
 nim nifm markup markdown loanvol coredepovo
l 
noncorede
p TAX 0.048** 0.065*** -0.108*** -0.132*** -0.031*** 0.009 -0.064*** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.027) (0.023) (0.011) (0.021) (0.014) 
Control 
variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Polynomial (2) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 998 998 998 998 998 500 500 
 Panel B: Event Study 
Capital Injection Event window Treated Banks Control Banks 
 CAAR adj-Patell adj-BMP CAAR adj-Patell adj-BMP 
[-5, 5] -11.18 -2.35 ** -3.29 *** -2.16 -0.021 -0.75 
[-5, -1] -3.52 -1.11 -2.24 ** -1.17 -0.80 -1.07 
[0, 5] -7.66 -2.16 ** -2.58 *** -0.98 -0.46 -0.33 
No of banks 
Observations 
16   84   
This table reports the results from alternative identification methods. Panel A presents results from a sharp 
regression discontinuity design taking advantage of the sharp cut-off at ¥5 trillion in deposits for banks to be taxed 
by the Tokyo authorities. TAX is a treatment indicator taking the value one for affected banks and zero for 
unaffected banks. The set of control variables include capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, 
earnings, liquidity, size, diversification and market share (see Table 3.2 for definitions of these variables). Panel B 
presents event study results. The event date considered in this analysis is February 7th, 2000, the day the Tokyo 
governor announced the plan to levy the Tokyo bank tax. CAAR denotes cumulative average abnormal returns. Both 
the adj-Patell statistic (Patell, 1976) and the adj-BMP statistic (Boehmer et al., 1991) are adjusted for cross-sectional 
correlation as recommended by Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively.  
among others, for each bank we estimate daily abnormal stock returns using the 
risk-adjusted market model 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily return 
of bank i and 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 is the daily return of the market portfolio approximated by the 
Tokyo Stock Price Index (Topix). The risk-adjusted market model is estimated over 
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the interval from 260 to 20 trading days before the event date. We use the 
estimates ?̂?𝑖, ?̂?𝑖 to construct abnormal returns in the event window as 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡). We then aggregate daily abnormal returns by averaging them 
over all banks summing them over the trading days of different event windows to 
obtain cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR). Formally, 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 =
∑ (
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 )
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡0 . Since the Tokyo bank tax applied to a considerable number of 
banks operating in Tokyo at the same time, this is likely to generate cross-sectional 
correlation in abnormal returns across affected banks. In order to address this 
issue, we test for statistical significance in the CAAR using both the adj-Patell and 
the adj-BMP test statistics proposed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2010), which are 
modified versions of the standardised tests developed, respectively, by Patell 
(1976) and (Boehmer et al. 1991). 
Panel B of Table 3.9 reports CAAR over different event windows. Along with 
adj-Patell and adj-BMP statistics, separately for affected and unaffected banks. 
CAAR for affected banks on the event window [-5, 5] are negative and statistically 
significant, according to both statistics, indicating a decline of around 11% in the 
banks’ stock prices arising from the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. There is 
mixed evidence of a decline in the affected banks’ market valuation in the window 
prior to the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. This indicates that the tax was 
largely unanticipated by the investors. On the other hand, the impact of the tax 
before, after and around its announcement on the unaffected banks is 
indistinguishable from zero in a statistical sense. Overall, these findings indicate 
that market participants view the Tokyo bank tax as detrimental to the 
performance of the affected banks.   
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Table 3.10 | Bank Monitoring Channel | Robustness checks  
Panel A: Distance-based portfolio | Placebo test 
 Local Portfolio Distant Portfolio 
Placebo-TAX 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Control variables YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 235 235 
R2 0.14 0.16 
Panel B: Collateral-based portfolio | Placebo test 
 Intangible Portfolio Pledgeable Portfolio 
Placebo-TAX -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Control variables YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 243 243 
R2 0.21 0.04 
Panel C: Borrowers’ cost of public debt | Placebo test 
 BPS 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑  36.72 
 (25.47) 
Control variables YES 
Observations 566 
R2 0.739 
Panel D: Borrowers’ market value | Placebo test 
 CAR[0,0] 
0.078 
(0.089) 
YES 
928 
0.115 
CAR[0,3] CAR[0,5] 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 0.069 -0.059 
 (0.090) (0.109) 
Other control variables YES YES 
Observations 928 928 
R2 0.120 0.091 
This table reports the results of robustness checks on the bank monitoring channel. Panels A and B report the results of 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions using a sample of 126 Japanese banks spanning the period before the introduction 
of the Tokyo bank tax. In Panel A the dependent variables are the shares of the local portfolio, LP (loans granted to firms 
located in the same area code as the bank is located) and distant portfolio, DP (loans granted to firms outside the area code 
where the bank is located) to the banks total loan portfolio. In Panel B the dependent variables are the shares of the 
intangible portfolio, IP (loans granted to firms belonging to the top quantile of the distribution of their pre-tax period 
intangible assets) and pledgeable portfolio, PP (loans granted to firms belonging to the bottom quantile of the distribution of 
their pre-tax period intangible assets) to the banks total loan portfolio. The main explanatory variable is Placebo-TAX, an 
indicator variable equal to one for banks affected by the Tokyo bank tax when it comes into effect and zero otherwise, but 
this time we falsely assume that this happens one year prior to the actual introduction. To control for potential 
heterogeneity between affected and unaffected banks the lagged values of capital adequacy, asset quality, management 
efficiency, earnings, liquidity, market share, diversification and size (see Table 3.2 for definitions of these variables) are 
included in the regressions as further control variables. In addition, a set of time dummies and bank specific fixed effects are 
included across both regressions. Panel C reports results on the effect of the Tokyo bank tax on the borrowers’ cost of public 
debt using bonds issued during the period before the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. The dependent variable, BPS, is the 
at-issue yield spread in basis points of the debt security over that of a corresponding Japanese government security of 
comparable maturity. The main explanatory variable is 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑, an indicator variable equal to one if the two largest 
banks the firm is banking with (in terms of loans granted to the firm) are affected by the Tokyo bank tax when it comes into 
effect and zero otherwise, but this time we falsely assume that this happens one year prior to the actual introduction. 
Control variables include: a) Maturity is the number of years of the security until maturity; b) Amount is the natural 
logarithm of the size of bond issue; c) Size is the natural logarithm of issuing firm’s total assets; d) Leverage is the ratio of 
total debt to total assets of the issuing firm. Other control variables include industry, prefecture, bank-type and Keiretsu 
affiliation dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Panel D reports 
coefficient estimates of OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for all listed Japanese firms included in the 
Japan Company Handbook (excluding banks) surrounding the announcement of the Tokyo bank tax, under the false 
assumption that the announcement of the tax occurred on January 7, 2000 instead of February 7, 2000. The event day 0 here 
is therefore January 7, 2000. The CAR is measured on the day of the announcement only, from day 0 to day 3, and from day 0 
to day 5, as indicated. 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 denotes the treatment group dummy which takes the value of one if the two largest 
banks the firm is banking with (in terms of loans granted to the firm) are taxed and zero otherwise. Control variables are a) 
Market cap is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total market capitalization a month before the Tokyo bank tax 
announcement; b) Risk is the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns during the estimation period [-260,-20]; c) Access 
to finance is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has issued at least one bond in the 3 years prior to the Tokyo tax 
bank announcement. Other control variables include industry, prefecture, bank-type and Keiretsu affiliation dummies. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
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and 10% level respectively. 
 
3.8 Summary  
Following the global financial crisis, bank taxation has received widespread 
media coverage and attention in policy circles in many developed economies. The 
effect of taxation on the behaviour of banks is likely to depend on the type and size 
of the tax imposed, prevailing market conditions and the extent to which banks 
choose to pass through any resultant increases in costs to customers.  In this 
chapter, we derive a theoretical model, which leads to several testable 
propositions related to how bank behaviour changes in response to a sudden 
imposition of a tax on gross profitability. Testing these aforementioned  
propositions empirically is challenging given identification concerns. This  
challenge is overcome in this chapter by utilising the case of the Tokyo bank tax, 
which was imposed on gross profits of large Japanese banks operating in Tokyo, 
while other banks operating in Japan remained unaffected.  
Our theoretical model, derived hypotheses and research design rests on the 
assumption that the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax triggered a change in bank 
behaviour and affected the ability of banks to act as financial intermediaries with 
possible implications for loan supply, pricing of loans and deposits, and the 
monitoring of borrowers.  The results derived from our estimable (difference-in-
differences) model suggests that banks subject to the tax increased both, net 
interest and net interest and fee margins in response to an unexpected tax on gross 
profitability. An analysis of deposit and loan interest rate components of the net 
interest margin suggests that rates paid to depositors and charged to borrowers 
decline following the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. Deposit rates decline by a 
greater degree than loan rates, implying that banks subject to the tax pass through 
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the effects of the tax to depositors. These banks also reduce total lending. On the 
liability side, the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax leads to a significant outflow 
of rate-sensitive deposits for banks subject to the tax compared to unaffected 
counterparts. These findings are robust to a battery of additional tests.  
We conduct an extensive analysis to explore the extent to which banks 
subject to the Tokyo bank tax reduce monitoring of borrowers. Banks subject to 
the provisions of the Tokyo bank tax reduce lending to firms located at distance 
relative to counterparts that are geographically proximate; to firms which are 
more informationally opaque relative to less opaque counterparts; and to firms 
higher levels of intangible assets. The costs of debt issuance increase and market 
valuations decrease for firms that are customers of banks subject to the Tokyo 
bank tax.  
Overall, the findings of this chapter suggest that taxes play an important 
role in affecting the behaviour of banks. The extent to which banks pass through 
any higher costs associated with tax increases to customers has implications for 
the cost and availability of credit to borrowers, and the interest rates paid to 
depositors. As such the results of this chapter have relevance to policymakers 
engaged in designing and monitoring the effectiveness of tax regimes in the 
banking industry. Our findings inform the ongoing policy debate about the 
appropriate scope of bank taxation as we show that the financial intermediation 
activity of banks is highly sensitive to taxation on gross profitability (at least 
within the laboratory of Japan). Because of banks may pass through increased tax 
costs, bank taxation can have sizeable effects for bank customers such as reduced 
credit supply for borrowers and lower deposit rates for depositors. Such 
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externalities of bank taxation suggest that the scope of bank taxation needs to be 
well balanced to prevent adverse impacts on the real economy. Additionally, our 
findings contain interesting information for bank supervisors who are concerned 
about the risk diversification of banks as we show that bank taxation impacts on 
the monitoring effort of banks and leads to adjustment of bank portfolios towards 
easier-to-monitor borrowers.   
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Chapter 4 | Bank Taxation and Liquidity Creation 
4.1 Introduction 
Since the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, the taxation of banks has 
attracted the interest of academics and policy makers. Tax arrangements that 
incentivize financial institutions to assume excessive risks have been identified as 
one of the factors that contributed to the global financial crisis (de Mooij 2012). A 
general call has emerged for appropriately designed taxation schemes, which 
reduce the incentives for banks to take on excessive risks, and thus improve the 
safety and soundness of the financial system. 47 
Recent evidence suggests that taxation may prompt banks to alter the 
composition of liabilities and assets, with resultant changes in leverage (Keen and 
de Mooij 2016; Schepens 2016; Gambacorta et al. 2017) and portfolio risk 
(Horváth 2013; Milonas 2016). This in turn is likely to have implications for the 
liquidity that banks create. By taking on leverage, typically in the form of deposits 
to finance longer term loans, banks create liquidity (Diamond and Rajan 2001). 
Banks also create liquidity via off-balance sheet activity by extending credit lines 
(which can be drawn upon when required) to households and firms (Holmström 
and Tirole, 1998; Kashyap et al., 2002). The liquidity creation of banks is essential 
for the functioning of the real economy via the provision of funding for 
entrepreneurial activity and investment, which is necessary for stimulating 
employment and economic growth (Aghion et al., 2010; Berger and Sedunov, 
2017).  
                                                        
47 For a discussion of the various tax schemes see Chronopoulos et al. (2017). 
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In recent years an empirical literature has emerged which provides 
valuable insights to the measurement and underlying determinants of bank 
liquidity creation. Berger and Bouwman (2009) present a novel method to 
measure how much liquidity banks create for the economy. By explicitly focusing 
on the creation of liquidity rather than liquidity itself, Berger and Bouwman depart 
from standard measures of bank liquidity, which typically capture how liquid the 
bank is but not how much liquidity the bank provides.48 The procedure involves 
the ranking and weighting of bank balance sheet and off-balance sheet items 
according to the degree of liquidity provided by the underlying banking activity.49 
Banking activities via which banks provide liquidity to the economy typically drain 
liquidity at the bank level. As such, the metric by Berger and Bouwman can also be 
understood as a direct measure of bank illiquidity. The findings of this literature 
suggest that large banks play an important role in liquidity creation, much of which 
is created off-balance sheet (Berger and Bouwman, 2009).  Moreover, the level of 
competition, government regulation (in the form of capital and other forms of 
prudential regulation), and economic policy uncertainty exert an important 
influence on bank liquidity creation (Hovarth et al., 2014, 2016; Fungáčová et al., 
2017; Berger et al. 2018).  
To date, the role of taxes in determining bank liquidity creation remains 
unexplored. We address this gap in the literature by investigating how an 
exogenous variation in the tax treatment of banks affects bank liquidity creation. 
As in Chapter 3, our setting is the Japanese commercial banking industry over the 
                                                        
48 Common measures of bank liquidity include the two Basel III measures (liquidity coverage ratio and net 
stable funding ratio) as well as market measures of liquidity such as trading volume and frequency.  
49 For instance, by issuing loans to borrowers, banks provide liquidity to households or the corporate sector. 
According to the Berger and Bouwman liquidity creation method, the issuance of loans is thus classified as a 
banking activity that creates liquidity. 
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period 1998 to 2001, when a special tax on the gross profitability of large banks 
operating in Tokyo was introduced. We use this setting to investigate whether the 
introduction of the aforementioned tax (in 2000) influenced the liquidity creation 
of affected banks. 
A tax on gross profits can affect the leverage and profitability of banks, 
which in turn has implications for liquidity creation. Theory offers contrasting 
predictions regarding the likely impact of taxation on bank liquidity creation via 
changes in leverage and profitability. Taxation can impact bank liquidity creation 
by affecting bank leverage, given that tax rules (that allow the deduction of interest 
payments from income as an expense) encourage banks to borrow rather than 
raise equity. This bias toward debt funding affects the overall balance of debt and 
equity, and leads banks to opt for a fragile capital structure dominated by debt 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Stiglitz, 1973; King 1974; Admati et al. 2013; Keen 
and de Mooij, 2016).50 This fragile capital structure in turn may have positive or 
negative implications for bank liquidity creation. On the one hand, a fragile capital 
structure may increase liquidity creation. By issuing debt in the form of deposits, 
banks produce liquid claims that serve the liquidity needs of depositors (Gorton 
and Pennacchi 1990; DeAngelo and Stulz 2015). On the other hand, a fragile capital 
structure may impede bank liquidity creation. Reliance on less stable sources of 
funding other than equity reduces the ability of banks to absorb and mitigate the 
risks arising when transforming liquid liabilities into illiquid assets (Bhattacharya 
and Thakor 1993). 
                                                        
50 The tax advantage of debt is potentially even more alluring for banks that compete with banks that are not 
taxed. To compete with unaffected competitors, banks may opt for high leverage to minimize tax payments.  
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Taxation impacts bank profitability, which in turn could lead to an increase 
or decrease in liquidity creation. By squeezing profits, taxation may induce a 
change in bank behaviour, which results in an increase in liquidity creation.51 
Specifically, if taxation leaves banks without some untaxed economic rent, banks 
may assume greater risks in the form of riskier portfolios. 52 By providing 
incentives to assume greater risk through extending riskier, more illiquid loans, 
taxation may be positively linked to bank liquidity creation. In contrast, if banks 
compensate for lower profits by cutting costs (via a reduction in the resources 
devoted to the monitoring of borrowers), then taxation may induce banks to adjust 
their respective optimal level of lending (an important component of liquidity 
creation) downwards to align with a lower level of monitoring activity (Caminal, 
2003).53 Ultimately, the extent to which the imposition of a tax on gross profits  
increases or decreases liquidity creation via changes in leverage and profitability 
of banks is an empirical question; one that we investigate in this chapter. 
Following Berger and Bouwman (2009) we use a category-based measure 
of liquidity creation. We classify on- and off-balance sheet items as either liquid, 
semi-liquid or illiquid. Liquid items include cash and cash due from banks, current 
deposits, and interest rate derivatives. Illiquid items include commercial loans, 
corporate bonds and letters of credit. Positive, zero and negative weights are 
assigned to on- and off-balance sheet items depending on the extent to which 
                                                        
51 If the costs associated with the tax cannot be fully arbitraged or passed onto customers (by lowering deposit 
rates or by increasing loan rates), the burden of the tax is borne by the banks via an immediate decline in 
profitability. 
52 The link between bank rents and risk-taking has been investigated extensively in the bank competition 
literature (Degryse et al, 2014). Theory predicts that an erosion of bank rents (from increased competition) 
results in a lower opportunity cost of bankruptcy. This in turn increases a bank’s incentive to overinvest in 
risky assets (Keeley 1990; Chan et al., 1992).  
53 When extending credit, banks monitor borrowers in order to attenuate excessive risk-taking and prevent 
strategic default. Moreover, by monitoring borrowers intensively banks gain credibility as delegated monitors 
(Diamond, 1984). Given that the monitoring of borrowers is an integral part of the lending process and is 
important for deposit-funding, a reduction in monitoring is likely to adversely affect bank liquidity creation.  
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liquidity is created, remains unchanged or is destroyed respectively. A weight of 
0.5 is assigned to all illiquid assets, liquid liabilities, and liquid off-balance sheet 
activities, while a weight of -0.5 is assigned to liquid assets, illiquid liabilities, and 
liquid off-balance sheet activities. All semi-liquid items are assigned a weight of 
zero. We also adopt a category-based measure of liquidity creation which excludes 
off-balance sheet activities. 
We use a difference-in-differences estimation strategy to identify the 
impact of a change in tax policy on bank liquidity creation. Based on semi-annual 
financial statements for a sample of 107 Japanese commercial banks over the 
period 1998-2001 (which straddles the introduction of the tax in 2000) we find 
that an increase in taxation significantly reduces bank liquidity creation.54 This 
holds for both of our liquidity creation measures (including and excluding off-
balance sheet items). For banks subject to the Tokyo bank tax, liquidity creation 
declines by 3% for banks subject to the tax relative to unaffected counterparts. 
These estimates suggest that this reduction is also economically significant. 
Further analysis reveals that the observed decline in bank liquidity creation is 
driven primarily by the negative impact of the Tokyo tax on the asset side of the 
balance sheet (including a significant reduction in commercial loans). That is, 
banks affected by the Tokyo bank tax hold significantly less illiquid assets 
compared to counterparts not subject to the tax.  We also exploit variation in bank 
characteristics to gain further insight concerning the mechanisms via which 
taxation affects liquidity creation. The results are consistent with two non-
mutually exclusive mechanisms related to capitalisation and monitoring. 
                                                        
54 The sample of 107 commercial banks differs in terms of number of banks from the sample of 126 
commercial banks used in Chapter 3. The difference in the number of banks arises from a lack of available data 
pertaining to liquidity measures for 19 banks in the original sample used in Chapter 3.  
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Specifically, we find that when faced with a sudden increase in taxes, banks which 
are better capitalised and devote more resources to monitoring borrowers reduce 
liquidity creation less than less well capitalised counterparts. 
A battery of additional tests are conducted in order to check the validity of 
our main findings. First, we examine explicitly the identifying (so-called parallel 
trends) assumption underlying the difference-in-differences approach. Second, we 
investigate the possibility that divergent economic conditions between regions 
(especially in those located farther away from Tokyo) are driving our results. 
Third, we restrict the analysis to large banks only in order to address the 
possibility that the impact of the Tokyo bank tax is heterogeneous with respect to 
observable bank characteristics (which may be unbalanced across affected and 
unaffected banks). Finally, we employ alternative specifications of our estimable 
model. The main findings of our empirical analysis are robust to all of these 
aforementioned additional tests. 
The findings of this chapter both augment and complement prior literature. 
First, we extend the literature that examines the determinants of bank liquidity 
creation. Previous findings suggest that managerial ability, bank capitalisation 
along with competition and the existence of a deposit insurance scheme are 
important determinants of bank liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2009; 
Horvath et al., 2014; Fu et al., 2015; Andreou et al., 2016; Fungáčová et al., 2017; 
Jiang et al., 2018). In the same vein, this chapter investigates if taxation is a key 
determinant of liquidity creation. Our difference-in-differences approach is well 
suited to isolate the specific implications of tax differences across banks for 
liquidity creation.  
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Second, we augment prior research that investigates the link between 
taxation and the capital structure of banks. For example, Schandlbauer (2017) 
(focusing on staggered increases in corporate income taxation across different US 
states) finds that tax increases affect the capital structure choices of banks. Milonas 
(2016) extends this analysis to include both increases and decrease in corporate 
income tax. He finds a positive relation between tax changes and bank leverage. In 
the same vein, Schepens (2016) finds that banks in Belgium increase equity capital 
following a policy change that reduced the relative tax advantage of debt funding, 
while Celerier et al. (2017) find that banks in Italy increase equity capital when 
equity and debt are treated symmetrically by tax authorities.55 Building on this 
literature, we present new evidence on the impact of a gross-profit tax on bank 
liquidity creation via its influence on bank funding decisions.  In order to do so, we 
decompose liquidity creation into asset-side, liability-side, equity, and off-balance 
sheet components liquidity creation. We find that the introduction of the Tokyo 
bank tax leads to a reduction in the liquidity creation on the asset side, while 
impacting on semi-liquid liabilities as well as equity. Off-balance sheet liquidity 
creation remains unaffected. 
Our findings have relevance for policy makers tasked with monitoring the 
safety and soundness of banks. Recent debates have centred on the extent to which 
revised capital and liquidity regulations are effective in limiting bank insolvency 
risk and reducing maturity mismatch (Bouwman 2014). Moreover, concerns have 
been expressed by the banking industry that enhanced solvency and liquidity 
standards will lead to increased costs and inhibit banks from pursuing profitable 
                                                        
55 Hemmelgarn and Teichmann (2014) and Keen and De Mooij (2016) provide cross country analyses of the 
impact of the asymmetric tax treatment of debt and equity on capital structure decisions of banks. 
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opportunities (Tarullo, 2016). The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that 
taxes appear to alter bank behaviour and reduce the overall level of liquidity 
created by banks. Furthermore, the impact of taxation differs between the asset 
and liability sides of the bank balance sheet. This suggests that imposing additional 
taxes on banks may result in reduced lending for households and firms with 
potentially adverse consequences for the real economy. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a 
background to the current study. The sample and methodology are described in 
Section 4.3. Section 4.4 discusses the main results. In Section 4.5 we report the 
results of a variety of robustness tests. Section 4.6 provides a summary of the main 
findings.  
4.2 Background 
In the 1980s, Japan witnessed the formation and then bursting of a stock 
market and real estate bubble. This was followed by a severe banking crisis, which 
had a long-lasting impact on the banking system and real economy throughout the 
1990s and 2000s.  Many Japanese banks with extensive equity holdings and loans 
collateralized by real estate, experienced dramatic declines in the value of their 
assets and capital. The effects of the crisis on bank profits were severe, with write-
downs and losses amounting to ¥46.5 trillion during the second half of the 1990s 
(Bank of Japan, 2000). The bankruptcy of some of Japan’s largest financial 
institutions in 1997 brought the banking system close to the brink of collapse. To 
rescue ailing banks, the Japanese Government intervened with large-scale capital 
injections using public funds amounting to ¥9.8 trillion equivalent to 1.9% GDP.  
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Despite a second round of capital injections, banks did not recover and 
continued to report losses. These losses led to a large decline in tax revenues of 
local (prefectural) governments.56 The government in Tokyo was particularly 
impacted given that this prefecture depended largely on tax revenue from the 
financial sector. In the fiscal year 1999, Tokyo’s estimated revenue shortfall 
amounted to ¥700 billion. 
To address the decline in tax revenue, the Tokyo Government introduced a 
new bank tax. This tax targeted commercial banks with deposits exceeding ¥5 
trillion (DeWit, 2000). After its initial announcement in February 7, 2000, the tax 
became effective on April 1, 2000 and was to be levied over a five-year period. 
Banks affected by the Tokyo bank tax regarded the new bank tax as an undue 
financial burden, and so filed a lawsuit against the Tokyo Government shortly after 
the introduction of the tax. Two years later the Tokyo District Court declared the 
tax to be void claiming it treated the banking sector unfairly. Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 
provides a chronology of key events surrounding the introduction, operation and 
eventual repeal of the Tokyo Bank Tax. 
The Tokyo bank tax was levied at a rate of three percent on gross profits 
(before personnel expense, operating expense and loan write-off deductions). 
Gross profits were at relatively high levels arising from an expansion of bank 
interest margins following the introduction of a zero-interest rate policy in early 
1999. Due to aggressive loan loss provisioning and write-offs, banks generally 
reported negative net profits. Thus, a tax on net profit would have yielded little or 
no extra tax revenues for the Tokyo government. However, taxing gross rather 
                                                        
56 Japan is among the countries with the highest statutory corporate income tax rates (de Mooij and Saito, 
2014). Depending on firm size, level of income, and region, corporate income tax rates vary and typically range 
from 30 to 40 percent.  Since the 1990s, corporate income tax rates have gradually declined.     
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than net profits removed the possibility that banks could inflate expenses to 
minimise profits and tax liabilities, and thus ensured a stable stream of tax revenue 
for the Tokyo government.  
The Tokyo bank tax affected 17 commercial banks in Japan.57 Bank lending 
attitudes deteriorated during the implementation period of the tax, according to a 
survey of Japanese enterprises (see Figure 4.1). Among the bank types affected by 
the tax were city and regional banks, which together account for approximately 
85% of the total assets of the banking industry in Japan. City and regional banks 
each provide financing to firms but may differ in the size of the firms they lend to. 
While regional banks typically focus on small to medium-sized domestic 
companies, city banks also serve large corporations domestically and overseas.58   
Given their size and prominent role in the administering of payments, city 
and regional banks represent important constituents of Japan’s payment system. 
These banks perform the twin role of distributing currency and of producing and 
servicing demand deposits. Regional and city banks also engage actively in the 
trading of financial derivatives with a focus on interest rate swaps. They also 
pursue traditional off-balance sheet activities including the provision of standby 
letters of credit and other commitments.  
 
 
 
                                                        
57 As in Chapter 3, the group of 17 commercial banks excludes affected trust banks and long-term credit banks. 
See Section 4.3.2 for further explanation. 
58 At the onset of the Japan’s crisis beginning in the early 1990s, city banks began to drastically retreat from 
their international activities evidenced by a decline in overseas lending (Peek and Rosengren 2000).    
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Figure 4.1 | Tankan Survey: Lending Attitude of Financial Institutions 
 
Source: Bank of Japan. Tankan Survey: Lending Attitude of Financial Institutions. Fiscal Year 1997-2003, 
quarterly. Survey item 612: Judgement of financial institutions' attitude towards lending as perceived by the 
responding enterprise (manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries [excluding financial institutions]). 
Diffusion index calculated by subtracting the percentage share of responding enterprises which judge business 
conditions to be “unfavourable” from the percentage share of responding enterprises which judge business 
condition to be “favourable”. The grey-shaded area denotes the period during which the Tokyo bank tax was 
operational. 
Despite the deregulation of the banking industry, city and regional banks 
maintained the characteristics of traditional financial intermediaries throughout 
the 1990s. In terms of balance sheet composition, loans make up the majority of 
assets of city and regional banks (Table 4.1). These assets are funded mainly by 
deposits, albeit for city banks to a lesser extent relative to regional banks. The 
equity capital ratio of both city and regional banks was approximately 4%. During 
the 2000s, security holdings became relatively more important, particularly for 
city banks. To fund assets, regional banks increased their reliance on deposits, 
while city banks began to reduce dependence on deposit funding. Overall, there 
was a proliferation of liquid demand deposits relative to other forms of deposits. 
City banks also held considerably more equity capital during the 2000s.  
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Table 4.1 Balance Sheet of Japanese Commercial Banks 
Components of Assets and Liabilities as a % of Total Assets 
 1990s  2000s 
(in percent) City Regional  City Regional 
Cash 7.52  4.88  4.34 3.03 
Earning Assets 86.45 93.79  89.95 96.27 
Loans & Bills discounted 70.85 71.84  55.87 68.26 
Security holdings 16.30 19.14  26.13 25.47 
Other earning assets 12.86 9.02  17.99 6.27 
   
 
     
Total liabilities 95.48 95.89  92.55 95.43 
Total deposits 71.48 88.96  71.74 94.11 
Demand deposits 18.66 20.65  47.21 41.95 
Other liabilities 28.52 11.04  28.26 5.89 
Equity capital 4.52 4.11  7.45 4.57 
Total assets  100.00 100.00  100.00 100.00 
This table reports balance sheet components of assets and liabilities as a percentage of total assets of city 
and regional banks for 1990s (1990–1999) and 2000s (2000–2009). Source: Bank of Japan Statistics.  
Casual observation of aggregate balance sheets over the fiscal years 1997 
and 2005 suggests that regional banks contributed considerably to the provision of 
liquidity. Panels A and B of Table 4.2 show that regional banks were represented 
among the top liquidity creators. Notably, city banks that are typically larger than 
regional banks did not create the most liquidity. Overall, liquidity creation was 
higher in fiscal year 2005 than in the crisis year 1997.  
 
Table 4.2 | Top 10 Liquidity Creators 
 Panel A: Fiscal Year 1997 Panel B: Fiscal Year 2005 
Rank Name Type LC Name Type LC 
1 Chiba Bank regional 0.12 Ashikaga Bank regional 0.28 
2 Bank of Okinawa regional 0.12 Toho Bank regional 0.24 
3 Kagoshima Bank regional 0.12 Bank of Yokohama regional 0.24 
4 Miyazaki Bank regional 0.12 Minato Bank regional 0.23 
5 Toho Bank regional 0.10 Miyazaki Bank regional 0.23 
6 Chikuho Bank regional 0.10 Kagoshima Bank regional 0.22 
7 Bank of Yokohama regional 0.10 Chiba Bank regional 0.21 
8 Bank of Fukuoka regional 0.09 Bank of Okinawa regional 0.20 
9 Oita Bank regional 0.09 Eighteenth Bank regional 0.20 
10 Tohoku Bank regional 0.09 Musashino Bank regional 0.20 
This table reports the top ten banks in terms of liquidity creation for the fiscal years 1997 and 2005. LC 
denotes the liquidity created per gross total assets using the Berger and Bouwman (2009)’s cat-fat measure 
(see Panel B of Table 4.3 for a definition). Author’s own calculation.  
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4.3 Methodology 
We employ a difference-in-differences approach to exploit the exogenous 
variation in the taxation of banks. This enables us to identify the causal effect of an 
increase in taxation on bank liquidity creation.  
We classify banks into affected banks (those that are affected by the Tokyo 
bank tax) and unaffected banks (those that are unaffected by the tax). This allows 
us to compare the difference in the liquidity creation of the affected banks between 
the pre-tax period and the post-tax period with the same difference in the liquidity 
creation of the unaffected banks, and thus retrieve the average treatment effect of 
the tax on banks’ liquidity creation.  
Our estimable model is as follows:  
𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
= 𝛿 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡⏟            
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (4.1) 
In Equation (4.1), 𝑖 and 𝑡 denote bank and time, respectively. 𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡 represents bank 
liquidity creation (discussed in detail below) and 𝐺𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 denotes gross total assets. 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable that equals zero for all banks in the pre-Tokyo bank 
tax period and one for those banks that are taxed when the Tokyo bank tax comes 
into effect. The coefficient 𝛿 captures the impact of the Tokyo bank tax on bank 
behaviour. 
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 represents a vector of bank level control variables that vary over time 
and across banks. These control variables account for factors that could influence 
the level of bank liquidity creation as well as any observed pre-intervention 
differences in the characteristics of affected and unaffected banks. The control 
variables include the bank size (measured as the log of total assets) and bank 
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diversification (measured as the ratio of non-interest income to total operating 
income). Market share is measured as the proportion of an individual bank’s assets 
to total aggregate assets.  The vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 includes variables that are used 
typically by supervisors to monitor capital adequacy, asset quality, managerial 
efficiency and earnings. Capital adequacy is defined as the ratio of tier 1 capital 
(common stock, retained earnings, and legal reserves) to total assets. Asset quality 
is measured by the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets. Managerial 
efficiency is proxied by the ratio of operating expense over operating income. 
Earnings are defined as net income divided by total assets.  Each control variable 
enters the model lagged by one period to avoid simultaneity. Bank fixed effects, 𝛼𝑖, 
and time fixed effects, 𝛾𝑡, capture the unobserved characteristics of banks and 
economy wide disturbances. 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at 
the bank level to account for within-bank correlation (Bertrand et al. 2004).  
4.3.1 Liquidity creation measures 
Following Berger and Bouwman (2009) we employ both a narrow and a 
broad measure of liquidity creation. The narrow measure (defined as ‘nonfat’ in 
Berger and Bouwman’s terminology) focuses on banks’ on-balance sheet activities 
only, while the broad measure (defined as ‘fat’ in the Berger and Bouwman’s 
terminology) takes into consideration both on- and off-balance sheet (OBS) 
activities. We compute these two measures of bank liquidity creation based on the 
categorisation (cat) of balance sheet and off-balance sheet items as follows. 59  
 
                                                        
59 We are unable to compute measures of liquidity creation based on the maturity profiles of on- and off-
balance sheet activities due to data limitations. 
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Table 4.3 | Construction of Liquidity Creation Measures 
Panel A: Item classification and weighting 
Assets 
Illiquid assets  
(weight = ½) 
Semi-liquid assets  
(weight = 0) 
Liquid assets  
(weight =-½)  
Commercial loans 
Premises and movable 
property 
Other assets 
Customers’ liabilities for 
acceptance and 
guarantees 
Consumer loans 
Residential real estate loans 
Trading account securities 
Money held in trust 
Investment securities 
Call loans 
Bills purchased 
Monetary claims purchased 
Cash and due from banks 
Foreign exchange 
Liabilities plus equity 
Liquid liabilities  
(weight = ½) 
Semi-liquid liabilities  
(weight = 0) 
Illiquid liabilities & equity  
(weight = -½) 
Current deposits 
Ordinary deposits 
Savings deposits 
Call money 
Trading liabilities 
Deposits at notice 
Time deposits 
Negotiable certificates of 
deposit 
Bills sold 
Commercial paper 
Borrowed money 
Foreign exchange 
Debentures 
Corporate bonds 
Convertible bonds 
Acceptance and guarantees 
Other liabilities 
Common stock 
New stock subscriptions 
Off-balance sheet activities (OBS) 
Illiquid OBS  
(weight = ½) 
Semi-liquid OBS  
(weight = 0) 
Liquid OBS  
(weight = -½) 
Guarantees 
Standby letters of credit 
Letters of credit 
 Interest rate derivatives 
Foreign exchange derivatives 
Equity derivatives 
Fixed income derivatives 
Commodity derivatives 
Credit derivatives 
Panel B: Liquidity creation measures 
Cat-fat 1 2⁄ ∗ (illiquid assets + liquid liabilities + illiquid OBS) −1 2⁄ ∗  (liquid assets + illiquid 
liabilities + equity + liquid OBS)  
Cat-nonfat 1 2⁄ ∗ (illiquid assets + liquid liabilities) −1 2⁄ ∗  (liquid assets + illiquid liabilities + equity) 
This table illustrates the classification and the weighting of the balance sheet items in line with the liquidity 
creation measure by Berger and Bouwman (2009) adapted for the Japanese banking industry. Panel A lists 
the items of bank balance sheets and off-balance sheets under liquid, semi-liquid and illiquid. Bank activities 
that add to liquidity creation are classified as illiquid, those that have a neutral effect are classified as semi-
liquid, and those that subtract from liquidity creation are classified as liquid. The weigths ½, 0, and -½ are 
multiplied times the yen amount of the corresponding bank activities. Panel B illustrates the calculation of 
cat-fat and cat-nonfat. The weighted yen amounts are added to arrive at the total yen value of liquidity 
creation of each bank in our sample.   
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First, we classify balance sheet items as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid. 
Second, these classified items are assigned weights in line with liquidity creation 
theory as follows: 0.5 for illiquid assets, liquid liabilities, and illiquid OBS items; 0 
for semi-liquid liabilities and semi-liquid OBS items; and -0.5 for liquid assets, 
illiquid liabilities, and liquid OBS items. Third, the classified and weighted on- and 
off-balance sheet items are combined to obtain the broad (cat-fat) and the narrow 
(cat-nonfat) liquidity creation measures (Berger and Bouwman, 2009, 2016). Table 
4.3 illustrates the classification and the weighting of the balance sheet items in line 
with the construction of the two liquidity measures. Finally, following Berger and 
Bouwman (2009, 2016), our analysis is based on the cat-fat and the cat-nonfat 
liquidity creation measures normalised by total assets to make them comparable 
across banks.  
4.3.2 Data 
Our analysis focuses on commercial banks operating in Japan over the 
period from March 1998 (fiscal year 1997) through September 2001 (fiscal year 
2001). The sample period straddles the introduction of the Tokyo tax in April 
2000. In order to ensure that there is sufficient overlap in the distribution of the 
covariates across the affected and unaffected banks, we restrict our analysis to 
commercial (city and regional) banks. This allows us to obtain correct statistical 
inference from our difference-in-differences analysis (Imbens and Rubin 2015).  
Our sample comprises city and regional banks. Trust banks and long-term 
credit banks are excluded from the sample, since these types of banks have 
business models that differ from those pursued by commercial banks. Banks which 
either failed or went bankrupt during the sample period are also excluded from 
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our sample.60 One merger between an affected and an unaffected bank occurred 
during our sample period.61 These banks are also excluded from the empirical 
analysis in order to ensure the separability of affected and unaffected banks.  
The primary source of data is the Japanese Bankers Association. This 
provides detailed semi-annual balance sheet and income statement information 
for each member bank. We supplement this information with hand collected data 
on off-balance items drawn from electronic copies of bank financial statements 
(yuho) obtained from Bloomberg. Our final sample is an unbalanced panel of 745 
bank-year observations of 107 Japanese commercial banks (8 City banks and 99 
Regional banks). Of the 107 commercial banks in our sample, 16 banks were 
affected by the Tokyo bank tax. 
Panel A of Table 4.4 reports the mean and standard deviation of the bank 
liquidity creation measures for the affected and unaffected banks before and after 
the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. According to the broad (cat-fat) measure of 
liquidity creation, unaffected banks create slightly more liquidity than taxed 
counterparts. Specifically, in the pre-tax period both groups create approximately 
¥0.30 of liquidity per ¥1 of total assets employed. The difference between the two 
groups is also statistically indistinguishable from zero (t-stat = 0.07).  In the post 
Tokyo tax period, however, control group banks create ¥0.46 of liquidity per ¥1 of 
total assets employed compared to affected banks which create ¥0.42 of liquidity 
                                                        
60 The following banks were excluded from the sample: Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (failed November 17, 
1997), Tokuyo City Bank (failed Nov 27, 1997), Tokyo Sowa Bank (under public administration, June 12, 
1999), Kokumin Bank (under public administration, April 11, 1999), Niigata Chuo Bank (under public 
administration, October 2, 1999), Ishikawa Bank (failed, March 2001), Chubu Bank (failed, March 8, 2001), 
Kyoto Kyoei Bank (failed, October 14, 1997), Kofuku Bank (under public administration, May 22, 1999), Kansai 
Sawayaka Bank (formerly Kofuku Bank), Namihaya Bank (under public administration, August 7, 1999), 
Midori Bank (failed, May 15,1998). (Source: Bank of Japan, Deposit Insurance Corporation Japan, Financial 
Services Agency Japan). 
61 Hachijuni Bank (affected) acquires Niigata Chuo Bank (unaffected), September 29, 2000 (Financial Services 
Agency Japan).  
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per ¥1 of total assets employed. This difference is statistically significant at the 5% 
level (t-stat = 2.47).  
Table 4.4 | Summary Statistics 
Variables Affected banks  Unaffected banks 
 Before After  Before After 
Panel A: Dependent Variables      
Cat-fat 0.30 0.42  0.30 0.46 
 (0.18) (0.12)  (0.19) (0.10) 
Cat-nonfat 0.28 0.40  0.29 0.45 
 (0.18) (0.12)  (0.19) (0.10) 
Panel B: Control Variables      
Capital Adequacy (%) 2.81 3.33  1.91 2.18 
 (0.93) (0.85)  (0.69) (0.98) 
Asset Quality (%) 2.86 3.97  2.62 4.79 
 (2.03) (1.61)  (2.10) (2.15) 
Management Efficiency (%) 0.97 1.09  1.03 1.05 
 (0.16) (0.10)  (0.15) (0.16) 
Earnings (%) -0.23 0.10  -0.08 -0.03 
 (0.65) (0.22)  (0.63) (0.44) 
Diversification (%) 25.94 30.06  17.50 17.58 
 (11.41) (8.77)  (6.72) (6.30) 
Size (log) 30.50 30.52  28.15 28.18 
 (1.02) (1.02)  (0.66) (0.68) 
Market Share (%) 3.48 3.49  0.26 0.27 
 (2.89) (2.92)  (0.16) (0.17) 
Number of Observations 80 47  450 267 
Number of Banks 16 16  91 91 
The table presents means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of both dependent and control variables 
used in our analysis before and after the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax and by treatment status. The set of 
control variables include capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, earnings, size, diversification 
and market share. See Table 3.2 for a definition.    
 
Panel B of Table 4.4 reports the mean and standard deviation for each of the 
control variables used in our analysis for both affected and unaffected banks 
before and after the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. Overall, the summary 
statistics confirm that affected and unaffected banks are on average relatively 
similar across a number of covariates including capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management efficiency, and earnings. Affected and unaffected banks differ to some 
extent in terms of size, market share, and diversification. Affected banks are larger, 
hold more market share and are more diversified than their unaffected 
counterparts. 
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4.4 Findings 
Table 4.5 presents our main results. In Column 1 we report estimates using 
the broad liquidity creation measure (cat-fat to total assets) as the dependent 
variable, while controlling for time and bank fixed effects only. The treatment 
effect is -0.035 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. This result indicates 
that banks affected by the Tokyo tax experience a 3.5 percentage point reduction 
in their liquidity creation relative to unaffected banks. The economic significance 
of the impact of the tax on bank liquidity creation is considerable. To illustrate this 
point, consider the average affected bank in our sample, which has total assets of 
¥28.3 trillion ($249 billion). The 3.5 percentage point reduction in the cat-fat to 
total assets ratio implies a loss of ¥990 billion ($8.71 billion) in liquidity creation.62 
The effect of taxation on liquidity creation is robust when we control for bank level 
time varying characteristics albeit the coefficient in this case (shown in Column 2) 
is marginally smaller.  
In Columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the narrow liquidity creation 
measure (cat-nonfat to total assets). The results using this measure are similar in 
both size and significance to the results for our broad liquidity creation measure. 
This suggests that the reduction in liquidity creation by affected banks is not due to 
changes in their OBS activities, but rather arises from changes in the composition 
of on-balance sheet assets and liabilities. 
Next, we explore the relationship between the gross profit tax and the 
components of liquidity creation. Table 4.6 presents the results of model (4.1) re-
estimated using the individual components of the broad (cat-fat) liquidity creation 
                                                        
62 When considering the median treated bank in our sample with total assets of ¥10.9 trillion ($95.82 billion) 
the effect of the tax is equally notable, as it implies a reduction of ¥381 billion ($3.35 billion) on its liquidity 
creation.  
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measure. Here we use the liquid, semi-liquid, and illiquid items of the asset-side, 
liability-side, and OBS section of the balance sheet (deflated by total assets) as 
outcome variables. We find that the tax is associated negatively with bank liquidity  
Table 4.5 | The Effect of Tax on Liquidity Creation 
 cat-fat cat-fat cat-nonfat cat-nonfat 
TAX -0.035** -0.028** -0.034** -0.028*** 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) 
Capital Adequacy  0.001  -0.0006 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Asset Quality  0.004**  0.004** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Management Efficiency  0.0002  0.002 
  (0.022)  (0.002) 
Earnings  0.002  0.001 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Market Share  0.009  0.020 
  (0.042)  (0.040) 
Diversification  -0.001*  -0.0004 
  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
Size  -0.088*  -0.089* 
  (0.052)  (0.050) 
Constant 0.060*** 2.579* 0.059*** 2.589* 
 (0.006) (1.472) (0.006) (1.437) 
Bank Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 844 844 844 844 
R2 0.890 0.893 0.885 0.888 
This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions using a sample of 107 Japanese banks 
spanning the period from March 1998 to September 2001. The dependent variables are cat-fat and cat-nonfat. 
The main explanatory variable is TAX, an indicator variable equal to one for banks affected by the Tokyo bank 
tax when it comes into effect and zero otherwise. To control for potential heterogeneity between affected and 
unaffected banks the lagged values of capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, earnings, market 
share, diversification and size are included in some specifications as further control variables. In addition, a set 
of time dummies and bank specific fixed effects are included across all regressions. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively.  
creation on the asset-side of the balance sheet only. Banks liable to pay the Tokyo 
bank tax have significantly less illiquid assets. This could be due to affected banks 
contracting their loan portfolios as a response to the tax (see Buch et al., 2016; 
Schandlbauer 2017; Banerji et al., 2018). There is little evidence of an effect of the 
tax on either semi-liquid or liquid assets. The detrimental effect of the tax on asset-
side liquidity creation is offset partially by the lower equity to total assets held by 
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affected banks relative to their unaffected counterparts; a difference that is 
significant at the 1% level (Table 4.6 Panel C).  
Table 4.6 | Components of Liquidity Creation 
Panel A: Assets    
 Illiquid (1/2) Semi-Liquid (0) Liquid (-1/2) 
TAX -0.057** -0.024 0.005 
 (0.023) (0.014) (0.004) 
Control variables YES YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 844 844 844 
Panel B: Liabilities  
 
   
 Illiquid (1/2) Semi-Liquid (0) Liquid (-1/2) 
TAX 0.004 -0.025*** 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.006) 
Control variables YES YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 844 844 844 
Panel C: Equity 
 
   
 Illiquid (1/2) Semi-Liquid (0) Liquid (-1/2) 
TAX -0.004***   
 (0.001)   
Control variables YES   
Bank Fixed Effects YES   
Observations 844   
Panel D: Off-Balance Sheet Activities 
 
   
 Illiquid (1/2) Semi-Liquid (0) Liquid (-1/2) 
TAX 0.00024  -0.00005 
 (0.00408)  (0.00067) 
Control variables YES  YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES  YES 
Observations 844  844 
This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions using a sample of 107 Japanese banks 
spanning the period from March 1998 to September 2001. The dependent variables are liquidity creation 
components normalised by the total assets. Liquidity is calculated based on the cat-fat measure. The set of 
control variables include capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, earnings, size, diversification 
and market share. In addition, a set of time dummies and bank specific fixed effects are included across all 
regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 We find that the tax affects semi-liquid liabilities. However, this category of 
liabilities carries a zero weight in the construction of both the broad and narrow 
measures of liquidity creation, and so does not impact on the overall liquidity 
created by banks (see Table 4.6 Panel B). In terms of magnitude, the imposition of 
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the Tokyo bank tax induces a reduction in asset-side liquidity of 5.7 percentage 
points, in liability- and equity-side liquidity of 2.5 and 0.4 percentage points 
respectively. The effect of tax on the asset-side of bank liquidity creation is larger 
than any of the other components of the balance sheet. Overall, the findings in 
Table 4.6 indicate that the reduction in bank liquidity creation is driven mainly by 
the negative impact of the Tokyo bank tax on the asset side of the balance sheet. 63    
4.5 Testing the Mechanisms 
The results of our initial empirical analysis suggest that the introduction of 
the Tokyo tax had a significant impact on bank liquidity creation. Moreover, our 
findings suggest that the tax affects certain components of the balance sheet, 
namely the illiquid assets and capital held by banks. In this section, we explore the 
possible mechanisms relating to bank leverage and profitability through which 
taxation may affect bank liquidity creation.  
First, the imposition of a tax on gross profitability could affect bank liquidity 
creation by inducing changes in the extent to which banks assume portfolio risk 
(Caminal, 2003; Horváth 2013; Milonas 2016; Gambacorta et al. 2017). Since an 
increase in tax costs leaves banks with a lower amount of after-tax earnings, banks 
may choose to re-organise portfolios by reallocating from safer toward riskier 
assets.64 For example, banks may reduce investments in government securities and 
shift to riskier commercial or consumer credit. The reallocation of portfolios 
toward riskier assets leads to an increase in asset-side liquidity creation. Thus, if 
                                                        
63 Our findings will understate the actual impact of the tax on liquidity creation if a mechanical relationship 
exists between taxes and liquidity creation. That is, tax settlements paid to the tax collecting authority may 
reduce cash holdings of banks. According to liquidity creation measure by Berger and Bouwman (2009), a 
reduction in cash increases the liquidity created by the bank. Findings presented in Table 4.6 however do not 
point to a strong offsetting impact from this relationship. The coefficient on TAX for liquid assets (which 
include cash holdings) as the outcome variable is close to zero and not statistically significant.  
64 Caminal (2003) theoretically shows that banks increase risk-taking if taxes reduce their ability to seek 
economic rent. 
Chapter 4 | Bank Taxation and Liquidity Creation 
127 
 
taxation affects liquidity creation through the risk-taking mechanism, we would 
expect that banks which take more risk increase liquidity creation following the 
imposition of the tax.  
In order to assess the risk-taking mechanism, we augment Equation (4.1) 
with an interaction term between TAX and Asset Quality (for a definition see 
Section 4.3), our proxy for bank risk-taking. This common proxy indicator of risk-
taking is motivated by the fact that non-performing loans involve a mechanical 
classification of loans as non-performing when payment is overdue. As such this 
proxy is less prone to manipulation by bank managers than loan loss provisions 
(Shrieves and Dahl 2003). The results of this analysis presented in Table 4.7 Panel 
A provide little evidence in support of this mechanism. The interaction term enters 
the regression with a negative coefficient and is statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels.  
Second, the imposition of a tax on gross profitability could affect bank 
liquidity creation by inducing changes in the extent to which banks fulfil their 
respective monitoring function as part of their overall financial intermediation 
activities (Dia and van Hoose 2016; Banerji et al., 2018). If taxation affects liquidity 
creation through this mechanism, then the negative impact of taxation on liquidity 
creation should be weaker among banks that devote more resources to the 
monitoring of borrowers.  
We test this monitoring mechanism by introducing an interaction term 
between High Monitoring and TAX into Equation (4.1). To construct High 
Monitoring, we follow Coleman et al. (2006) and calculate a salary expenses ratio 
defined as personnel expenses to total non-interest expenses. Given that the salary 
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expense ratio is driven in large part by the size of the bank, we divide banks into 
five groups based on total assets. For each bank half-year observation, we compute 
the difference between the salary expenses ratio and the median for a given group 
of banks. We then set High Monitoring equal to one if the salary expenses ratio 
adjusted for bank size is positive and zero otherwise. The results are presented in 
Table 4.7 Panel B and are consistent with the monitoring mechanism being at play 
in the case of the Tokyo tax. The estimated coefficients on the interaction between 
taxation and monitoring enter positively and significantly. Our findings imply that 
banks that devote more resources to the monitoring of borrowers reduce liquidity 
creation by less following the imposition of the Tokyo bank tax.  
Third, taxation could affect liquidity creation via the leverage of banks. As 
interest payments are deducted prior to arriving at gross profit, banks might opt 
for a more fragile capital structure to take advantage of this tax shield. If so, a 
fragile capital structure dominated by debt and deposits may reduce the ability of 
banks to absorb risk and hence create liquidity. This implies that the negative 
impact of tax on liquidity creation would be weaker among better capitalised 
banks. A competing view in relation to bank capital is that fragility induces banks 
to monitor their borrowers more intensely and hence extend more loans and 
create more liquidity. We use Capital Adequacy to proxy for the capital structure of 
the bank. We include this proxy along with its interaction with the TAX variable in 
Equation (4.1) to assess whether bank capitalisation mechanism is relevant in 
explaining the link between taxation and bank liquidity creation. The results 
reported in Table 4.7 Panel C are consistent with the view that bank capital 
absorbs risk. The interaction term of the Tax and Capital Adequacy enters 
positively and significantly in both regressions. This implies that the Tokyo tax 
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exerts a less pronounced negative effect on liquidity creation for better capitalised 
banks.  
Table 4.7 | Testing the Mechanisms (Risk-Taking, Monitoring, Capitalisation) 
  Panel A: Risk-Taking Panel B: Monitoring Panel C: Capitalisation 
 cat-fat cat-fat cat-nonfat cat-nonfat cat-nonfat cat-nonfat 
TAX -0.027* -0.027** -0.052** -0.054*** -0.032** -0.033** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) 
TAX ∙ Asset Quality -0.003 -0.003     
 (0.009) (0.009)     
TAX ∙ Monitoring   0.041* 0.044*   
   (0.024) (0.023)   
TAX ∙ Capital Adequacy    0.008* 0.009** 
     (0.005) (0.005) 
Asset Quality 0.004** 0.004**     
 (0.002) (0.002)     
Monitoring   0.006 0.006   
   (0.005) (0.005)   
Capital Adequacy     -0.001 -0.001 
     (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 2.581* 2.591* 2.700* 2.717* 2.545* 2.550* 
 (1.467) (1.432) (1.486) (1.455) (1.447) (1.410) 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 844 844 844 844 844 844 
R2 0.893 0.888 0.885 0.888 0.893 0.888 
This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions examining the effect of Tokyo tax on 
liquidity creation. We consider the three different mechanisms through which tax can impact on liquidity 
creation. Panel A focuses on bank risk-taking by introducing an interaction term between TAX, an indicator 
variable equal to one for banks affected by the Tokyo bank tax when it comes into effect and zero otherwise, 
and our proxy for bank risk-taking (Asset Quality, defined as non-performing loans to total assets). We 
consider monitoring as an alternative non-mutually exclusive mechanism in Panel B. Panel C focuses on bank 
capital as an alternative mechanism through which tax affects liquidity creation. Lagged values of management 
efficiency, earnings, market share, diversification and size are included as further control variables. In 
addition, a set of time dummies and bank specific fixed effects are included across all regressions. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
4.6 Robustness checks 
In Table 4.8, we check the robustness of our estimates of the effect of the 
Tokyo bank tax on bank liquidity creation to common problems inherent in 
differences-in-differences approach. First, we focus on whether the outcome 
variables of affected and unaffected banks demonstrate similar trends in the 
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absence of treatment. This is a key assumption behind our identification strategy 
(and is often referred to as the parallel trend assumption). Although this 
assumption cannot be tested directly, placebo tests can be useful in mitigating 
concerns that the parallel trend assumption is violated. As a check for the parallel 
trend assumption, we conduct a placebo test by assuming falsely that the Tokyo 
bank tax was introduced one year prior to its actual adoption. By introducing a 
placebo tax just before the actual bank tax was introduced, we also test for 
potential anticipation effects. Panel A of Table 4.8 presents results of this placebo 
test. None of the coefficients on the Placebo-Tax are significant. This suggests that 
the parallel trend assumption for the period prior to the introduction of the tax is 
not violated and that anticipation effects are not present. 
Next, we focus on the possibility that the OLS standard errors of our 
difference-in-differences estimates of treatment effects are biased downward as a 
result of serially correlated dependent variables (Bertrand et al., 2004). In order to 
alleviate concerns regarding serial correlation, we cluster the standard errors at 
the bank level throughout our analysis. To further check the robustness of our 
results, we collapse our data into a two-period panel. All observations prior to the 
introduction of the Tokyo bank tax are averaged into a single pre-intervention 
period, while all observations after the tax are averaged into a single post-
intervention period. The results shown in Panel A of Table 4.8 suggest that there is 
little deviation from the estimated tax effects reported in Table 4.5. This confirms 
that the baseline results are robust to using estimators that adjust standard errors 
for serial correlation.  
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Table 4.8 | Falsification Tests 
Panel A: Fiscal Year 1999   
 cat-fat cat-nonfat 
Placebo-TAX -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
Control variables YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 318 318 
Panel B: Two-Period Sample  
 
  
 cat-fat cat-nonfat 
TAX -0.027** -0.026** 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
Control variables YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 211 211 
This table reports the results from falsification tests. Panel A presents the results of ordinary least squares 
regressions using a sample spanning the period before the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. The main 
explanatory variable is Placebo-TAX, an indicator variable equal to one for banks affected by the Tokyo bank 
tax when it comes into effect and zero otherwise, but this time we assume falsely that this happens one year 
prior to actual introduction. In order to account for problems arising from serially correlated outcomes, In 
Panel B we collapse our dataset into a two-period panel, by averaging the observations in dates prior to the 
Tokyo bank tax into a single pre-intervention period and likewise for the observations in dates after the 
introduction of the tax, which are averaged into a single post-intervention period (Bertrand et al., 2004). The 
dependent variables are cat-fat and cat-nonfat. The set of control variables include capital adequacy, asset 
quality, management efficiency, earnings, size, diversification and market share. In addition, a set of time 
dummies and bank specific fixed effects are included across all regressions. Robust standard errors clustered 
at the bank level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively.  
To provide additional insight, we also examine whether various subsamples 
are driving our results. First, we consider the possibility that liquidity creation by 
banks located at distance from Tokyo may be affected by different economic 
conditions to those experienced by banks located in or close to Tokyo. To alleviate 
concerns regarding the impact of different economic conditions across Japan 
impacting on the liquidity created of banks located in different geographic areas, 
we re-estimate our regressions imposing geographic restrictions on our sample. 
The restricted sample contains banks operating predominantly in the three major 
regions (Kanto, Chubu and Tohoku) that directly surround the Tokyo prefecture. 
This restriction effectively excludes banks located in Japan’s other major industrial 
centres (such as the Kansai and Kyushu regions), and reduces our sample size from 
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107 banks to 48 banks (16 affected and 32 unaffected). The results of this analysis 
are presented in Panel A of Table 4.9, and are consistent with our main findings, 
indicating that the average effect of tax on bank liquidity creation is negative and 
statistically significant, even when a geographically constrained sample is 
considered.  
 We also consider the possibility that some of the unaffected banks that 
have no physical presence in Tokyo, and which do not compete directly with the 
affected banks might be driving our results. To address this concern, we exclude 
from our sample those banks that have no physical branch presence in the Tokyo 
area. This exclusion restriction results in a sample of 97 banks (comprising 16 
affected and 81 unaffected). The results shown in Panel B of Table 4.9 are 
consistent with those reported in Table 4.5.  
The negative effect of the Tokyo bank tax on bank liquidity creation could 
be driven by differences in the size of banks included in the affected and control 
groups. To address this concern, we limit our sample to banks with total assets 
greater than that of the median bank. The results of this analysis shown in Panel C 
of Table 4.9, suggest that restricting our sample to relatively large banks does not 
change materially the results reported in Table 4.5. 
Finally, the inclusion of Capital Adequacy as a control variable in some 
specifications used for our main analysis could raise endogeneity concerns, given 
that both our broad and narrow measures of liquidity creation capture the share of 
equity in liquidity creation by construction. Although our results remain robust to 
excluding Capital Adequacy as a control variable, (see columns 1 and 3 of Table 
4.5) following Berger and Bouwman (2009) and Fu et al. (2016), we reconstruct  
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Table 4.9 | Robustness Checks 
Panel A: Economic Trends 
 cat-fat cat-nonfat 
TAX -0.032** -0.031** 
 (0.016) (0.015) 
Control variables YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 474 474 
Panel B: Tokyo Presence   
 cat-fat cat-nonfat 
TAX -0.029** -0.029** 
 (0.014) (0.013) 
Control variables YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 772 772 
Panel C: Large Banks Sample 
 
 cat-fat cat-nonfat 
TAX -0.029** -0.028** 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
Controls variables YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 463 463 
Panel D: Alternative Liquidity Creation Measures 
 
 cat-fat cat-nonfat 
TAX -0.029** -0.029** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Controls variables YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 844 844 
This table reports the results of further robustness checks on the effect of the Tokyo bank tax on bank liquidity 
creation. In Panel A, we limit our sample to banks which operate predominantly in the three major regions 
(Kanto, Chubu and Tohoku) that directly surround the Tokyo prefecture, in order to alleviate concerns 
regarding differential economic climates across Japan driving our main findings. In Panel B, we restrict the 
sample to those banks that have physical presence (i.e. branches) in Tokyo, in order to alleviate concerns that 
our results might be driven by unaffected banks that do not compete directly with affected banks. In Panel C, 
we limit our sample to banks which have total assets greater than that of the median bank, in order to alleviate 
concerns regarding relatively small sized banks driving our main findings. In Panel D, the dependent variables 
have been reconstructed to exclude equity’s effect on liquidity measures. The main explanatory variable is 
TAX, an indicator variable equal to one for banks affected by the Tokyo bank tax when it comes into effect and 
zero otherwise. The set of control variables include capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, 
earnings, size, diversification and market share. In addition, a set of time dummies and bank specific fixed 
effects are included across all regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
both dependent variables excluding equity to further alleviate any concerns 
associated with this variable. The results, reported in Table 4.9 Panel D, suggest 
that our main findings are robust to the exclusion of equity from the liquidity 
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creation measures. The coefficient on TAX is still negative and significant in both 
cases. 
4.7 Summary  
Liquidity creation is one of the core functions of banks. Prior literature 
suggests that the extent to which banks can perform this core function is likely to 
be affected by managerial decision making, capitalisation, competition from other 
financial intermediaries, and capital, liquidity and deposit insurance regulations. 
The level of taxes is also likely to be a key determinant of bank liquidity creation. 
Taxes increase bank costs, which if not arbitraged or passed onto customers will 
impact on profitability, leading banks to change the asset and liability composition 
of balance sheets. To date, there is no evidence regarding the effects of taxation on 
bank liquidity creation.  
In this chapter we fill this gap via a research design and setting which 
allows us to isolate the implications of taxation for bank liquidity creation. Using a 
sample of Japanese commercial banks, we provide new evidence on the 
relationship between taxation and bank liquidity creation. As our identification 
strategy we use the sudden introduction of the Tokyo bank tax (which affected 
some banks but left others unaffected). This differential tax treatment of banks 
allows us to identify the impact of taxation on bank liquidity creation.  
Using a difference-in-differences approach we estimate the impact of taxes 
on bank liquidity creation. Our regression results indicate that gross profit taxes 
have a negative effect on bank liquidity creation. Specifically, banks affected by the 
Tokyo bank tax create significantly less liquidity than banks that were not affected 
by the tax. Our findings suggest that the downward adjustment in liquidity 
Chapter 4 | Bank Taxation and Liquidity Creation 
135 
 
creation is primarily driven by illiquid bank assets. We detect only a marginal 
effect of tax on the liability-side liquidity creation and no effect on off-balance 
sheet liquidity creation. Furthermore, we provide evidence on the underlying 
mechanisms that drive the observed reduction in bank liquidity creation. We test 
for the presence of three non-mutually exclusive mechanisms related to bank risk-
taking, monitoring and capitalisation. Our findings suggest that banks which are 
better capitalised and devote more resources to the monitoring of borrowers 
reduce liquidity creation by less when faced with a sudden increase in taxes. We do 
not find evidence for the risk-taking mechanism.  
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Chapter 5 | The Real Effects of Bank Taxation 
5.1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis and subsequent slow economic recovery have 
underlined interconnections between banks and the real economy. In this chapter 
we investigate the impact of a sudden introduction of a bank tax on the banking 
sector and real economy in Japan. We assess how banks adjust their balance sheets 
in response to the higher costs resulting from the tax, and how these adjustments 
affect the investment decisions of corporate borrowers. To the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first to investigate the effects of bank taxation on real 
economic outcomes. 
In many countries, there has been a proliferation of new and enhanced bank 
regulations. These have included tax schemes that are targeted specifically at the 
banking industry. The net effects of bank taxation depend crucially on the extent to 
which banks internalise or pass through (to customers) the increased costs arising 
from the taxes. For example, if banks pass through increased costs by reducing the 
availability of credit or increasing interest rates on borrowed funds, then this is 
likely to have implications for the ability of borrowing corporates to access 
external finance and execute real investments. As a consequence, understanding 
how banks respond to changes in taxes, and whether this has implications for 
corporate level investment is of substantive interest to policymakers charged with 
overseeing developments in the banking industry and real economy. 
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Assessing the implications of bank taxation for corporate borrowers and 
the real economy faces a significant challenge given that changes in economic 
conditions that prompt governments to change the taxation arrangements for 
banks may also affect corporate investment behaviour. To assess the effects of 
bank taxation on real economic decisions of corporates, we therefore require a 
change in the taxation of banks that is independent from a change in the demand 
for credit. In this study, we overcome this identification problem in two ways. First, 
we utilise an exogenous variation in bank taxation induced by an unexpected 
imposition of a local bank tax (in Tokyo, Japan) which affected one group of banks, 
but left others unaffected. Second, we rely on an estimation strategy (pioneered by 
Khwaja and Mian, 2008), which permits us to disentangle supply-side from 
demand-side factors. Specifically, we utilise loan level data on the individual 
corporate customers of banks. In our sample (discussed in more detail below) we 
observe the borrowing activity of approximately 2400 corporates that borrow 
from an average of seven banks. We exploit the presence of these multiple bank-
corporate relationships, and control for credit demand of corporates by including 
corporate fixed effects. The use of corporate fixed effects allows us to absorb the 
individual demand conditions for credit that may influence bank lending behaviour 
and isolate supply- from demand-side effects. As a consequence, estimated 
differences in credit supply can be thus attributed correctly to differences in bank 
exposures to tax.  
As an empirical setting we exploit the so-called Tokyo bank tax as a quasi-
natural experiment. At the beginning of the fiscal year 2000, large Japanese banks 
with operations in Tokyo and deposits exceeding ¥5 trillion unexpectedly became 
liable to pay a tax to the Tokyo government. The Tokyo bank tax which was 
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introduced as part of a populist political agenda led by the Tokyo Governor 
Ishihara aimed to curtail the excessive profitability of banks and arrest a three-
year long decline (1997-1999) in tax revenues raised from banks for local 
government coffers. Under the terms of the Tokyo bank tax, the tax base shifted 
from net to gross profit, resulting in a considerable widening of the tax base, and 
increasing the tax liability of affected banks. The Tokyo bank tax was not part of a 
broader or widely anticipated set of fiscal reforms but was instead specifically 
targeted at large banks. These banks represented an important source of funding 
for corporates with operations outside the Tokyo prefecture. There was 
considerable variation in the individual tax liabilities of banks subject to the Tokyo 
bank tax, since the amount payable to the local (Tokyo) government was related 
directly to the number of employees based in Tokyo.  
Our empirical analysis comprises two stages. In the first stage, we 
investigate the impact of the bank tax on the availability of credit, and the likely 
implications for the investment activity of borrowing corporates. In the second 
stage, we investigate if corporates compensate for a decline in credit by utilising 
alternative sources of funding (such as internal cash reserves, equity and bond 
issuance and loans from banks not liable for the Tokyo bank tax). We complement 
this via an investigation of whether competitor banks (exempt from the Tokyo 
bank tax) which compete in local loan markets with banks liable to pay the tax 
adjust their credit supply in response to the tax.  
To execute the first stage of our analysis, we use a loan level dataset to 
investigate if banks that are more affected by the Tokyo bank tax supply less credit 
to large corporate borrowers. A priori, we expect that banks with a higher 
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exposure to the Tokyo area (and thus a high Tokyo bank tax liability) tighten credit 
supply relatively more than less exposed counterparts.65 We investigate changes in 
credit supply by examining both the likelihood that a new loan is granted, and the 
amount of new credit extended. By means of a corporate fixed effects estimation 
strategy, we show that banks more exposed to the Tokyo bank tax reduce lending 
to corporates. More precisely, the within-corporate comparison reveals that a 10-
percentage point increase in bank tax exposure, reduces lending by 7.95 
percentage points. 
To finalise the first stage of our empirical analysis, we investigate the 
implications of changes in the lending patterns of banks for corporate level 
investments. When financing frictions are present, a negative shock to the supply 
of external finance will impede corporate investment (Holmström and Tirole 
1997). The effects of such a shock should be more severe for corporates that 
depend on external finance to fund investment opportunities, and for corporates 
that face higher costs in acquiring external finance. Using corporate level data, we 
quantify the extent to which corporate level investment is affected by a reduction 
in credit supplied by banks liable to pay the Tokyo bank tax. We find that a 10-
percentage-point increase in corporate exposure to the bank tax results in a 
reduction in corporate level investment of 0.7 percentage points. This suggests 
that the imposition of the Tokyo bank tax had a relatively modest impact on 
corporate investment.  
The second stage of our empirical analysis focuses on the impact of the 
Tokyo bank tax on corporate financing and related developments in local loan 
                                                        
65 Using bank level data, Banerji et al. (2018) find that the imposition of the Tokyo bank tax results in 
additional costs to banks which hampers their ability to function as financial intermediaries (evidenced by a 
resultant decline in credit supply). 
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markets. Given that our sample comprises large publicly listed corporates, the 
relatively small effect of the Tokyo bank tax on corporate investment may in part 
be attributable to the availability of alternative sources of funding to large 
corporates. Corporates may compensate for any reduction in credit from banks 
affected by the tax through the use of internal cash reserves, issuing equity or 
bonds, or borrowing from other banks. Using our corporate level dataset (which 
we complement with data on corporate equity and bond issuance), we investigate 
the extent to which corporates compensate for any decline in credit by raising 
funds from alternative sources. We find that corporates do not compensate fully 
for the decline in credit by using alternative funding sources, and thus experience 
an overall modest decline in overall funding.  
To finalise the second stage of our empirical analysis, we investigate if 
banks that compete in local loan markets with banks liable to pay the tax increase 
credit to corporates affected by the decline in credit. Exploiting the spatial 
segmentation in local loan markets, we investigate the extent to which regional 
banks that were exempt from the Tokyo bank tax respond by increasing lending to 
affected corporates. Our findings suggest that regional banks that compete in local 
loan markets with banks liable for the bank tax, expand short-term credit supply. 
However, this is insufficient to mitigate the decline in credit to corporates and the 
subsequent decline in corporate investment.  
We undertake a number of additional tests to verify the validity of our main 
findings. In order to check the plausibility of our common trends assumption, we 
perform placebo tests in the pre- and post-shock (tax) periods. We also undertake 
a further test to disentangle credit supply- from demand-side effects by using an 
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alternative method. Specifically, we use a simple ordinary least squares estimation 
and compare the estimates with our original findings. The common trend analysis 
reveals no systematic differences across corporates in the pre- or post-shock 
period, lending strong support to our common trend assumption. Moreover, the 
alternative method approach also produces estimates in line with our main 
findings and supports the assertion that demand-side factors are not driving the 
results.  
The present study is related to prior literature that examines the effects of 
corporate taxation on non-financial corporates. Results emanating from this 
literature suggest that taxation can influence: mergers and acquisitions (Auerbach 
and Reishus 1988); the repatriation of profits (Blouin and Krull 2009; Graham et 
al. 2011); location decisions (Voget 2010; Barrios et al. 2012); and corporate risk-
taking (Ljungqvist et al. 2017). We contribute to this literature via an examination 
of the effects of taxes that are targeted at banks on non-financial corporates. To the 
best of our knowledge, the findings presented in our study are the first to 
document the propagation of bank taxation to the real economy. Specifically, we 
show that an increase in bank taxation is associated with a reduction in bank 
lending leading to a decline in corporate level investment activity.  
We also contribute to a growing literature that investigates changes in bank 
lending to corporates following a regulatory change.66 A number of studies 
investigate the impact of bank capital injections for the real economy. For example, 
                                                        
66 Berger and Roman (2018) provide an extensive review of the literature that explores how bank shocks 
impact the real economy. The burgeoning real effects literature focuses on a wide range of shocks affecting 
bank lending activity, including regulatory shocks (Aiyar et al. 2014; Jiménez et al. 2017), liquidity shocks 
(Khwaja and Mian 2008; Duchin et al. 2010; Cingano et al. 2013), bank capital injections (Giannetti and 
Simonov 2013; Berger and Roman 2017), and shocks to bank assets (Gan 2007; Bottero et al. 2015). The 
literature examines implications of shocks for the geographical (Giannetti and Laeven 2012; De Haas and Van 
Horen 2012; Liberti and Sturgess 2016) and sector specialisation of bank portfolios (De Jonghe et al. 2016).  
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in a cross-country study, Laeven and Valencia (2013) provide evidence that the 
recapitalization of banks has a significantly positive effect on the growth of 
corporates. Giannetti and Simonov (2013) show that the re-capitalisation of 
Japanese banks in the late 1990s led to an increase in bank lending, followed by an 
increase in investments by borrowing corporates. Berger and Roman (2017) 
provide evidence that the purchase of toxic bank assets by the US Treasury (under 
the terms of the Troubled Asset Relief Programme) improved employment 
conditions and reduced the rate of corporate bankruptcies. Gropp et al. (2018) 
investigate the effects of higher capital requirements (by exploiting the 2011 
capital exercise by the European Banking Authority) on bank lending to corporate 
and retail borrowers. The results of the empirical analysis suggest the presence of 
a strong link between bank capital and lending. This is particularly evident for 
corporates that have a high dependence on external finance. Focusing on the 
international transmission of changes in UK banks capital requirements, Aiyar et 
al. (2014) find a substantial impact on the supply of cross-border capital. UK banks 
are found to reduce cross-border credit in particular to other banks. Smolyansky 
(2016) investigates the propagation of changes in corporate income tax rates for a 
sample of US banks. The author finds that banks reallocate credit to small-and 
medium-sized corporates in states that have not undertaken tax changes. Further, 
the credit reallocation of affected banks impacts on local employment. Finally, 
Jiménez et al. (2017) investigate the impact of macro-prudential policy measures 
(introduced in Spain in 2000) on real economic outcomes. The authors provide 
evidence that dynamic loan-loss provisioning smoothes credit cycles, which in turn 
impacts positively on corporate performance.  
Chapter 5 | The Real Effects of Bank Taxation 
144 
 
We augment these aforementioned studies in two ways. First, by using a 
unique shock that emanates from a sudden imposition of a local tax targeted 
exclusively at banks, we adopt a research design that allows us to identify the 
impact of fiscal policy changes affecting banks on real economic outcomes. In 
contrast to Smolyansky (2016) who focuses on the link between ordinary income 
taxation (affecting all corporates including banks), bank lending and the real 
economy, we focus on a tax that is targeted exclusively at banks. This allows us to 
alleviate concerns that a change in income tax impacts both the behaviour of banks 
and corporates simultaneously. Second, by using a sample of large listed 
corporates from various industries (to investigate the lending decisions of banks 
following a tax shock) we can rule out the possibility that our empirical results are 
driven by small bank-dependent borrowers, or by industries where levels of 
investment are particularly sensitive to a contraction in bank credit (Rajan and 
Zingales 1998). Overall, the findings of this study suggest that bank taxation 
impacts corporate level investment via a decline in the availability of credit.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 provides a 
background to the present study. In Section 5.3, we present the first stage of the 
empirical analysis focusing on the impact of bank taxation on credit supply, and 
how this affects the investment activity of borrowing corporates. Section 5.4 
discusses the second stage of our analysis focusing on the compensation behaviour 
of corporates and related developments in local loan markets. Section 5.5 presents 
the results of various robustness tests. Section 5.6 provides a summary. 
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5.2 The Tokyo Bank Tax 
Japanese banks reported large losses for several consecutive years 
following the banking crisis of 1997. This led to a large decline in the tax revenues 
of the Tokyo prefecture.67 To address the decline in tax revenues, the Tokyo 
Government introduced a new tax targeted at banks operating in Tokyo.  
Banks were selected by the Tokyo government based on the amount of 
deposits held (at the end of fiscal year 1999). 26 banks with deposits exceeding ¥5 
trillion and operations in Tokyo (branches or headquarters) were deemed liable to 
pay the Tokyo bank tax.68 The tax was levied on gross profitability (before 
personnel expense, operating expense and loan write-off deductions) weighted by 
the scale of respective presence in the Tokyo prefecture. According to the 
Handbook of Japanese Taxes, the tax amount payable to the Tokyo government is 
calculated based on the ratio of employees in Tokyo relative to the total number of 
domestic employees (Japanese Ministry of Finance, 2006). This ratio varied across 
banks liable to pay the Tokyo bank tax ranging from 0.01 to 0.72. Figure 5.1 
summarizes the variation of this ratio across the 26 banks that were affected by 
the Tokyo bank tax.  
At the time when the tax was introduced, the gross profitability of banks 
was relatively high. However, aggressive loan loss provisioning and loan write-off 
policies led banks to report low net profits (Ota 2001). Thus, higher tax rates on 
net profit were unlikely to yield extra tax revenues. Under the terms of the Tokyo 
bank tax, taxing gross rather than net profits removed the possibility that banks 
                                                        
67 The Tokyo prefecture was highly dependent on the tax revenues generated by the financial sector. In fiscal 
year 1999, Tokyo’s estimated revenue shortfall amounted to ¥700 billion. 
68 The types of banks affected by the Tokyo bank tax include commercial banks (city and regional banks) as 
well as trust and long-term credit banks.  
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could minimise their respective tax exposure by inflating expenses, and thus 
ensured a stable stream of tax revenue for the Tokyo government.  
Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 provides a chronology of key events related to the 
Tokyo bank tax. Key events relevant to this analysis include the date when the tax 
became effective (1st April 2000), as well as the decision of the Tokyo District 
Court to call off the Tokyo bank tax two years later (26th March 2002) on the 
grounds that it violated the right to equal treatment.69 
Figure 5.1 | Individual Bank Exposure to the Tokyo Bank Tax 
                                                        
69 The right to equal treatment (Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution) ensures that firms are treated equally. 
Thus, a tax that affects some firms, but excludes others is deemed unlawful.  
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5.3 Stage 1: Impact of Bank Taxation on Bank Lending and Corporate 
Investment 
In the first stage of our empirical investigation, we exploit the imposition of 
the Tokyo bank tax to identify the impact of taxation on bank lending and 
corporate investment. Section 5.3.1 outlines our empirical strategy. In Section 
5.3.2, we present the data. Section 5.3.3 discusses the findings.  
5.3.1 Empirical Strategy 
Impact of Bank Taxation on Bank Lending  
To identify the impact of local bank taxation on the supply of credit to 
corporate borrowers, we follow Khwaja and Mian (2008) and compare changes in 
credit for each corporate across the 26 banks affected by the Tokyo bank tax.70 
Specifically, we test whether banks with a relatively greater exposure to the Tokyo 
bank tax reduce lending to the same corporate by more than banks less exposed to 
the tax. Here, we use a loan level dataset and exploit the fact that Japanese 
corporates typically hold credit relationships with multiple banks. By focusing on a 
sample of corporates that borrow from multiple banks, corporate specific credit 
demand shocks can be absorbed through introducing corporate fixed effects to the 
following model: 
∆𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝐸𝑋𝑗 + 𝛿𝑋𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗  (5.1) 
where ∆𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗  is the change in credit granted to corporate i by bank j after the 
imposition of the Tokyo bank tax. 𝐵𝐸𝑋𝑗 is the bank’s exposure to the Tokyo bank 
tax, measured as the number of employees based in Tokyo relative to total number 
of employees in fiscal year 1998. The vector of bank specific control variables, 𝑋𝑗, 
                                                        
70 Khwaja and Mian (2008) provide the theoretical and empirical foundations underlying empirical studies on 
the bank lending channel and its impact on the real economy. By exploiting the presence of multiple corporate 
relationships in a loan level dataset, their proposed estimation strategy allows for the control of demand-side 
effects.  
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include: capital-to-assets, return on equity, liquidity-to-assets, bank size and loan 
loss provisions-to-total-loans.  
To capture both changes in credit granted and the likelihood that a new 
loan is granted we employ different credit growth measures. Credit growth is 
defined as the change in the total outstanding credit granted to each corporate in 
the sample between fiscal year 1999 and fiscal year 2001 over total credit 
outstanding in fiscal year 1999 (pre-shock period). We also decompose total credit 
into short-term and long-term components. We also add two additional indicator 
variables, Entry and Exit. Entry takes the value of one if the corporate receives 
credit from a new bank in the second year of the Tokyo bank tax but had no 
outstanding credit from that bank in the year before the imposition of the tax, and 
zero if otherwise. Exit takes the value of one if an existing bank-corporate 
relationship is terminated in the second year of the Tokyo bank tax, and zero 
otherwise. 𝑎𝑖 is the corporate fixed effect that absorbs a credit demand shock 
specific to an individual corporate.  
Impact of Bank Taxation on Corporate Investment  
We extend our empirical analysis and exploit the imposition of the Tokyo 
bank tax to investigate how corporate investment responds to bank taxation. 
Specifically, we examine if corporates that are affected by the tax (via their existing 
relationship with a bank subject to the provisions of the Tokyo bank tax), change 
their investment activity following the imposition of the Tokyo bank tax.  
In order to identify the impact of bank taxation on corporate level 
investment, we follow Cingano et al. (2016) and compare the changes in the 
investment rate across corporates. We classify corporates as affected by the Tokyo 
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bank tax based upon their relative exposure to banks that are liable to pay the tax. 
Corporate exposure is calculated for the fiscal year prior to the introduction of the 
Tokyo bank tax as follows:  
𝐶𝐸𝑋𝑖 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗,1999 ∗ 𝐵𝐸𝑋𝑗,1999𝑗  (5.2) 
where corporate exposure 𝐶𝐸𝑋𝑖  depends upon 𝐵𝐸𝑋𝑗, which is defined as bank 
exposure to the Tokyo bank tax (measured as the number of employees based in 
Tokyo relative to total number of employees). 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the share of credit the 
corporate borrows from each bank relative to total debt (as reported in the 
balance sheet).71 Using 𝐶𝐸𝑋𝑖  as a measure of corporate level exposure to the 
Tokyo bank tax via its borrowing relationships, we estimate the following:  
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (5.3) 
where 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 is the sum of investment flows after the shock, normalised by the start-
of-period assets. Conditional on corporate exposure being exogenous to corporate 
investment decisions, estimates of 𝛽 are used to infer the aggregate influence of 
the tax shock on the capital accumulation of corporates.  
The vector of control variables 𝑋𝑖 includes industry fixed effects to control 
for unobserved industry level heterogeneity in corporate investment behaviour. 
To capture corporate level determinants of credit demand, 𝑋𝑖 also includes a set of 
corporate specific credit demand parameters obtained from estimating corporate 
fixed effects 𝑎𝑖 in Equation (5.1), and a set of proxies for corporate growth 
opportunities (Tobin’s Q defined as market-value-to-book-value of equity, size) 
and frictions to capital accumulation (leverage, liquidity) prior to the imposition of 
                                                        
71 The following example illustrates the calculation of CEX. A corporate borrows a total of ¥100m from three 
banks. ¥30m from bank A, ¥20m from bank B, and ¥50m from bank C so the weights 𝑤𝑖𝑗 are 0.3, 0.2, and 0.5 
respectively. Assuming that the tax exposure (BEX) of bank A is 0.2, bank B is 0, and bank C is 0.6, CEX is then: 
0.3*0.2 + 0.5*0.6 = 0.36. 
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the Tokyo bank tax. At corporate level we include Tobin’s Q, the liquidity (cash-to-
total assets), leverage (debt-to-equity), corporate size (and its quadratic), the 
number of banks that are lending to corporate i, and the corporate’s credit demand 
derived from the estimates of Equation (5.1), along with industry and prefecture 
fixed effects. The various definitions of corporate specific control variables are 
presented in Table 5.1. The financial ratios (liquidity and leverage) are included to 
capture a corporates ability to service debt obligations. Tobin’s Q is included to 
control for corporate profitability and growth opportunities. The quadratic of 
corporate size is included alongside corporate size to control for potential non-
linear effects. The number of bank relationships and the estimated corporate fixed 
effects from Equation (5.1) are included to control for a corporate’s use of multiple 
banking relationships and demand for credit.  
5.3.2 Data  
We obtain loan level data from the Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest database 
for the period fiscal year 1999 to 2002. This period comprises one pre-treatment 
year, two treatment years, and one post-treatment year. The loan level dataset 
comprises detailed annual information on the credit granted to Japanese listed 
corporates by each of their banks. Corporates report total bank debt, which can be 
decomposed into short-term (< one year maturity) and long-term (> one year 
maturity) components.72 We match this loan level dataset with two further 
datasets. This first dataset contains bank level balance sheet, income statement 
items and other attributes (location of bank headquarters). The second dataset 
contains corporate level balance sheet, income statement, and other attributes 
(associated industry and location of corporate headquarters). Finally, we hand-
                                                        
72 The credit reported is actually drawn credit in year t; undrawn credit is not reported. 
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collect data on the number of Tokyo-based employees from the notes of annual 
reports of banks liable for the Tokyo bank tax. 
To obtain the baseline sample, we select all listed non-financial corporates 
and banks for which information on total assets are available for the year prior to 
the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax. Following Khwaja and Mian (2008), we 
restrict the analysis to corporates that borrowed from at least two banks and drop 
all corporates with a single bank relationship.73 This yields a baseline sample of 
2368 non-financial publicly listed corporates active in fiscal year 2000, which 
receive loans from 140 different banks. We observe that corporates on average 
borrow from 7 banks. 26 out of 140 banks in the baseline sample are liable to pay 
the Tokyo bank tax.  
For our analysis of the impact of the Tokyo bank tax on corporate 
investment outcomes, we first use the baseline sample to calculate 𝐶𝐸𝑋𝑖  as in 
Equation (5.2). We then amend the baseline sample by collapsing multiple bank 
relationships to corporate i into a single “average” bank relationship to corporate i. 
To construct this “average” bank, we sum all loans issued to corporate i by each of 
its banks in a given year and take the average of those banks’ characteristics.74 This 
yields a cross-sectional time series dataset with the corporate as the cross-
sectional unit borrowing from a single, synthetically created bank. The sample 
consists of the original 2368 corporates from the baseline sample. In a final step, 
                                                        
73 Multiple banking is very common in Japan. A mere 4.7% of corporates in our sample borrow from a single 
bank in FY1999. For datasets with a large number of corporates with single bank relationships, Degryse et al. 
(2018) suggest including these corporates in the identification of supply shocks. 
74 The following example illustrates the steps used to calculate the “average” bank. A corporate borrows ¥30m 
from bank A, ¥20m from bank B, and ¥50m from bank C in year 200X. To determine the loan amount issued by 
the “average” bank, we simply take the sum of all loans issued to the corporate: ¥30m + ¥20m + ¥50m = 
¥100m. To determine the characteristics of this “average” bank, we take the following steps. Assume that the 
Return-on-Equity (ROE) for bank A is 0.02, for bank B, 0.04, and for bank C, 0.06. The ROE of the “average” 
bank is then the average ROE of bank A, B, and C: (0.02 + 0.04 + 0.06)/3 = 0.04.  
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we add to this dataset the estimates of the corporate fixed effects from the first 
part of our analysis. Table 5.1 provides detailed definitions of both our outcome 
and control variables. Table 5.2 reports summary statistics. In Appendix II we 
provide an overview of the samples used in Stage 1 of our empirical analysis. 
Table 5.1 | Variable Definitions 
Shock  
Pre-shock period  FY 1999 
Shock period  FY 2000 and FY 2001 
Post-shock period FY 2002 
 
Loan level analysis 
 
Definition 
Credit growth Change in credit granted within a bank-corporate pair between 
FY1999 and FY2001 relative to credit measured in pre-shock period 
Short-term credit 
growth 
Change in short-term credit (maturity < 1 year) granted within a 
bank-corporate pair between FY1999 and FY2001 relative to credit 
measured in pre-shock period  
Long-term credit 
growth 
Change in long-term credit (maturity > 1 year) granted within a bank-
corporate pair between FY1999 and FY2001 relative to credit 
measured in pre-shock period  
Entry Dummy variable equals one if corporate has credit granted from bank 
during shock period but not in pre-shock period; zero otherwise.  
Exit Dummy variable equals one if bank-corporate relationships are 
terminated; zero otherwise.  
BEX (Bank exposure) Ratio of the number of employees based in Tokyo relative to total 
number of employees (pre-shock period) 
TAX Dummy variable equals one if a bank (exempt from the Tokyo bank tax) 
is headquartered in the same prefecture in which a bank liable to pay the 
Tokyo bank tax is headquartered; zero otherwise 
Capital to total assets Bank equity capital over total assets (pre-shock period) 
Return on equity  Bank income before income taxes over equity capital (pre-shock period) 
Provisions to total 
loans 
Bank provision for loan losses over total loans and bills discounted (pre-
shock period) 
Liquidity Bank cash and due from banks over total assets (pre-shock period) 
Size Bank total assets (pre-shock period) 
  
Corporate level analysis 
Capital investment 
rate 
Cumulative net investment, obtained as the sum of investment 
expenditure in FY2001, normalised by the value of total assets as of 
FY1999.  
Funds Sum of change in credit granted plus new equity issued plus new 
bonds plus change in cash (between FY1999 and FY2001) over sum of 
credit plus equity plus bonds plus cash (all measured in pre-shock 
period 
  
  
  
  
Chapter 5 | The Real Effects of Bank Taxation 
153 
 
Table 5.1 (continued)  
CEX (Corporate 
exposure) 
Average exposure of corporates to the Tokyo bank tax measured as 
weighted average of Bank Exposure of all banks that are lending to the 
corporate. Weights are bank share of total credit to corporate. 
Credit demand Corporate credit demand is the fixed effects from estimation of Equation 
(5.1)  
Liquidity Corporate cash to total assets (pre-shock period) 
Tobin’s Q Corporate market value to book value (pre-shock period) 
Bank-relationships Number of lenders a corporate borrows from measured in pre-shock 
period 
Leverage Corporate debt to equity (pre-shock period) 
Size Corporate total assets (logarithm) (pre-shock period) 
Table 5.2 | Summary Statistics 
 Mean St. dev. Min Max Obs 
Loan level Dataset      
BEX (Bank Exposure) 0.35 0.27 0 0.71 15830 
TAX 0.22 0.41 0 1 4129 
Credit growth 0.1 0.86 -0.86 7.14 15830 
Short-term credit growth 0.09 0.71 -0.83 5.78 12332 
Long-term credit growth  0.12 1.16 -0.92 9.59 8736 
Exit 0.05 0.22 0 1 17284 
Entry 0.05 0.22 0 1 13826 
Bank Control Variables      
Size 16.6 1.28 13.5 18.18 15830 
Capital 0.05 0.01 0 0.08 15830 
Liquidity 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.08 15830 
Loan loss provisioning 0.03 0.05 0 0.41 15830 
Return on equity 0.02 0.1 -0.71 0.09 15251 
      
Corporate level Dataset      
CEX (Corporate Exposure) 0.24 0.18 0 0.68 2368 
Investment rate 0.18 0.21 -0.08 1.91 2368 
Credit demand -0.07 0.7 -0.86 4.42 2368 
Liquidity 0.12 0.09 0 0.74 2368 
Tobin’s Q 3.94 6.07 0 53.96 2368 
Bank-relationships 18.65 13.6 2 141 2359 
Leverage 4.85 11.21 0.14 81.67 2368 
Size 10.56 1.46 6.19 14.83 2368 
This table presents summary statistics of dependent and independent variables for the sample of 140 banks 
used for the loan level analysis and corporate level analysis. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided 
in Table 5.1. All accounting data are winsorized at the 98% level to reduce the impact of outliers. 
5.3.3 Findings 
Table 5.3 reports the results of estimating Equation (5.1). We find that the 
coefficient on Bank Exposure (𝐵𝐸𝑋𝑗) reported in Column 1 is negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The point estimate of 0.795 in Column 1 
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implies that a 10-percentage-point increase in tax exposure reduces credit growth 
by about 7.95 percentage points during the second year the tax was in place. With 
the average bank supplying approximately ¥274bn of credit to the corporates in 
the sample, this finding translates to a reduction in credit supply of approximately 
¥21.81bn in fiscal year 2001.75 Thus the effect of the tax on credit supply is both 
statistically and economically significant. Columns 2 and 3 report the coefficient on 
𝐵𝐸𝑋𝑗 for short-term and long-term credit growth. The coefficient in Column 3 is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. A 10-percentage-point 
increase in tax exposure reduces long-term credit growth by 9.14 percentage 
points. The coefficient in Column 2 is not statistically significant. These findings 
provide evidence that the Tokyo bank tax impacts on the supply of long-term, but 
not short-term credit. Columns 4 and 5 summarise the effect of bank exposure to 
the tax on corporate’s exiting or entering bank relationships. The coefficients on 
𝐵𝐸𝑋𝑗 are not statistically significant. In other words, we do not find evidence of 
corporates exiting or entering a relationship with banks that are exposed to the 
Tokyo bank tax.  
Column 1 in Panel B of Table 5.3 reports the results of estimating Equation 
(5.3), controlling for a number of factors that could influence corporate level 
investments. The coefficient on 𝐶𝐸𝑋𝑖  in Column 1 is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This suggests that the imposition of the Tokyo bank tax 
has an adverse effect on corporate level investment during the two-year 
enforcement period of the Tokyo bank tax. The effect is also economically 
significant but relatively modest; a ten-percentage point increase in 𝐶𝐸𝑋𝑖  results 
in a reduction in the investment rate of 0.7 percentage points.  
                                                        
75 Expressed in US dollars, this amounts to $2.5bn and $200m respectively 
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Table 5.3 | The Effect of Tax on Credit Growth and Corporate Investment 
Panel A  Credit growth Short-term  Long-term Exit Entry 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bank Exposure -0.795** 
(0.432) 
-0.583 
(0.352) 
-0.914*** 
(0.336) 
0.0903 
(0.269) 
-0.180 
(0.156) 
Corporate FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9608 7134 5596 17284 12906 
Panel B  Investment 
(1) 
 
Corporate Exposure -0.0706** 
(0.0289) 
Corporate Controls Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y 
Prefecture Fixed Effects Y 
Observations  2296 
This table presents the estimates from the first stage of the empirical analysis, which focuses on the impact of 
the Tokyo bank tax on credit supply and corporate investment activity. The sample consists of loan level data 
of 2368 corporate borrowers and 26 banks that were affected by the Tokyo bank tax. Panel A presents 
estimates of Equation (5.1). The dependent variable is the growth in credit (Column 1), short-term credit 
(Column 2) and long-term credit (Column 3) issued by bank j liable to the Tokyo bank tax to corporate i 
between FY 1999 and FY 2001. The dependent variable in Column 4 is an indicator variable that is one if bank-
corporate relationships are terminated between FY 1999 and FY 2001; zero otherwise. The dependent 
variable in Column 5 is a dummy variable that is one for new bank-corporate relationships and zero otherwise 
between FY 1999 and FY 2001. Bank Exposure is measured as the number of employees based in Tokyo 
relative to total number of employees as of FY 1999. Bank specific control variables are capital, return on 
equity, provisions to loans, liquidity, bank size as of FY 1999. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered at the bank level and firm level are reported in parentheses.  The dependent variable in Column 1 of 
Panel B is corporate cumulative net investment in FY 2001 divided by the value of total assets as of FY 1999 
(pre-shock). Corporate Exposure is the average exposure of corporate i to the Tokyo bank tax measured as the 
weighted average of Bank Exposure of all banks that are lending to the corporate. Weights are bank share of 
total credit to corporate i. Control variables are corporate credit demand, corporate size (+ quadratic), 
corporate liquidity, corporate leverage, corporate Tobin’s Q as of FY 1999. Corporate industry and prefecture 
fixed effects are included. All accounting data are winsorized at the 98% level to reduce the impact of outliers. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the main bank level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
*, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
5.4 Stage 2: Impact of Bank Taxation on Corporate Hedging and Local Loan 
Markets 
In the second stage of our analysis, we exploit the imposition of the Tokyo 
bank tax in order to investigate if corporates compensate for the adverse impact 
on funding (arising from the imposition of the Tokyo bank tax) by obtaining 
finance from alternative sources. These sources include: internal cash reserves; 
equity and bonds; and, borrowing from other banks (unaffected by the Tokyo bank 
tax). We complement our analysis with an investigation of the impact of bank 
Chapter 5 | The Real Effects of Bank Taxation 
156 
 
taxation on local loan markets. Exploiting the spatial segmentation of Japanese 
local loan markets, we investigate the extent to which regional banks that were 
exempt from the Tokyo bank tax respond by increasing lending to corporates 
affected by a decline in credit following the imposition of the tax. Our empirical 
strategy is outlined in Section 5.4.1. In Section 5.4.2, we present the data. Section 
5.4.3 discusses the findings. 
5.4.1 Empirical Strategy 
Impact of Taxation on Corporate Hedging 
Our empirical results suggest that a sudden increase in bank taxation leads 
to a decline in lending to existing corporates. The degree to which the decline in 
lending affects corporate level investment depends crucially on the extent to which 
other banks fill any void in credit supply by increasing lending to the corporates 
affected by the decline in lending. We therefore investigate if corporates 
compensate for the reduction in credit by borrowing more from banks that are not 
liable to the Tokyo bank tax. In order to do so, we follow Khwaja and Mian (2008) 
and examine the lending activity of all banks in our sample. We assume that the 
140 banks not liable to the Tokyo bank tax have experienced no other changes in 
their respective tax burdens. 76  In addition, we augment our analysis by 
investigating if corporates compensate for the reduction in loans by issuing new 
equity or bonds, or draw upon internal cash reserves.77 To test the extent of 
substitution, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression: 
∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 (5.4) 
                                                        
76 This assumption is reasonable as Tokyo remained the only prefecture to impose the bank tax. Osaka 
prefecture considered the imposition of a tax similar to the Tokyo bank tax but this was never enacted.  
77 Jimenez et al. (2010) suggest including all available funding sources to gain a complete picture of the credit 
supply shocks.  
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where ∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖  represents the change in credit of corporate i from banks liable to 
pay the Tokyo bank tax and from those banks not liable. We add to the change in 
credit any new equity and bonds issued by the corporate, as well as changes in 
cash reserves. For our statistical inference, we calculate ∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖  as follows: 
∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖 =
∆𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡+∆Equity+ΔBonds+ΔCash
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡1999+𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦1999+𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑1999+𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ1999
 . 𝐶𝐸𝑋𝑖 in Equation (5.4) is the 
loan-size weighted average of a corporate’s exposure to the Tokyo bank tax, 
calculated for the fiscal year prior to the introduction of the tax. The vector of loan-
size weighted averages of bank control variables, 𝑋𝑖, include the: capital-to-assets 
ratio, return on equity, liquidity-to-assets ratio, size (measured by total assets) and 
the ratio of loan loss provisions-to-total loans. We control for corporate level loan 
demand using the estimated corporate fixed effects from Equation (5.1). 𝛽 in 
Equation (5.4) captures the extent to which corporates compensate for the decline 
in loans (from banks affected by the Tokyo bank tax) through a combination of: 
loans from other banks (unaffected by the Tokyo bank tax); funds raised in 
financial markets; and internal cash reserves. A 𝛽-coefficient equal to zero implies 
that corporates fully compensate for any decline in loans using alternative sources 
of finance.  
Impact of Taxation on Local Loan Markets 
A priori, one would expect that corporates reliance on other banks as 
alternative providers of funds should be reflected in an increase of credit supplied 
by those banks. To verify whether banks not liable to pay the Tokyo bank tax 
increase their volume of credit, we also investigate whether there are any spill-
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over effects arising from the introduction of the Tokyo bank tax.78 Specifically, we 
examine whether the imposition of the Tokyo bank tax results in a change in the 
competitive conditions of regional loan markets where affected and unaffected 
banks compete with one another. Imposing a tax on some banks, while exempting 
others may worsen the relative competitive position of affected banks.  
Our identification strategy exploits the fact that loan markets of smaller 
banks in Japan are characterised by spatial segmentation. Until the early 2000s, the 
lending activity of smaller banks was confined largely within the prefecture where 
bank headquarters were located (Kano and Tsutsui 2003; Ishikawa and Tsutsui 
2013).79 Therefore, we hypothesise that unaffected regional banks (competitor 
banks), which compete with at least one affected bank in the same loan market, 
increase lending in response to the tax.80 We do not expect the same spill-over 
effect for unaffected, regional banks that operate in loan markets without the 
presence of banks liable to pay the Tokyo bank tax. We estimate a regression of the 
form: 
∆𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑗 + 𝛿𝑋𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 (5.5) 
where ∆𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗 , is the change in short-term and long-term credit granted to 
corporate i by bank j after the imposition of the Tokyo bank tax. 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑗 is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of one if a bank (exempt from the Tokyo bank tax) is 
headquartered in the same prefecture as a bank liable to pay the Tokyo bank tax is 
headquartered and zero otherwise. The vector of bank specific control variables, 
                                                        
78 Our approach is similar to the study by Haskamp (2018) which investigates the spill-over effects of the 
German bank levy focusing on changes in the loan interest rates charged by local banks. 
79 An amendment of the Bank Law in 2002 lifted restrictions applied to the opening of new branches.   
80 Several banks affected by the Tokyo bank tax are headquartered in other prefectures than the Tokyo 
prefecture.  
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𝑋𝑗, include: capital-to-assets, return on equity, liquidity-to-assets, bank size and 
loan loss provisions-to-total loans. A detailed definition of the variables is provided 
in Table 1. 𝛽 in Equation (5.5) captures the extent to which competitors of banks 
that are liable to pay the Tokyo bank tax increase credit supply to corporates, and 
therefore facilitate the substitution efforts of corporates.  
If competitor banks increase the supply of credit to corporates, then an 
important question is whether these banks expand their overall volume of credit 
or alternatively adjust the composition of their loan portfolios. To provide a clearer 
picture of the spill-over effects emanating from the Tokyo bank tax, we also 
investigate developments in the loan volume of competitor banks. We use a 
difference-in-differences estimation strategy, and estimate a regression of the 
following form:  
∆𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡⏟            
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛽𝑋𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡  (5.6) 
where 𝑗 denotes bank and 𝑡 denotes time. 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡  represents the loan volume 
measured by the logarithm of loans. We also use the ratio of loans to total assets as 
an alternative measure. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑑 is an indicator variable which captures whether 
a regional bank competes in a loan market with a bank affected by the Tokyo bank 
tax or not. The indicator variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  equals one after the Tokyo bank tax is 
introduced and zero otherwise. 𝑋𝑗,𝑡−1 is a vector of bank level control variables 
that vary over time and across banks. Bank control variables include: bank capital, 
return on equity, loan loss provisions to total loans, liquidity and bank size. A 
detailed definition of the variables is provided in Table 5.1. To avoid simultaneity, 
each of these controls enters the model lagged by one period. The model also 
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includes time dummies, 𝛾𝑡, to capture time effects common to all banks, as well as, 
bank specific fixed effects, 𝛼𝑖, to control for unobserved bank level heterogeneity. 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 is a stochastic error term.  
5.4.2 Data 
To investigate if corporates (that experience a decline in credit from the 
banks affected by the Tokyo bank tax) compensate for the decline in bank credit by 
using other sources of funding, we rely on the baseline sample which comprises 
borrowing activity of 2368 corporates from a total of 140 banks. We obtain 
detailed data on equity and bond issuance for those corporates from Thomson 
Reuter. In a final step, we amend the baseline sample following the steps described 
in Section 5.3.2 to obtain a panel dataset with the corporate as the cross-sectional 
unit.  
To investigate if smaller regional banks increase credit supply to 
corporates, we again use the baseline sample comprising loan level data of 2368 
corporates. We amend the sample by excluding all banks that are liable to the 
Tokyo bank tax, and those that are not classified as regional banks. This yields a 
sample of 112 regional banks which were exempt from the Tokyo bank tax. 26 
banks of these 112 banks are competing in local loan markets (as proxied by the 
presence of bank headquarters) with at least one bank liable to pay the Tokyo 
bank tax (as proxied by the presence of bank headquarters). The remaining 86 
banks operate in loan markets without the immediate presence of a bank liable to 
the bank tax. Figure 5.2 shows a map depicting the headquarter locations of banks 
subject to the Tokyo bank tax. We obtain the area code of bank headquarters from 
Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest.  
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Finally, for our analysis of developments in loan volumes of smaller 
regional banks, we obtain semi-annual data on bank balance sheets of the 112 
regional banks from Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest for the period from fiscal year 
1999 to 2001. An extended discussion of the sample construction for Stage 2 of the 
analysis is provided in Appendix II. 
Figure 5.2 | Headquarter Location of Banks Liable to the Tokyo Bank Tax 
 
 
This figure shows a map of 47 prefectures in Japan. Dark-grey shaded areas indicate presence of headquarters 
of both, banks liable to pay the Tokyo bank tax and competitor banks that are exempt from paying the Tokyo 
bank tax. Light-grey shaded areas indicate presence of banks that operate in loan markets without the 
immediate presence (headquarter location) of banks liable to pay the Tokyo bank tax.  
5.4.3 Findings 
Column 1 of Panel A in Table 5.4 reports the estimates of Equation (5.4) for 
the change in credit augmented by the change in newly issued equity, bonds and 
cash in fiscal year 2001. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level 
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and is negative and close to zero. This implies that corporates protect against the 
adverse impact of the Tokyo bank tax by: borrowing more from banks exempt 
from the Tokyo bank tax; increased equity and bond issuance; and drawing upon 
internal cash reserves.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Panel B in Table 5.4 report the estimates of Equation 
(5.5) for the change in short-term and long-term credit. The coefficient in Column 
1 is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that 
competitor banks (exempt from the Tokyo bank tax) which compete in local loan 
markets with banks liable to pay the Tokyo bank tax, on average increase their 
supply of short-term credit to corporates.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Panel C in Table 5.4 report the estimates of Equation 
(5.6) for the change in the loan volume of competitor banks. The coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant at the 10% and 5% level. This implies that 
regional banks which compete in loan markets with affected banks increase their 
loan portfolio relative to their regional counterparts, which are located in 
prefectures without an affected bank headquarter location. When comparing the 
coefficients reported in Panel B with those reported in Panel C, we observe that the 
magnitude of the expansion of the loan portfolio relative to the increase in short-
term credit is lower by a factor of 8. This suggests that competitor banks may 
adjust both, the volume of the loan portfolio as well as its composition in response 
to the Tokyo bank tax.  
Overall, the results of our empirical analysis provide some evidence of 
substitution behaviour on the part of corporates. To some extent, corporates 
compensate for any decline in credit by borrowing more from alternative sources  
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Table 5.4 | The Effect of Tax on Corporate Hedging and Local Loan Markets 
Panel A | Corporate Hedging 
Funds 
(1) 
 
Corporate Exposure 
-0.0482*** 
(0.0170) 
Corporate Credit Demand Y 
Bank Controls Y 
Corporate Industry FE Y 
Corporate Prefecture FE Y 
Observations 2348 
Panel B | Credit Supply  
(Competitor Banks) 
Short-term credit 
(1) 
Long-term credit 
(2) 
TAX 
0.108*** 
(0.037) 
-0.0291 
(0.127) 
Bank Controls Y Y 
Corporate Industry FE Y Y 
Corporate Prefecture FE Y Y 
Observations 2403 1277 
Panel C | Loan Growth  
(Competitor Banks) 
Loan to asset ratio 
(1) 
Loan volume 
(2) 
TAX 
0.0140* 
(0.00786) 
0.0167** 
(0.00730) 
Bank Controls Y Y 
Observations 273 273 
This table presents the estimates of Equation (5.4), (5.5) and (5.6) from Stage 2 of our analysis focusing on the 
impact of the Tokyo bank tax on corporate financing and spill-over effects in local loan markets. The 
dependent variable in Column 1 of Panel A is the growth in credit issued by banks, both liable to and exempt 
from the Tokyo bank tax, plus issuance of new equity, bonds and change in cash reserves of a corporate 
between FY 1999 and FY 2001. Corporate Exposure is the average exposure of corporate i to the Tokyo bank 
tax measured as the weighted average of Bank Exposure of all banks that are lending to the corporate. Weights 
are bank share of total credit to corporate i. Bank specific control variables are loan-size weighted averages of 
bank capital, return on equity, provisions to loans, liquidity, bank size as of FY 1999. Heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors clustered at the main bank level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in 
Column 1 (2) of Panel B is the growth in short-term (long-term) credit issued by banks exempt from the Tokyo 
bank tax. TAX is a dummy variable which equals one if a bank (exempt from the Tokyo bank tax) is 
headquartered in the same prefecture in which a bank liable to pay the Tokyo bank tax is headquartered; and 
zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in 
parentheses. The dependent variable in Column 1 of Panel C is the change in the loans-to-total-assets ratio; the 
dependent variable in Column 2, is the change in total loans (logarithm). TAX is a dummy variable which 
equals one if a bank (exempt from the Tokyo bank tax) is headquartered in the same prefecture in which a 
bank liable to pay the Tokyo bank tax is headquartered; zero otherwise. All accounting data are winsorized at 
the 98% level to reduce the impact of outliers. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the bank 
level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively 
of funding including capital markets and other banks exempt from the Tokyo bank 
tax. We observe that competitor banks assist corporates in their substitution 
efforts. However, the credit supplied is insufficient to allow corporates to fully 
compensate for the reduction in credit supplied by bank affected by the Tokyo 
bank tax.  
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5.5 Robustness of Main Findings 
This section presents the results of a set of robustness tests. These 
comprise: placebo tests to test the common trend assumption and tests to 
disentangle credit supply- from demand-side effects using an alternative 
estimation method.  
5.5.1 Common Trend Analysis 
In this section, we present the results of several tests conducted at bank and 
borrower level, in order to provide corroborating evidence in support of our main 
findings from Stage 1 and 2 of our empirical analysis. To test pre- and post-shock 
trends we assume falsely that the Tokyo bank tax was imposed in FY 1999 and FY 
2001 and introduce a placebo tax for these fiscal years. 
First, we execute a test to ensure that Corporate Exposure is not correlated 
with credit growth across corporates before and after the Tokyo bank tax. Credit 
growth is measured on a year-by-year basis normalised by the stock of credit 
outstanding in fiscal year 1999. Columns 1 and 4 in Panel A of Table 5.5 report the 
coefficients for the period pre- and the post-imposition of the Tokyo bank tax 
period. The coefficients for these years are not statistically significant. This 
suggests that there are no systematic differences in the growth of credit to 
corporates with differential exposure to banks liable to pay the Tokyo bank tax.  
Second, we repeat the common trend analysis for corporate investment. 
The yearly investment rate is measured as the cumulative net investment divided 
by the value of total assets as of fiscal year 1999. The results are reported in Table 
5.5 Panel B. The coefficients in Column 1 are not statistically significant suggesting 
that there are no systematic differences in investment behaviour of corporates
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Table 5.5 | Common Trend Analysis 
Panel A | Credit Growth 
FY 1999  
(pre-shock) 
FY 2000 FY 2001 
FY 2002  
(post-shock) 
Corporate Exposure 
-0.382 
(0.230) 
-0.244** 
(0.0953) 
-0.324* 
(0.190) 
-0.658 
(0.394) 
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y 
Prefecture FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2035 2035 2035 2035 
Panel B | Investment  
FY 1999  
(pre-shock) 
FY 2000 FY 2001 
FY 2002  
(post-shock) 
Corporate Exposure 
-0.0290 
(0.0186) 
-0.0543** 
(0.0272) 
-0.0706** 
(0.0289) 
-0.0682* 
(0.0402) 
Corporate Controls Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y 
Prefecture FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2354 2357 2296 1939 
Panel C | Credit Growth 
(Competitor Banks) 
FY 1999  
(pre-shock) 
FY 2000 FY 2001 
FY 2002  
(post-shock) 
TAX 
0.00007  
(0.0226) 
-0.0574** 
(0.0365) 
-0.015** 
(0.0517) 
0.0523  
(0.0339) 
Bank Controls Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y 
Prefecture FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 3738 3558 3041 2277 
This table presents the results from the trend analysis of pre- and post-shock trends. To test pre- and post-
shock trends we falsely assume that the Tokyo bank tax was imposed in FY 1999 and FY 2002 and introduce a 
placebo tax for these fiscal years. The dependent variable in Columns 1-4 in Panel A is the difference between 
the stock of credit at the beginning and end of the indicated year normalised by the stock of credit in FY 1999. 
This sample is restricted to corporates exposed to banks liable to the Tokyo bank tax. Bank specific control 
variables are loan-size weighted averages of bank capital, return on equity, provisions to loans, liquidity, bank 
size as of FY1999. Corporate industry and prefecture fixed effects are included. Heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors clustered at the main bank level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in 
Columns 1-4 in Panel B is the cumulative net investment in indicated year divided by the value of total assets 
as of FY 1999. Corporate Exposure is the average exposure of corporate i to the Tokyo bank tax measured as 
the weighted average of Bank Exposure of all banks that are lending to the corporate. Weights are bank share 
of total credit to corporate i. Corporate specific control variables are size, credit demand, Tobin’s Q, leverage, 
cash, bank-relationships as of FY1998. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the main bank 
level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in Columns 1-4 in Panel C is the short-term credit 
growth. This sample is restricted to bank that were exempt from the Tokyo bank tax. TAX is a dummy variable 
which equals one if a bank (exempt from the Tokyo bank tax) is headquartered in the same prefecture in 
which a bank liable to pay the Tokyo bank tax is headquartered; zero otherwise. All accounting data are 
winsorized at the 98% level to reduce the impact of outliers. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively. 
with differential exposure to banks liable to pay the Tokyo bank tax. The 
coefficient in Column 4 is statistically significant, suggesting a sustained impact of 
the Tokyo bank tax on corporate investment beyond the two-year period during 
which the tax was operational.  
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Finally, we perform the common trend analysis of short-term credit growth 
using the sample of 112 banks that were exempt from the Tokyo bank tax. The 
results are reported in Table 5.5 Panel C. The coefficients in Columns 1 and 4 are 
not statistically significant. This confirms that the credit supply of banks in local 
loan markets follows a common trend in the pre-tax and post-tax period.  
5.5.2 Loan Supply versus Demand Effects  
One possible identification limitation of testing whether the Tokyo bank tax 
affects bank lending is that, in principle, economic conditions unrelated to the 
Tokyo bank tax could impact bank credit supply. For example, suppose an adverse 
change in economic conditions renders investments less profitable for corporates. 
The subsequent decline in corporate loans leads to a reduction in bank lending 
(which is not related to the imposition of the tax).  
To mitigate concerns that economic effects unrelated to the Tokyo bank tax 
are biasing our results, we use a simple strategy proposed by Jiménez et al. (2010). 
Following Jiménez et al. (2010), we first estimate Equation (5.1) using an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) instead of a corporate fixed effects estimation procedure. In 
contrast to the corporate fixed effects estimation, the OLS estimation procedure 
does not absorb corporate specific credit demand. Thus, if banks affected by the 
Tokyo bank tax are more likely to reduce lending to corporates that 
simultaneously receive a negative shock to credit demand, then the estimated 𝛽-
coefficient from the OLS estimation would be biased and different from the 
estimated 𝛽-coefficient using corporate fixed effects.81 In a second step, we 
therefore compare the estimated  𝛽 -coefficients from the two estimation 
                                                        
81 For a more detailed discussion of the methodology see Jimenez et al. (2010) on page 7-9 
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procedures. As long as the estimated 𝛽-coefficients are similar, we can interpret 
credit demand shocks during our sample period to be largely uncorrelated with 
the credit supply shock driven by the Tokyo bank tax. In other words, demand 
shocks are unlikely to drive our results.  
Column 1 in Panel B of Table 6 reports the coefficients for the model with 
corporate characteristics for fiscal year 2001. Importantly, the coefficient is very 
similar to the coefficient in the fixed effects model, and so supports our 
interpretation that loan supply effects are driving the results.  
Table 5.6 | Robustness Checks 
Baseline   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Bank Exposure 
 
-0.795* 
(0.432) 
-0.583 
(0.352) 
-0.914** 
(0.336) 
OLS   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Bank Exposure 
 
-0.826* 
(0.430) 
-0.590* 
(0.332) 
-0.842** 
(0.354) 
Bank Controls Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Prefecture Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Observations  9608 7134 5596 
This table presents the estimates of the robustness test introduced in Section 5.5.2. The table presents the OLS 
estimates of Equation (5.1). The dependent variable in Columns 1, 2 and 3 is growth in credit, short-term 
credit and long-term credit issued by bank j to corporate i between FY 1999 and FY 2001. Bank Exposure is 
measured as the number of employees based in Tokyo relative to total number of employees as of FY 1999. 
Bank specific control variables are capital, return on equity, provisions to loans, liquidity, bank size 
relationship as of FY 1999. Corporate industry and prefecture fixed effects are included. All accounting data 
are winsorized at the 98% level to reduce the impact of outliers. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively. 
5.6 Summary 
Bank taxes are likely to affect bank behaviour, which in turn is likely to 
affect funding conditions facing corporates and resultant investment decisions that 
over time can impact the real economy. Exploiting the Tokyo bank tax shock and a 
unique loan level dataset, we investigate the economic impact of bank taxation on 
bank lending activity and corporate level investment. By means of a corporate 
fixed effects estimation strategy (which accounts for any changes in corporate 
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specific loan demand), we show that an increase in bank exposure to the Tokyo 
bank tax leads to a reduction in the supply of credit. In other words, banks affected 
by the Tokyo bank tax pass on the increased costs arising from the imposition of 
the tax to their respective borrowing corporates. 
Using corporate level data, we find that the reduction in bank lending 
impacts on corporate level investment. The effect however is relatively modest, 
reflecting the ability of corporates to compensate for the decline in credit via the 
increased use of internal cash reserves and funds from other banks and capital 
markets (via increased equity and bond issuance). While rival banks that are 
unaffected by the Tokyo bank tax assist corporates in their substitution effort, the 
additional credit provided is not sufficient to alleviate entirely the adverse impact 
of the tax on corporate investment.  
The negative impact of bank taxes on corporate investment has important 
implications for the efficacy of tax policy given that reduced corporate investment 
is likely to have consequences for production, labour and ultimately economic 
growth. In light of the increasing reforms to bank taxation worldwide, our study 
makes an important contribution to the debate on the relative merits of taxing 
banks and sheds further light on the importance of banks for the real economy.  
 169 
 
Chapter 6 | Conclusion 
Large-scale taxpayer funded interventions to mitigate the effects of the 
global financial crisis, and the resultant rise in public debt prompted major 
reforms to the regulation and supervision of banks. New capital and liquidity 
regulations have been accompanied by the introduction of taxes targeted 
specifically at banks.  Such taxes aim to discourage excessive bank risk-taking, 
curtail excessive rent extraction, and allow governments to recoup the costs of tax 
payer funded interventions and build resolution funds to tackle future episodes of 
instability in the banking industry.  
This thesis investigates the implications of a tax on the gross profitability of 
banks for financial intermediation, bank liquidity creation and the real economy. 
As financial intermediaries, banks serve as a middleman between savers and 
borrowers, meet deposit and credit demands, monitor borrowers on behalf of 
savers, and create liquidity. Understanding whether and how taxation impacts on 
bank behaviour is important given the critical role that banks play within the 
financial system and wider economy. In this thesis, we investigate: how sensitive 
banks are to changes in taxation; whether taxes impact on key functions 
performed by banks; the underlying mechanism through which taxation affects 
bank behaviour; and how changes in bank behaviour impact on the funding 
environment facing corporates and by extension the likely impact on real 
economic outcomes. 
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Identifying a suitable exogenous shock to bank taxation is a significant 
challenge given that changes to bank taxation are announced typically well in 
advance of imposition and often occur alongside other policy reforms. We address 
this challenge using a quasi-natural experimental research design to investigate 
how the unexpected imposition of a special tax on the gross profitability of banks 
in Tokyo influenced the lending, deposit taking, pricing, monitoring and liquidity 
creation of Japanese commercial banks. Using this differential tax treatment to 
overcome identification concerns, we investigate whether there is a causal link 
from tax to bank behaviour and real economic outcomes. Our findings are as 
follows. In Chapter 3, we show that banks are sensitive to changes in taxation. This 
is evidenced by observed changes in the quantity and pricing of financial services, 
and the effort devoted to monitoring borrowers in response to a tax on the gross 
profitability of banks. Specifically, banks increase net interest and net interest and 
fee margins. A decomposition of the margin reveals that both the interest rates 
paid to depositors and charged to borrowers decline. This implies a pronounced 
pass-through effect from banks to depositors. Further analysis shows that banks 
subject to the tax experience a decrease in interest rate-sensitive deposits and 
reduce total lending. Furthermore, banks reduce monitoring costs via the 
rebalancing of respective loan portfolios toward borrowers that are geographically 
proximate, more transparent or hold more assets that can be readily used as 
collateral.  
Chapter 4 sheds further light on the tax sensitivity of banks by presenting 
evidence that banks create less liquidity following a tax on gross profitability. The 
observed reduction in liquidity created is driven by a decline in the amount of 
illiquid bank assets. We identify only a marginal effect of tax on liquidity created on 
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the liability-side of the balance sheet, and no effect of tax on liquidity created off-
balance sheet. Better capitalised banks and banks that devote more resources to 
the monitoring of borrowers decrease liquidity creation by less than counterparts 
in response to the tax.   
The results of the empirical investigation conducted in Chapter 5 suggest 
that a tax on gross profitability which impacts on bank lending also has 
implications for the investment activity of corporates. Consistent with the view 
that bank loans cannot be easily substituted with other financing sources, the 
investment activity of corporates borrowing from affected banks declines. This 
effect however is relatively mild, reflecting the ability of large publicly listed 
corporates to compensate for the decline in credit supply via funding from capital 
markets. In order to assist corporates in mitigating the effects of a decline in bank 
funding, banks not affected by the tax increase lending. However, the additional 
credit provided by banks unaffected by the tax is not sufficient to alleviate 
completely the decline in corporate investment resulting from the decline in 
funding provided by banks affected by the tax. 
Overall, the findings presented in this thesis make a valuable contribution 
to the understanding of how banks, in their key role as financial intermediaries 
respond to taxes. Using an innovative quasi-natural experimental research design, 
we establish a causal link between bank taxation and bank behaviour. We also 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the underlying mechanism and impact of the 
Tokyo bank tax as a representative of a margin-based tax. Our study on a margin-
based tax scheme fills an important void in the literature on bank taxation which 
has to date focused almost exclusively on risk-based and transaction-based taxes. 
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We also present the first empirical evidence of a link between bank taxation and 
bank monitoring effort.  
The results presented in this thesis generate important implications for 
policy makers engaged in monitoring the effectiveness of tax regimes in the 
banking industry. Bank taxes are increasingly seen as a viable instrument to 
augment enhanced capital and liquidity regulations. Unlike regulatory measures 
which typically restrict or mandate certain activities, bank taxes work via 
incentives and therefore require less micro-managing of banks. More than a 
decade since the onset of the global financial crisis, bank taxes have become a 
permanent feature of many banking industries alongside other forms of bank 
regulation. Tax schemes which aim to reduce excessive risk-taking of banks proved 
particularly popular. More recently, we have also witnessed the emergence of 
margin-based tax schemes that aim at curbing the excessive profits of banks. This 
thesis sheds some light on banks’ behavioural responses to this type of taxes and 
the likely distortions that come with it. It provides guidance for policy makers on 
whether tax policy weakens or strengthens banks and also discusses likely 
interactions with other regulatory measures such as capital and liquidity 
requirements.  
Our findings presented in Chapter 3 and 5 underscore the importance of a 
careful design of bank taxation. The pass-through of the tax burden from banks to 
bank customers has implications for the cost and availability of credit to 
borrowers, and their resultant investment activity, as well as the interest rates 
paid to depositors. The substantial pass-through highlights another important 
issue. A tax that is not borne by the owners of the bank is likely to be inconsistent 
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with the request of the G-20 for a fair and substantial contribution of the banking 
sector. Policy makers would be well advised to find ways that limit the pass-
through of tax cost onto bank customers. Furthermore, the findings presented in 
Chapter 4 confirm a link between bank taxation and liquidity creation. In light of 
recently introduced bank liquidity regulations (including the Basel Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio), our results underscore the importance of considering the 
interaction of bank taxation and liquidity regulation when introducing new tax 
schemes for banks.  
Based on the empirical analyses presented in this thesis, several 
shortcomings of this thesis can be identified. The first shortcoming is related to the 
use of the Tokyo bank tax as a quasi-natural experiment. Overall, the Tokyo bank 
tax qualifies as a suitable quasi-natural experimental design given the size, 
suddenness and unexpected nature of its imposition. Moreover, banks were 
assigned on observable characteristics, and the tax (shock) occurred in isolation 
from other policy reforms and government interventions to the banking industry. 
There are however two drawbacks of the Tokyo bank tax. The first is related to the 
fact that the tax was effective for a period of approximately two years. Such a short 
period of enforcement precludes an analysis of the long-term effects of the tax on 
bank behaviour. For instance, a longer period of enforcement would have provided 
an opportunity to investigate whether taxes affect location decisions, and whether 
banks affected by the tax relocated from the high-tax rate Tokyo prefecture to 
another prefecture. Another drawback is related to the legal actions that were 
taken against the Tokyo government shortly after the Tokyo bank tax became 
effective. It is plausible to assume that banks may have corrected their behaviour 
in anticipation of an early withdrawal of the bank tax. Such anticipatory 
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adjustments could undermine the statistical significance of some of our estimation 
coefficients. Unfortunately, we have no credible way of assessing whether any such 
adjustments did take place.   
There are also a number of limitations related to the data used in our 
analyses. The lack of panel data at a higher frequency than semi-annual or annual 
poses limitations to uncovering the effect of the Tokyo bank tax. Data at a monthly 
or quarterly frequency would have provided opportunities for a more nuanced 
analysis and allowed us to capture more precisely any changes in bank behaviour 
in response to taxation. For instance, we could identify if changes in bank 
behaviour are different in the specific months in which tax payments are made to 
the Tokyo government. Furthermore, the use of bank level data poses limitations 
to uncovering changes in bank lending in response to taxation. While we are able 
to capture heterogeneity, the use of bank level data fails to mitigate concerns that 
demand-side effects are driving our results. We address this limitation in Chapter 5 
by using individual loan level data (which allows us to isolate potential demand-
side effects). However, this loan level dataset is limited to a sample of large, 
publicly listed corporates which report their outstanding loans with individual 
banks. As a consequence, we are unable to investigate any changes in bank lending 
to households or small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). As is the case in the 
vast majority of advanced industrialised economies, SMEs play a pivotal role in the 
Japanese economy, and thus a study which investigates the impact of bank taxation 
on funding conditions facing SMEs would fill a significant void in the current 
academic and policy evidence base. 
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 Overall, recent years have seen significant advances in our understanding 
of the design and impact of bank taxation schemes. A number of studies have 
generated evidence that provides important insights for policy makers tasked with 
designing and implementing risk- and transaction-based bank taxation schemes. 
However, there remains a paucity of studies that examine the effects of margin-
based tax schemes on bank behaviour. While this thesis addresses this void to 
some extent, it would be fruitful for future research to examine how margin-based 
taxes impact bank behaviour in geographies beyond Japan. The recent imposition 
of margin-based taxes in the UK in 2016 and Norway in 2017 are likely to provide 
promising avenues for further research. It may also be valuable to look at franchise 
tax schemes as applied in some US state. As for research directions, we would 
suggest to extent the research avenues taken in this thesis. For instance, it would 
be of interest to the academic community and policy makers to gain further 
insights into the impact of bank taxes in an international context. Given the 
unilateral approach to the design and imposition of bank taxes, there are likely 
ample opportunities for tax arbitrage. Research would be of value that investigates 
the extent to which cross-border pass-through effects exist and whether taxes 
directed at banks impact on domestic or non-domestic economies differently.   
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Appendices 
Appendix I 
This appendix provides the proofs of our theoretical model presented in Section 
3.3.1 of Chapter 3.  
 
Hypothesis 1 
To derive Hypothesis 1 and 2, we rely on the following two equations:  
[
(1−𝛼)𝑓(𝐿∗)+𝑝∗𝑐
(1− 𝑝∗)
− {𝑟𝑑 − 𝑟𝑓(1 − 𝛽)}
1
1+𝜃
(𝑤0 −
𝑤1
𝑟𝑑
) − 𝑟𝑓𝐿
∗] (1 − 𝜏) − ℎ(𝑝∗) = 0, 
and 𝐷∗ =
1
1+𝜃
(𝑤0 −
𝑤1
𝑟𝑑
). 
The first equation is the competitive bank’s break-even condition reported 
in Equation (3.9) in Section 3.3.1, while the second is the depositor’s optimal level 
of deposits. The first equation implicitly defines the deposit rate as a function of 
taxes and can be rewritten as: 
[
(1−𝛼)𝑓(𝐿∗)+𝑝∗𝑐
(1− 𝑝∗)
− 𝑟𝑓𝐿
∗] −
ℎ(𝑝∗)
(1− 𝜏)
= {𝑟𝑑 − 𝑟𝑓(1 − 𝛽)}
1
1+𝜃
(𝑤0 −
𝑤1
𝑟𝑑
).  
By using the envelope theorem and implicitly differentiating the zero-profit 
condition with respect to 𝜏, we get:  
 
𝑑𝑟𝑑
𝑑𝜏
= −
ℎ(𝑝)
(1−𝜏)2
1
1+𝜃
[(𝑤0−
𝑤1
𝑟𝑑
)+{𝑟𝑑−𝑟𝑓(1−𝛽)}
𝑤1
(𝑟𝑑)
2]
< 0.  
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Hypothesis 2 
The proof follows by implicitly differentiating 𝐷∗ =
1
1+𝜃
(𝑤0 −
𝑤1
𝑟𝑑
), which gives rise 
to the following expression: 
𝑑𝐷∗
𝑑𝜏
= (
1
(1+𝜃)𝑟𝑑
)
2
𝑤1
𝑑𝑟𝑑
𝑑𝜏
< 0, with 
𝑑𝑟𝑑
𝑑𝜏
< 0 as shown in Hypothesis 1.  
 
Hypothesis 3 and 6 
To derive Hypothesis 3 and 6, we use the first-order conditions given by (A-1) and 
(A-2)  
𝑟𝑓 = 
𝑝(1−𝛼)𝑓/(𝐿)
(1−𝑝)
  (A-1)  
ℎ/(𝑝) =
[(1−𝛼)𝑓(𝐿)+𝑐](1−𝜏)
(1−𝑝)2
 (A-2) 
Differentiating these two equations with respect to the tax, we get a system of 
simultaneous non-linear equations:  
𝑝
1−𝑝
(1 − 𝛼)𝑓//(𝐿)
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝜏
+
 (1−𝛼)𝑓/(𝐿)
(1−𝑝)2
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝜏
= 0  
 (1−𝛼)𝑓/(𝐿)
(1−𝑝)2
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝜏
+ [
[(1−𝛼)𝑓(𝐿)+𝑐]2
(1−𝑝)3
−
ℎ//(𝑝)
1−𝜏
 ]
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝜏
= 
[(1−𝛼)𝑓(𝐿)+𝑐]
(1−𝑝)2(1−𝜏)
  
We simplify both equations by using the first order condition, 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)𝑓/(𝐿) =
 𝑟𝑓(1 − 𝑝) and the incentive constraint 𝐿 = 𝑝 
(1−𝛼)𝑓(𝐿)+𝑐
(1− 𝑝)
:  
(1 − 𝑝)𝑟𝑓𝑎
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝜏
+
 𝑟𝑓
𝑝
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝜏
= 0 (A-3) 
 𝑟𝑓
𝑝
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝜏
 +  [
[(1−𝛼)𝑓(𝐿)+𝑐]2
(1−𝑝)2
−
ℎ//(𝑝)(1−𝑝)
1−𝜏
 ]
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝜏
=
𝑅𝐿
𝑝(1−𝑝)(1−𝜏)
, (A-4)  
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where 𝑎 =
𝑓//(𝐿)
𝑓/(𝐿)
< 0 
By using Cramer’s rule and the implicit function theorem, we get:  
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝜏
= −
𝑅𝐿
𝑝2(1−𝑝)(1−𝜏)∆
𝑟𝑓 < 0   (Hypothesis 3)  
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝜏
= −
𝑅𝐿
𝑝(1−𝜏)∆
𝑎𝑟𝑓 < 0   (Hypothesis 6).  
It must be noted that ∆ ≡  𝜋𝑝𝑝
𝑏 (𝑝, 𝐿) − 𝜋𝑝𝐿
𝑏 𝜋𝐿𝑝
𝑏 > 0 due to concavity of the objective 
function implied by the second order condition of the optimization.  
A sufficient condition for concavity of the objective condition is as follows:  
𝜋𝐿𝐿
𝑏 (𝑝, 𝐿) < 0, 𝜋𝑝𝑝
𝑏 (𝑝, 𝐿) < 0 and 𝜋𝐿𝐿
𝑏 (𝑝, 𝐿) 𝜋𝑝𝑝
𝑏 (𝑝, 𝐿) − 𝜋𝑝𝐿
𝑏 𝜋𝐿𝑝
𝑏 > 0, 
where subscripts refer to the partial derivatives with respect to the relevant 
variables.82  
In our model, these conditions are:  
𝜋𝐿𝐿
𝑏 (𝑝, 𝐿) = 𝑝
(1−𝛼)𝑓//(𝐿)
1−𝑝
= 𝑟𝑓𝑎 < 0 where 𝑎 = −
𝑓//(𝐿)
𝑓/(𝐿)
 
𝜋𝑝𝑝
𝑏 (𝑝, 𝐿) =  
[(1−𝛼)𝑓(𝐿)+𝑐]2
(1−𝑝)3
−
ℎ//(𝑝)(1−𝑝)
(1−𝜏) 
≡ 𝐺(𝑝) < 0  
𝜋𝐿𝑝
𝑏 =
𝑟𝑓
𝑝(1−𝑝)
= −𝜋𝑝𝐿
𝑏 =
𝑟𝑓
𝑝(1−𝑝)
 and 
∆ ≡ 𝜋𝑝𝑝
𝑏 (𝑝, 𝐿) − 𝜋𝑝𝐿
𝑏 𝜋𝐿𝑝
𝑏 = (1 − 𝑝)𝑟𝑓𝑎𝐺(𝑝) − (
𝑟𝑓
𝑝(1−𝑝)
)2 > 0.  
  
                                                        
82 For example: 𝜋𝐿𝐿
𝑏 (𝑝, 𝐿) =
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝑏(𝑝,𝐿)
𝜕𝐿
. 
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Appendix II 
This appendix provides the overview of samples used in Stage 1 and 2 in Chapter 5.  
Table (A1) | Samples used in Stage 1 and 2 in Chapter 5 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 
Outcome variable Credit supply Corporate investment Corporate funds Credit supply  
(competitor banks) 
Loan Volume 
(competitor banks) 
Level/Cross.Unit Loan  
(issued by bank j to 
corporate i) 
Corporate  Corporate  Loan  
(issued by bank j to 
corporate i) 
Bank  
No. corporates/banks  2368 corporates 
26 banks (liable to the 
Tokyo bank tax) 
2368 corporates 2368 corporates  
140 banks 
(of which 26 liable to the 
Tokyo bank tax, 114 exempt 
from the Tokyo bank tax) 
2368 corporates 
112 banks (exempt from 
Tokyo bank tax, bank type: 
regional) 
(of which 26 banks compete 
in local loan markets where 
the headquarter of at least 
one bank liable to the Tokyo 
bank tax is located) 
112 banks (exempt from 
Tokyo bank tax, bank type: 
regional) 
(of which 26 banks compete 
in local loan markets where 
the headquarter of at least 
one bank liable to the Tokyo 
bank tax is located) 
Composition Unbalanced Unbalanced Unbalanced Unbalanced Unbalanced 
Merged with Bank balance sheet, income 
statement, attributes 
Corporate balance sheet, 
income statement, 
attributes 
n.a. Corporate equity and bond 
issuance 
Bank area code Bank area code 
Selection criteria/ 
Amendments 
Drop if corporate asset/ 
bank asset not present in FY 
1999 
Number of bank 
relationships: >1 
Aggregate data on loans to 
each corporate 
Create single “average” bank 
(see Section 3.2 for details) 
Expand baseline sample by 
including banks exempt 
from Tokyo bank tax 
Aggregate data on loans to 
each corporate 
Create single “average” bank 
(see Section 3.2 for details) 
Exclude banks liable to the 
Tokyo bank tax 
Exclude banks liable to the 
Tokyo bank tax 
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